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Sylvia Rolloff 
Dissertation Abstract 
Explanatory Models in Behavioral Endocrinology 
 
The historical development of explanatory models in the field of behavioral 
endocrinology, the study of hormones and their effects upon body and behavior, 
exemplifies both the philosophical account of scientific explanation by unification and 
mechanism.  However, an examination of the reasoning behind the proposal and adoption 
of these models demonstrates that neither philosophical account can fully explain the 
development of the field.  
 
Specifically, the development of the field is due to “crucial resolutions,” resolutions of 
conceptual problems proffered and accepted in advance of unambiguous empirical 
evidence.  Crucial resolutions decide between one or more elaborated hypotheses – 
hypotheses that can explain some (but not all) of the empirical data.  While both the 
unification and mechanistic accounts can explain aspects of the adoption and 
development of the field, neither can account for the logic of discovery behind crucial 
resolutions.   
 
The first chapter is a historical introduction to the early development of the field, 
focusing on the importance of the explanatory promise of hormones.  Those chemical 
substances (‘hormones’) thought to be responsible for male and female developmental 
endpoints were gendered from the outset, and remain so to the present.  From an initial, 
heuristic definition, hormones came to be defined as members of a specific chemical 
class. 
 
The second chapter is an introduction to crucial resolutions in general, and an exploration 
of one resolution in particular: whether mammalian sexual development requires one 
hormone or two.  The crucial resolution of this debate – that of the freemartin problem – 
determined the conceptual landscape for the future of the field. 
 
 ii 
The third chapter begins with a discussion of the philosophical debates concerning the 
possibility of a logic of scientific discovery.  I demonstrate that, rather than being 
capricious, the process of discovery behind the formulation of elaborated hypotheses and 
the crucial resolutions that decide between them are founded on good reasons.  This logic 
of discovery influenced the experimental confirmation of the crucial resolution, and not 
simply in terms of the initial questions investigated.  I address this in the second half of 
this chapter. 
 
After the question about the relative importance of male and female hormones for 
physiological development was resolved, the next general research program was to 
determine the etiology of sexual behavior.  The general question addressed was whether 
mammals are inherently capable of demonstrating behavior typical of either sex, or if 
there is an “inequality of potential.”  The fourth chapter elucidates the arguments in 
support of the former claim, and provides historical background of the lines of thought 
leading to the triumph of the latter. 
 
The fifth chapter details the research leading to the adoption of the dominant model of 
psychosexual development within the field of behavioral endocrinology: the 
organization/activation model, wherein prenatal gonadal hormone exposure permanently 
organizes the brain as either masculine or feminine.  Hormones secreted in adulthood 
“activate” the previously organized tissues to induce masculine or feminine behavior.  
The scientific community initially adopted this model in part, because it promised to 
unite a wide range of phenomena under one explanatory model. 
 
The organization/activation model was adopted by the scientific community with 
astonishing rapidity, not just because of its unificatory appeal, but because it provides a 
crucial resolution to an outstanding etiological mystery: that of homosexuality.  
According to the model, abnormal prenatal gonadal hormone exposure results in a brain 
whose “gender” is at odds with a phenotypically normal body.  Chapter six presents the 
early, unsatisfactory hypotheses, both endocrinological and psychological, of the etiology 
of homosexuality, and how the organization/activation model appeared to provide a 
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satisfactory solution.  Although, when first proposed, the model had no empirical 
evidence in support of its theory of human (male) homosexuality, it inspired a research 
program dedicated to uncover neurological gender atypicality. 
 
The organization/activation model purports to explain the development of both normal 
and deviant types by reference to a single causal mechanism. The structure of explanation 
is as follows: the model plus one set of initial conditions yields a normal individual; the 
model plus another set yields a deviant individual of type T.  This general explanatory 
model serves to explain not just normal physical and behavioral development (including 
sex differences in aggression and cognitive abilities), but also the emergence of 
homosexuality, transsexualism, and gender-atypical behavior correlated with endocrine 
abnormalities.  As such, it appears to be an example of what Kitcher calls “explanation 
by unification.”  This is the topic of the seventh chapter. 
 
In the eight chapter, I demonstrate how behavioral endocrinology fulfills the criteria for 
mechanistic explanatory models.  As is the case in other areas of science, many 
endocrinologists explicitly describe their work as the search for underlying causal 
mechanisms. For the purposes of my argument, I focus on neurological investigations 
into the mechanisms underlying sexual and gendered behavior.  While the 
organization/activation model is genuinely explanatory (if not always correct), 
mechanism cannot account for its rapid acceptance and uncritical extension to human 
gendered and sexual behavior. 
 
One such uncritical extension is the topic of the ninth chapter: transsexuality. I begin with 
a historical introduction to early etiological hypotheses of gender identity, both 
“constitutional” and in terms of learning.  With the crucial resolution of the etiology of 
homosexuality, the same general argument pattern was applied to transsexuality: a 
gendered brain incongruent with the body.  There are two versions of this explanation of 
transsexuality.  The first, that it is a variety of homosexuality, fails the criteria of 
genuinely explanatory mechanistic models.  The second, that it is a phenomenon distinct 
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from homosexuality, demonstrates a flaw in unificationist appeals: the same general 
argument pattern is invoked to explain two different developmental outcomes.   
 
Finally, I conclude that an investigation of the field through the lens of crucial resolutions 
reveals both the strengths and the weaknesses of the unificationist and mechanist 
accounts of scientific explanation, while providing a more complete account of the 
development of explanatory models. 
 1 
Explanatory Models in Behavioral Endocrinology 
 
 
Introduction 
    
The historical development of explanatory models in the field of behavioral 
endocrinology, the study of hormones and their effects upon body and behavior, 
exemplifies both the philosophical account of scientific explanation by unification and 
mechanism.  However, an examination of the reasoning behind the proposal and adoption 
of these models demonstrates that neither philosophical account can fully explain the 
development of the field.  
Specifically, the development of the field is due to “crucial resolutions,” 
resolutions of conceptual problems proffered and accepted in advance of unambiguous 
empirical evidence.  Crucial resolutions decide between one or more elaborated 
hypotheses – hypotheses that can explain some (but not all) of the empirical data.  While 
both the unification and mechanistic accounts can explain aspects of the adoption and 
development of the field, neither can account for the logic of discovery behind crucial 
resolutions.   
  As proving this claim will require a great deal of ground work, the first chapter is 
a historical introduction to the early development of the field, focusing on the importance 
of the explanatory promise of hormones.  Those chemical substances (‘hormones’) 
thought to be responsible for male and female developmental endpoints were gendered 
from the outset, and remain so to the present.  From an initial, heuristic definition, 
hormones came to be defined as members of a specific chemical class. 
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The second chapter is an introduction to crucial resolutions in general, and an 
exploration of one resolution in particular: whether mammalian sexual development 
requires one hormone or two.  In other words, whether in feminine embryonic 
development the mere absence of male hormones suffices, or if specifically female 
hormones are required.  The crucial resolution of this debate – that of the freemartin 
problem – determined the conceptual landscape for the future of the field.  Importantly 
for my argument, the actual empirical results of the resolutions and crucial experiments 
generated by the research programs are often interpreted as supporting the crucial 
resolutions more strongly than the evidence allows.  
Both the initial, plausible hypotheses put forth to explain the phenomena and the 
crucial resolutions that decide between them exhibit a logic of discovery, the topic of the 
third chapter.  I present arguments both against and for the possibility of a logic of 
discovery, and present some examples from the history of endocrinology in support of its 
possibility.  In addition, the logic of discovery – in the form of crucial resolutions – 
influences the logic of method, and not merely in terms of which problems are addressed.  
I demonstrate this using the example of the empirical confirmation of the crucial 
resolution mentioned above. 
The fourth chapter addresses another crucial resolution in the history of 
behavioral endocrinology; one concerned with the etiology of sexual and gendered 
behavior.  The general debate concerned whether all mammals have the potential to 
display both masculine and feminine behavior.  That is, whether mammals, when born, 
have the capacity to display behaviors typical of either sex, or if there is an “inequality of 
potential” wherein animals are predisposed towards behavior specific to their anatomical 
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sex.  Here, I elucidate the arguments in support of the former claim, and provides 
historical background of the lines of thought leading to the triumph of the latter.   
The organization/activation model was adopted by the scientific community with 
astonishing rapidity, not just because of its unificatory appeal, but because it provides a 
crucial resolution to an outstanding etiological mystery: that of homosexuality.  
According to the model, abnormal prenatal gonadal hormone exposure results in a brain 
whose “gender” is at odds with a phenotypically normal body.  Chapter six presents the 
early, unsatisfactory hypotheses, both endocrinological and psychological, of the etiology 
of homosexuality, and how the organization/activation model appeared to provide a 
satisfactory solution.  Although, when first proposed, the model had no empirical 
evidence in support of its theory of human (male) homosexuality, it inspired a research 
program dedicated to uncover neurological gender atypicality. 
The organization/activation model of psychosexual development appears to be, 
upon first glance, an exemplar of explanation by unification.  In the seventh chapter, I 
demonstrate that it is such an exemplar, drawing primarily upon the work of Philip 
Kitcher.  Many scientists have extolled this explanatory model for its ability to unify 
seemingly disparate phenomena – specifically, the embryonic phenotypical development 
of genitalia with neurological developments influencing hormone regulation, sexual and 
gender-related behavior, and cognitive abilities.  However, the goal of scientists within 
this field has been, and continues to be, to cash out the initial predictions of the model in 
terms of biochemical mechanisms, an appeal to causality that explanation by unification 
cannot incorporate.  
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In the eighth chapter, I demonstrate how behavioral endocrinology fulfills the 
criteria for mechanistic explanatory models.  As is the case in other areas of science, 
many endocrinologists explicitly describe their work as the search for underlying causal 
mechanisms.  For the purposes of my argument, I focus on neurological investigations 
into the mechanisms underlying sexual and gendered behavior.  While the 
organization/activation model is genuinely explanatory (if not always correct), 
mechanism cannot account for its rapid acceptance and uncritical extension to human 
gendered and sexual behavior. 
One such uncritical extension is the topic of the ninth chapter: transsexuality. I 
begin with a historical introduction to early etiological hypotheses of gender identity, 
both “constitutional” and in terms of learning.  With the crucial resolution of the etiology 
of homosexuality, the same general argument pattern was applied to transsexuality: a 
gendered brain incongruent with the body.  There are two versions of this explanation of 
transsexuality.  The first, that it is a variety of homosexuality, fails the criteria of 
genuinely explanatory mechanistic models.  The second, that it is a phenomenon distinct 
from homosexuality, demonstrates a flaw in unificationist appeals: the same general 
argument pattern is invoked to explain two different developmental outcomes.   
Finally, I conclude that crucial resolutions appeal to unifcatory ideals, but set the 
disciplinary matrix in terms of mechanistic explanations.  As such, I suggest that what 
counts as an explanation in the field of behavioral endocrinology is not a case of the same 
phenomenon being explained in two different ways, one mechanistic and the other 
unificationist, but rather a single explanatory model that explains the phenomena in terms 
of a general, mechanistic schema.  An investigation of the field through the lens of 
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crucial resolutions reveals both the strengths and the weaknesses of the unificationist and 
mechanist accounts of scientific explanation, while providing a more complete account of 
the development of explanatory models. 
 
 
 
Chapter 1  
The Importance of Hormones  
  
I. Introduction 
 
The discovery of hormones drastically changed the field of biology in general, 
and the field physiology in particular.  In particular, it shifted the focus of research from 
external to internal factors.  In what follows, I give a brief history of early research on 
hormones and their initial, vague, categorical definitions.  These initial definitions were 
in terms of function, rather than chemical composition.  For this reason, I begin my 
substantive discussion of endocrinological research in the early part of the 1900s.   
Because the biochemical mechanisms operating in bodies were, at this time, 
unknown, initial discussions were framed in terms of internal versus external factors.  To 
use the terminology of Wesley Salmon, these internal factors were “black boxes” whose 
internal workings, initially, are mysterious.  The role of science is to open them up to see 
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how they work.1
Because of the comparatively primitive laboratory techniques of chemical assay, 
the initially posited ‘internal secretions’ were defined in terms of their effects on nearby 
organs.  In other words, their definition was functional, rather than structural.  With 
technological advances in the field, the internal secretions came to be regarded as a 
particular class of chemical substances deemed ‘hormones.’   
 At this time, scientists identified three classes of internal factors: 
heredity, the nervous system, and what were labeled ‘internal secretions.’  Because the 
field of genetics was in its infancy, with the result that the question of how genes 
organize the nervous system was unanswerable, many researchers focused their 
investigations of internal factors on the (internal) secretions of the ductless glands.  This 
narrowing of focus was not (merely) due to the seeming lack of immediate progress in 
the fields of genetics and neurophysiology; as I demonstrate, the burgeoning field of 
endocrinology itself held out great promise.  
The early, vague mechanistic explanations of hormones and their effects upon the 
body developed into research projects dedicated to elucidating the mechanisms of 
biological feed-back loops, as well as the more general project of determining the overall 
importance of hormones upon the functioning of the mammalian body including, 
importantly for my later claims, mammalian sexuality.  But first, some intellectual 
background to set the stage. 
 
 
II. Internal versus External Factors 
                                                 
1 Salmon, W. (1998). The Importance of Scientific Understanding. Causality and Explanation. W. 
Salmon. New York, Oxford University Press: 79 - 91. 
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Before the development of endocrinology as a clearly defined subfield, the 
question of the relative influences of internal versus external factors was a question about 
the relative importance of the environment as opposed to that of genes (specifically, how 
they organize the nervous system).  However, because the science of genetics was very 
young, researchers had only extremely vague hypotheses concerning the mechanisms by 
which genes determined physiology and behavior.  As Naccarati and Garrett, in their 
1923 paper on the comparative influences of ‘constitutional’ versus environmental 
influences on behavior, write: 
 
A growing organism is, in general, subject to the action of two systems of forces: 
the internal – those inherited through the germplasm – and the external – those 
residing outside of it in the environment.  Of the two determinants, the second, 
being the most obvious, is usually assigned first place.2
 
 
  
Because behaviors and the environmental forces correlated with them are more 
easily observed than genes (especially at this time), most researchers focused upon, and 
hence gave more weight to, external factors.  Investigations into learning, for instance, 
gave preeminence to the environment.  Naccarati and Garrett note that this same state of 
affairs, that is: 
 
                                                 
2 Naccarati, S., and Garrett, Henry (1923). "The Influence of Constitutional Factors on Behavior." 
Journal of Experimental Psychology 6(6): 455 - 465. 
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The greater importance of external factors as against the internal, may be 
observed also in medicine; the causes of disease are usually sought in morbid 
factors which enter the organism from without – germs, poisons, traumata.3
 
   
With the opening up of the internal “black boxes,” the importance of external 
factors lessened with time.  More accurately, with the development of the potential to  
open the black boxes of internal factors, the focus of research shifted from the 
(supposedly easily) observable to the (no longer completely) unobservable.  One such 
class of “quasi-observables” was that of the internal, glandular, secretions within the 
mammalian body.   
In the infancy of the field of endocrinology, some scientists4 noticed that some 
organs secrete chemicals directly into the bloodstream (not through the medium of ducts) 
that have transformative effects upon other organs and tissues in the body.  This 
discovery challenged the then-common notion that the nervous system, and only the 
nervous system, was responsible for the development and maintenance of other organs.5
As Naccarati and Garrett point out: 
  
 
It has only been since the development of endocrinology as a branch of medicine 
that a better understanding of another important group of morbid causes, viz., the 
                                                 
3 Ibid. 
 
4 For instance, A. A. Bertold, Claude Bernard, and Chareles Brown-Séquard. 
  
5 This notion of internal regulation is expressed concisely by Cuvier: “Le système nerveux est, au 
fond, tout l’animal, les autres systèmes ne sont la que pour le servir.”  Quoted in Abel, J. (1915). 
"Experimental and Chemical Studies of the Blood with an Appeal for More Extended Chemical 
Training for the Biological and Medical Investigator." Science 42(1075): 165 - 178. 
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endogenous, has been reached.6  These causes, according to endocrinologists, are 
inherent in our organic makeup, in the more or less solid structure of our body, in 
the variable functional capacity of individual organs whether congenital or 
acquired during the period of development of the organism.7
 
 
That is to say, the investigation of internal factors – either hereditary or those 
“developmentally acquired” – not only could advance to field of palliative medicine, but 
that of biology in general. 
The discovery of hormones held great promise for the fields of physiology and 
medicine.  In particular, the secretions of the ductless glands promised to explain more 
aspects of physiology – especially those of sexuality – than could the nervous system per 
se, as well as appeals to the (then mostly conjectural) field of genetics. 
Just as genetics did not appear to be a promising route of investigation at this 
time, the nervous system did not seem to be able to tell the whole story about behavioral 
responses in general and sexual behavior in particular.  As a result, many investigators 
decided to persue the more promising route of hormonal research – especially in lieu of 
the rapidly advancing techiniques in chemical assays. 
One proponent of the shift in emphasis from external factors in general to 
hormones in particular was Calvin Stone, who claims: 
 
No account of sexual behavior based wholly upon neurophysiology has been 
found adequate to explain the facts brought forward from experimental studies 
during the past thirty years.  Hence new dynamogenic factors underlying sexual 
                                                 
6 “As Sir William Osler said recently, medicine has made no more brilliant advance than in the 
cure of certain diseases of these ductless glands.” Kunkel, B. (1921). "Harmonizing Hormones." 
Scientific Monthly 13(3): 266-274. 
 
7 Naccarati, S., and Garrett, Henry (1923). "The Influence of Constitutional Factors on Behavior." 
Journal of Experimental Psychology 6(6): 455 - 465.  
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activation have been sought.  This search has led to investigations in the field of 
endocrinology with the result that data pertaining to a testicular hormone have 
been revealed which are of interest to students of behavior.8
 
   
 
For instance, the suppression and eventual extinction of sexual behavior in adult 
male castrates has been noted since antiquity.  Some researchers explained this by 
claiming that castration cut the nerve connections from the testes to the peripheral 
muscles.  However, this explanation is untenable in light the results of experiments 
wherein testes were implanted after castration and sexual behavior was restored.9
 
  As 
Stone points out, the explanation with the most experimental support: 
[I]s based on the assumption that the testes elaborates an internal secretion which, 
through its chemical influence on the nervous system and the general bodily 
metabolism, predisposes the animal to orient with respect to animals of the 
opposite sex and to carry out such further sexual responses as will eventually lead 
to the consummation of the reproductive act.  The persistence of sexual behavior 
after castration is explained on the assumption that libidinous substances are 
retained in the blood for a variable period of time.10
                                                 
8 Stone, C. Ibid."Experimental Studies of Two Important Factors Underlying Masculine Sexual 
Behavior: the Nervous System and the Internal Secretion of the Testis." (2): 85 - 106. 
 
 
9 See, for instance, Berthold, 1849. 
 
10 Stone, C. (1923). "Experimental Studies of Two Important Factors Underlying Masculine 
Sexual Behavior: the Nervous System and the Internal Secretion of the Testis." Journal of 
Experimental Psychology 6(2): 85 - 106.  Stone is careful to point out that: 
 
Factual data concerning the mode and seat of action of the testicular hormone are 
wanting.  At the present time, however, it is generally believed that its influence is 
exercised by direct action upon the central and sympathetic nervous system and through 
chemical regulation of the general metabolism.  The evidence upon which these 
assumptions rest, as we have shown, is indirect and conjectural, being founded primarily 
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While Stone did not ignore the importance of a properly developed nervous 
system, he rejected the notion that sexual behavior was “reflexive” (and thus completely 
dependent upon the nervous system) like other behaviors such as the ‘scratch reflex’: 
 
The copulatory response differs fundamentally from the ‘scratch reflex’ and other 
reflexes of similar nature by virtue of its dependence upon a special gland, the 
testis, for activation and regulation.11
  
 
This means that “instinctive” sexual responses were of a much more complicated 
character than reflexes solely dependent on the central nervous system.  This initial, 
vague characterization of sexual response presages the complicated etiological picture 
that later emerges. 
Once the scientific community accepted this system of regulatory internal 
chemical secretions as contrasting with and complimenting the (earlier) understood 
phenomenon of the nervous system, a new venue of investigation opened up.  One early 
commentator writes: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
upon analogies taken from the actions of other hormones with which investigators are 
more intimately acquainted. 
 
Stone, C. (1923). "Experimental Studies of Two Important Factors Underlying Masculine Sexual 
Behavior: the Nervous System and the Internal Secretion of the Testis." Journal of Experimental 
Psychology 6(2): 85 - 106. 
 
11 Stone, C. (1923). "Experimental Studies of Two Important Factors Underlying Masculine 
Sexual Behavior: the Nervous System and the Internal Secretion of the Testis." Journal of 
Experimental Psychology 6(2): 85 - 106. 
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[I]n recent years we have come to understand that the complex of activities in the 
animal body is united into a functional harmony, not only through a reflex control 
exerted by the nervous system, but also by means of a chemical regulation 
effected through the blood or other liquids of the organism.  The first serious 
realization of the importance of this second method of regulation came with the 
development of our knowledge of the internal secretions during the last decade of 
the nineteenth century.12
 
   
In addition, these scientists discovered that the chemical and organic interactions 
had a cyclical character – that is, internal secretions were not constant, but would ebb and 
flow according to distinct time periods.  As a result, cyclical bodily functions were 
presumed to be controlled by a class of chemicals secreted by ductless internal organs.  
This (initially hypothetical) class of chemicals was given the name “hormone,” and was 
accorded primacy in physiological research.  Howell writes: 
 
There is thus established a circulus benignus by means of which each tissue 
profits from the functional activity of its fellow tissues.  From many sides and in 
many ways facts have been accumulating which tend to impress the general truth 
that the co-activity of the organs and tissues may be controlled through chemical 
changes in the liquid media of the body, as well as through nerve impulses.13
 
  
This new emphasis on hormones (‘internal secretions’) led to a conception of the 
body “such that the products of metabolism in one tissue serve as a stimulus to the 
                                                 
12  Howell, W. (1910). "The Chemical Regulation of the Processes of the Body by Means of 
Activators, Kinases and Hormones." Science 31(786): 93 - 100. 
 
13 Ibid. 
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activities of other tissues.”14  Scientists investigating the new field of hormones faced 
multiple (and exciting) challenges: determining the chemical nature of hormones15, how 
many (mammalian) hormones existed, and uncovering the mechanics of each hormone-
induced feedback loop.16
Unfortunately, techniques for chemical assays, as well as techniques of chemical 
isolation and refinement, were not advanced enough to identify any hormones except 
those few that were amenable to primitive techniques.
 
17
Shifting the focus from genes to hormones promised to provide a more 
satisfactory explanatory model for some perturbations in development.  For instance, for 
  As time progressed, so did 
laboratory techniques, and thus the field of endocrinology. 
                                                 
14 Ibid. 
 
15 Abel, in his discussion of the initial determination of epinephrin, adrenaline, and suprerenin, 
claims that  
 
The actual finding of definite and specific chemical principles in the organs of internal 
secretions has in each case an importance in the way of explaining and correlating a large 
number of disconnected facts, only to be likened to the discovery of the etiological cause 
of an infectious disease.  
 
Abel, J. (1915). "Experimental and Chemical Studies of the Blood with an Appeal for More 
Extended Chemical Training for the Biological and Medical Investigator." Ibid. 42(1075): 165 - 
178. 
 
16 See, for instance, Hoskins, R. (1924). "The Functions of the Endocrine Organs." Scientific 
Monthly 18(3): 257 - 272. 
 
17 As late as 1931, investigators into the cortico-adrenal hormone had difficulties isolating their 
object of study:   
 
The method of Swingle and Pfiffner, although long drawn-out (taking usually 10 to 14 
days) and offering many possibilities for the loss of potency to occur, is simple to carry 
out; that of Hartman takes only a few days but offers technical difficulties, particularly in 
the elimination of inert lipoid substances and of adrenalin. 
 
Britton, S., and Herbert Silvette (1931). "The Cortico-Adrenal Hormone." Science 73(1890): 322 
- 323. 
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a pregnant female, an emotional shock could disturb her hormonal equilibrium, thus 
affecting the development of the fetus:   
 
Once the endocrine glands of the newborn begin to malfunction, its hormones will 
determine morphologic, neuro- and biochemical changes which will appear later 
on in the mature organism in a manner that will puzzle the most experienced 
psychologist if he wants to attribute the abnormal behavior to heredity and 
environment alone.18
 
 
Many researchers thought that an investigation into the effects of hormones (as 
opposed to the genetic ordering of the nervous system) could explain typical, not just 
atypical, development.  This reflects the general approbation of Frank Lillie’s focus upon 
the exceptional as a means of explaining the unexceptional, whose work is discussed in 
the following chapter. 
 
 
III. From Function to Structure 
 
                                                 
18 Naccarati, S., and Garrett, Henry (1923). "The Influence of Constitutional Factors on 
Behavior." Journal of Experimental Psychology 6(6): 455 - 465.  The authors make a suggestion 
that is prescient of future investigations into the etiology of homosexuality: 
 
And since mental changes when due to endogenous causes connected with the endocrine 
glands are usually accompanied by morphologic changes or characteristics also (because 
of the influence which the hormones exercise on the morphogenesis as well as on the 
nervous system and the metabolism), therefore a systematic study of the morphologic 
type of a given individual should yield valuable information concerning his mental status 
also. 
 
Naccarati, S., and Garrett, Henry (1923). "The Influence of Constitutional Factors on Behavior." 
Journal of Experimental Psychology 6(6): 455 - 465.   
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During the early development of the field, endocrinologists identified hormones 
as chemical substances secreted by organs that induced changes in other organs – not as 
members of a specific chemical family, as is the common practice today.  For instance, 
Howell (in 1910) lists the known internal secretions as carbon dioxide, adrenalin, bile, 
and “iodothyrin” of the thyroid gland.  He also notes that:  
 
In addition there are a number of hormones of unknown composition which have 
been either proved or assumed to exist, and which are held responsible for certain 
well known correlations of functions.19
 
 
While all four of the above-mentioned substances are involved in biological feed-
back loops, the notion of “hormone” eventually came to be associated with a specific 
class of chemicals excreted by ductless glands, among them the sex glands.  
The infant field of endocrinology held great promise not just for medicine in 
particular, but for biology in general.  In an early review, B. Kunkel writes:  
 
It is only very recently that the full significance of this last class of coordinators 
[what he refers to as “special chemical substances which modify different parts of 
the body”] has been realized and it is to this system that I would call your 
                                                 
19 Howell, W. (1910). "The Chemical Regulation of the Processes of the Body by Means of 
Activators, Kinases and Hormones." Science 31(786): 93 - 100. Interestingly, Howell cautions 
that it seems 
 
. . . probable that the term hormone, like some of the useful terminology of immunology, 
will be overworked, and that investigators may deceive themselves as well as others 
when they conclude that any given relationship is an example of hormone regulation. 
 
Howell, W. (1910). "The Chemical Regulation of the Processes of the Body by Means of 
Activators, Kinases and Hormones." Science 31(786): 93 - 100. 
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attention specially.  Within the past few years the energies of a great number of 
physiologists have been directed to certain specialized organs having the structure 
of glands but not communicating with any free surface by means of ducts.  These 
organs secrete internally, directly into the blood stream from which they have 
derived the raw materials from which the hormone is secreted.  The effects on 
neighboring organs of the products of other organs has been studied with great 
earnestness for some years, but our knowledge is still in its infancy.20
 
 
This functional definition of internal secretions (hormones) acts as an initial, 
heuristic, conception of the phenomena.  As an example of this functional, rather than 
chemical, definition, Abel describes his use of the term “internal secretion” as follows: 
 
For the present we shall follow custom and apply the term to definite and 
specifically acting indispensable chemical products of certain organs (organs that 
may or may not have an external secretion), which are poured into the blood and 
modify the development and growth of other organs, more especially during 
embryonic and early life, and which also greatly affect the entire metabolism, that 
of the nervous system included, during adult life. (Original emphasis.)21
 
 
Scientists could describe the effects of some internal secretions (particularly those 
of the testes22
                                                 
20 Kunkel, B. (1921). "Harmonizing Hormones." Scientific Monthly 13(3): 266-274. 
), but could not yet explain those effects.  As such, the over-arching goal in 
the field of endocrinology was to discover the number and nature of these hormones.    
 
21 Abel, J. (1915). "Experimental and Chemical Studies of the Blood with an Appeal for More 
Extended Chemical Training for the Biological and Medical Investigator." Science 42(1075): 165 
- 178. 
 
22 Even before they were determined to be ductless, the (male) gonads were considered an 
important developmental inductor: 
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This general, proto-mechanistic program of research echoes other historical 
incidents of scientific explanations.  An example of this type of explanation, and the 
understanding that comes with it, is the work of Jean Perrin on Brownian motion – the 
behavior of microscopic particles in fluid.  First discovered by the botanist Robert Brown 
early in the nineteenth century, Brownian motion remained a mystery until the first 
decade of the twentieth century, when Einstein published his famous paper on the topic, 
offering a theoretical explanation.  Perrin’s monumental experimental work confirmed 
Einstein’s theory.  Salmon notes that we should: 
 
Notice how we need to go to the submicroscopic level to explain microscopic 
phenomena, something that many physical scientists thought impossible at the 
turn of the present [20th] century.  Not only did Perrin establish the mechanism of 
Brownian movement, but he also ascertained Avogadro’s number, the number of 
molecules in a mole (gram molecular weight) of any given substance.23
 
  
This shows the hierarchical nature of mechanical systems, in that submicroscopic 
interactions can produce microscopic changes.  In the case of endocrinology, the 
“submicroscopic” interactions are those of internal factors and bodily tissues. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Man has long made practical use of the fact that the removal of the sex glands at a certain 
age will give us the docile ox in place of the unruly bull, the easily fattened and tender-
fleshed capon for the muscular and stringy cock; and in human society in its various 
stages of development has also practiced this mutilation on its individuals for various 
reasons, religious, economic, or penal . . . From remote antiquity, therefore, man has 
known that the [male] gonads, or sex glands, exert a marked influence on the 
development and structure of the body.  
 
Ibid.  
 
23 Salmon, W. (1998). The Importance of Scientific Understanding. Causality and Explanation. 
W. Salmon. New York, Oxford University Press: 79 - 91. 
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One way of “opening up” a black box is to hypothesize about the mechanics 
within it (as Einstein did in the case of Brownian motion).  If the hypothesized 
mechanical system is sufficiently explanatory – to put it crudely, if it works – it can serve 
as a model for the relevant phenomena.  Not only can it serve as a model, but it can serve 
as an explanatory model. 
With technological advances in chemical analysis, it became apparent these 
hormones belonged to general chemical class.  Once endocrinologists accepted the 
general notion that the substances inducing sexual differentiation were hormones, their 
task became to discover the number and nature of these hormones.  Barker, in his 
discussion of the endocrine glands, notes that: 
 
The chemical substances contained in the incretions have been called “hormones” 
and the determination of the precise chemical constitution of these hormones sets 
fascinating tasks for the biochemist.24
 
 
Hormone research involved not just chemical analysis, but also deliberately 
interrupting or altering the normal process of development in order to determine the 
effects of excessive presence or absence of hormones on physiology. 
While determining the number of hormones appeared to be a straight-forward task 
and, given advances in chemical analysis, relatively simple,25
                                                 
24 Barker, L. (1922). "The Relation of Endocrine Glands to Heredity and Development." Science 
55(1435): 685 - 690. 
 uncovering the nature of 
 
25 Collip writes: 
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hormones proved much more difficult.  This difficulty was due, in part, to terminological 
vagueness, which in turn was due to a lack of understanding of the mechanisms 
underlying sexual development. 
 
 
IV. Gendered Definitions 
 
The development of endocrinology allowed scientists to investigate the influence 
of internal factors.  These internal factors – later to be called “hormones” – were 
classified as chemical secretions of the ductless glands (also known as “internal 
secretions”).  As such, the development of endocrinology allowed scientists to study the 
effects of hormones upon physiology and behavior.  More specifically, hormones could 
work as the foundation for an explanatory model of mammalian psychosexual behavior.26
                                                                                                                                                 
It may be confidently expected that great advances will be made in this subject in the near 
future, because accurate methods for the assay of certain of the hormones in the blood 
and secretions of the individual are being developed. 
 
 
Collip, J. (1936). "Hormones." Scientific Monthly 43(5): 411 - 420. 
26 More than two decades after the work of Kunkel and Abel, William Perloff begins his review 
of the influence of hormones on human sexuality by stating that: 
 
The mechanism of sexual behavior has long been an intriguing although frustrating 
subject of investigation.  With the discovery of the role of the gonads as producers of 
hormones, and particularly after the isolation, purification, and synthesis of the steroid 
hormones, biologists believed that a simple explanation of sexual behavior was at last 
available. 
 
He goes on to note that, in spite of later, contradictory, observations, “the hormonal concept of 
sexual regulation is still widely held perhaps because of its apparent simplicity.” Perloff, W. H. 
(1949). "Role of Hormones in Human Sexuality." Psychosomatic Medicine: Experimental and 
Clinical Studies 11(3): 133 - 139. 
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As a result of the general acceptance of the (largely hypothetical) notion of 
hormones, it was a natural step to assume that the sex glands produced hormones.  
Indeed, male and female developmental endpoints were often thought to be the result of 
“male” and “female” factors present during embryonic development.  For example, 
Conklin, in response to the general question concerning the “formative agent in 
embryonic [sexual] development,” makes an initial suggestion that: 
 
Without attempting to find the primum movens we may conclude that if there are 
material differences in areas and cells it is not necessary to resort at once to some 
immaterial agent to account for their differentiation.  It is impossible to 
understand, i.e., to make intelligible, development except as a result of the 
formation and localization of different material substances.27
 
  
In other words, physiological development can, and should, be explained by 
physiological substances.  Specifically, different (sexual) developmental endpoints could 
be explained through appeals to different (gendered) material substances.  Hormones, 
then, were defined functionally and in a gendered fashion.  For instance, the “male 
hormone” was that chemical which, when secreted from the male gonads, controlled or 
determined specifically male characters in the organism. 
Because the initial discussion of the factors divided them into male and female, 
subsequent discussions of the hormones also divided them into male and female.  One 
result of this was less than ideal terminological distinctions between the chemical 
compounds (e.g., “estrogen” and “androgen”), organs of origin (e.g., “ovarian” and 
                                                 
27 Conklin, E. (1933). "Mosaic vs. Equipotential Development." American Naturalist 67(711): 
289 - 297. 
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“testicular”) and gendered (“male” and “female”) hormones.  Perloff, in his discussion of 
the role of hormones in human sexuality, notes that while estradiol “has been called the 
female sex hormone” and, likewise, testosterone “has been called the male sex hormone:” 
 
This terminology is unfortunate, because it suggests incorrect concepts and leads 
to faulty reasoning.  As a matter of fact, the stallion produces more estrogenic 
material than any other animal known, and had it first been isolated in this animal, 
might very well be called the male sex hormone.28
 
 
These distinctions are less than ideal because a) both kinds of organs produce 
both kinds of chemical compounds, as a result of which b) neither compound can be 
correctly labeled as “male” or “female.” 
In spite of these ambiguities, endocrinologists were certain that “sex” hormones 
were responsible for developmental sexual physiology.  The challenge remained to 
uncover the mechanisms responsible for specific developmental endpoints. 
Once scientists accepted the existence of “male” factors and “female” factors, the 
question arose of their relative contributions to physiological development.  Goldschmidt, 
in his discussion of intersexuality, writes: 
 
The embryological problem of intersexuality is then to find how the sex-
determining hormones interact with such developmental processes which lead to 
sexual differences.  Undoubtedly the developmental system concerned in the 
production of intersexuality has two phases: the inductive agency for which we 
use the term hormones, and the reacting tissues of the developing animal.  The 
                                                 
28 Perloff, W. H. (1949). "Role of Hormones in Human Sexuality." Psychosomatic Medicine: 
Experimental and Clinical Studies 11(3): 133 - 139. 
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first question is, therefore, whether we are dealing with two inductive stuffs for 
the two sexes respectively or only with one.29
 
   
 
The etiological question of one or two hormones and its resolution is the topic of 
chapters three and four. 
At this point in time, another question arose: are hormones solely responsible for 
the development of sexual behavior?  Stone was convinced not only that hormones were 
necessary for sexual behavior, they were, given proper anatomic and neurological 
development, sufficient.  From his studies of the differences between the sexual behavior 
of pre- and post-puberty castrates, he concludes that “the gonads are absolutely necessary 
for the completion of the development processes underlying overt expression of the 
sexual libido.”30 Not only are hormones necessary, Stone later suggests that “hormones 
form the sine qua non for the organization of sexual behavior in young vertebrates.”31
                                                 
29 Goldschmidt, R. (1938). "Intersexuality and Development." American Naturalist 72(740): 228 - 
242. 
 
Here, Stone is making a stronger claim – not only are hormones necessary for the 
foundational processes that support sexual behavior, they are responsible for the 
organization of the behavior per se.  In other words, while the development of mature 
sexual behavior cannot proceed without the presence gonadal hormones, the very 
 
30 Stone, C. (1932). "The Retention of Copulatory Ability in Male Rabbits Following 
Castrations." Journal of Genetic Psychology 40: 296-305. 
 
31 Calvin Stone, “Sex Drive,” in Sex and Internal Secretions, 2nd ed., 1939. 
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presence of gonadal hormones is sufficient for the development of adult sexual 
behavior.32
In spite of the simple appeal of this causal story, not all researchers thought that 
hormones alone were the causal agents behind mature sexual behavior.  Frank Beach 
(who is discussed more thoroughly in the fourth chapter) pointed out that there are 
several lines of evidence implying that, while hormones were necessary, proved that they 
were insufficient.   
 
One such line was observations of mating behavior in animals with a congenital 
lack of gonads.  In particular, one researcher observed mating behavior in male pigeons 
that congenitally lacked testes.33
 
  Beach himself noticed a female rat, also congenitally 
lacking gonads (and a uterus) that, after estrogen and progesterone injections, displayed 
mating behavior.  From this, he concludes: 
If the diagnosis of congenital absence is correct, it follows that behavioral 
mechanisms in the case of pigeons and the one rat attained a functional condition 
in the total absence of sex hormones.34
                                                 
32 Frank Beach, whose research is explored later, writes: 
 
 
Although authorities generally agree that one major function of the hormones in the adult 
animal is to increase the stimulability of the behavioral mechanisms, there are some 
writers who believe that the hormones have another very important responsibility, namely 
the control or direction of the developmental organization of the mechanisms. 
 
Beach cites Stone as an example of the latter. Beach, F. A. (1949). Hormones and Behavior: A 
Survey of Interrelationships Between Endocrine Secretions and Patterns of Overt Response. New 
York, Paul B. Hoeber, Inc. Medical Book Department of Harper & Brothers. 
 
33 Riddle, O. (1927). "The Quantitative Theory of Sex." Science 66(1703): 169 - 170. 
 
34 Beach, F. A. (1949). Hormones and Behavior: A Survey of Interrelationships Between 
Endocrine Secretions and Patterns of Overt Response. New York, Paul B. Hoeber, Inc. Medical 
Book Department of Harper & Brothers. 
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That is, while hormones are necessary for the manifestation of mating behavior, 
they are not necessary for the functional organization of that behavior.  In contrast to 
Stone’s claim, hormones do not direct the organization of sexual mechanisms; they play 
only a stimulatory role.  Something else creates the template upon which hormones can 
act.  (As we shall see, this “something else” was thought to be genes or learning.)35
A second line of evidence that post-natal gonadal hormones are not essential to 
the organization of sexual behavior mechanisms comes from the observations of Boling, 
Blandau, Wilson and Young (1939) of newborn guinea pigs.  They noticed that, in 
response to tactile stimulation, pups of both sexes would execute feminine mating 
behaviors for a few hours after birth.  Presumably: 
 
 
These reactions, which are characteristic of the adult female in heat, appear in 
newborn infants under the influence of maternal hormones; at any rate the 
observations establish the fact that in this species the essential neuromuscular 
mechanisms for the feminine mating response are fully organized prepartum.36
 
 
                                                 
35 William Perloff, studing humans with endocrine abnormalities, concurs: 
 
From these observations it would appear that in the human, libido and potency may be 
present and even normal though the gonadal hormones are diminished or absent.  This 
would imply that these hormones are not necessarily essential to the libidinous urge, 
although, as will be shown later, they may indirectly influence the libido by affecting a 
common end organ. 
 
Perloff, W. H. (1949). "Role of Hormones in Human Sexuality." Psychosomatic Medicine: 
Experimental and Clinical Studies 11(3): 133 - 139. 
 
36 Beach, F. A. (1949). Hormones and Behavior: A Survey of Interrelationships Between 
Endocrine Secretions and Patterns of Overt Response. New York, Paul B. Hoeber, Inc. Medical 
Book Department of Harper & Brothers. 
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 Finally, Beach found that male rats gonadectomized at different periods of 
development (from zero to 350 days after birth) displayed similar mating behavior after 
daily injections of androgen.  Specifically, males castrated at birth showed just as much 
excitement and mounted receptive females just as often as males that had been castrated 
as adults.  Beach takes this to: 
 
Indicate that postnatally secreted testis hormone is not essential to the 
organization of the neuromuscular mechanisms for mating in the rat.  (However, 
penis growth was markedly inhibited by loss of the testes at birth and 
consequently animals so treated rarely achieved intromission and with one 
exception never ejaculated.)37
 
   
From these three lines of evidence, Beach comes to a number of conclusions 
regarding the organization of sexual behavior.  First, that gonads are not necessary for 
this process.  Second, that hormones are not the causal agents behind organization.  
Finally, that the neuromuscular elements necessary for hormonally conditioned behavior 
patterns (such as courtship, mating and parenting) “are fully organized and ready to 
function relatively early in life, well in advance of the time that they will be normally 
activated.”38
                                                 
37 Ibid. 
 For Beach, the organization is due to early socialization.  
 
38 Ibid.  Beach continues, 
 
They may be completely developed at birth or attain this condition at some time 
thereafter, but their organization is complete prior to the time that the hormones which 
will sensitize them to stimulation are secreted in sufficient quantities to become effective. 
 
Beach, F. A. (1949). Hormones and Behavior: A Survey of Interrelationships Between Endocrine 
Secretions and Patterns of Overt Response. New York, Paul B. Hoeber, Inc. Medical Book 
Department of Harper & Brothers. 
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 Specifically, while the neuromuscular elements may be fully organized, Beach 
also claims that there is a psychological component to the organization process. (This 
hypothesis is discussed in the next section.)  It should be noted that this separation of 
mating into two components, organization and activation, not only directed Beach’s 
research, but set the conceptual framework for the later development of the field. 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
 The development of the field of endocrinology shifted the focus of research from 
external to internal factors.  From an initial, vague hypothesis about the existence and 
function of hormones, scientists set about determining the nature and number of these 
hormones, with the goal of moving from a (merely) descriptive to an explanatory model.  
The goal of developing such a model was to explain not just physiological development, 
but the etiology of sexual behavior. 
Explanatory models in the history of endocrinology are choosen through crucial 
resolutions, the topic of the next chapter.   
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Crucial Resolutions in Endocrinology 
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I. Introduction 
 
While the progress of science has been described by some as proceeding by a 
series of “crucial experiments,” I claim that a critical factor in the development of many 
scientific fields is that of what I call “crucial resolutions” of outstanding anomalies.  In 
contrast to crucial experiments, crucial resolutions are proposed to solve persistent 
anomalies or conflicting theoretical positions – often in advance of experimental 
confirmation.  In what follows, I illustrate this point using a specific example from the 
history of endocrinology. 
For a resolution to count as crucial it requires, at minimum, a collection of 
anomalies (perhaps just one) which arise in a situation of competition between 
“elaborated hypotheses”39
                                                 
39 Elaborated hypotheses (term due to Dennis Des Chene) have three characteristics: they have 
convincing, but not definitive, empirical support; as such, they explain part of, but not all, of a 
particular problem; two or more elaborated hypotheses are offered as solutions to unresolved 
problems.  An example is hypotheses concerning the origin of life on earth.  Abiogenesis is the 
hypothesis life originated from chemical processes on earth, panspermia the hypothesis that life 
came to earth from somewhere else.  Both are supported by convincing, but not conclusive, 
evidence.   
 (as opposed to initial postulations).  Crucial resolutions are not 
just inferences to unobservables; when scientists initially propose them, they seem to 
resolve the anomalies which are regarded ex post facto as decisive, as in providing 
adequate grounds for deciding in favor of one or another of the elaborated hypotheses.  It 
is the decision between elaborated hypotheses, based on their relative merits with respect 
to explaining anomalies, that is a crucial resolution.  When scientists determine one 
specific problem (or set of problems) to be crucial they make a choice about what 
problems are the most important in a particular discipline at a particular time.  As a result, 
the elaborated hypotheses offered to solve these problems serve as a construing of the 
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state of a field.  Finally, the choice between elaborated hypotheses (the crucial resolution) 
shapes the subsequent development of a discipline.  
While a crucial resolution directs the path a field will take, these resolutions are 
not “revolutions,” in the Kuhnian sense.  As the following chapters demonstrate, crucial 
resolutions decide between already existing elaborated hypotheses, as opposed to 
radically changing a world view.  
Endocrinologists are very clear that “crucial resolutions” supply answers to 
previously unresolved issues, as well as providing direction for new research programs.  
There have been a number of such resolutions in the development of the field; in the 
following two chapters, I focus on one particular resolution that occurred in the late 
1930’s to the early 1940’s.  The issue in this case was whether in feminine embryonic 
development the mere absence of male hormones suffices, or if specifically female 
hormones are required.  As intimated by the previous discussion of “inductive stuffs,” 
this reflects the initially gendered framework vis a vis gonadal secretions. 
In this period, some researchers postulated both a male hormone and a female 
hormone that guided the impetus for male and female development, respectively.  This 
position is referred to in the literature as “di-hormonic.”  Other researchers hypothesized 
that only one substance was needed for male development; female embryonic 
development proceeded in the absence of hormonal stimulus.  Importantly for my 
argument, researchers decided in favor of one or the other view based their capacity to 
explain certain anomalous phenomena.  The view that has the greatest explanatory scope, 
that explains the most anomalous phenomena, resolves the “crucial” problems in a 
“crucial” fashion.  
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Two points of philosophical interest fall out of history of this debate.  First, and 
most generally, not all successful explanations of persistent anomalies are taken to be 
crucial resolutions.  I address reasons for this towards the end of this chapter.  Second, 
experiments designed to provide empirical support for a particular resolution often yield 
ambiguous results.  Yet the experiments often are interpreted by a large part of the 
scientific community as providing solid confirmation.  I also address this incongruity. 
These two points are historically related, but conceptually distinct.  In what 
follows, I present a history of endocrinology (focused on this specific question) in order 
to demonstrate that: 
(1) Crucial resolutions occur. 
(2) They are often formulated in response to initial, anomalous test results, but in 
advance of convincing empirical experiments, and thus are not equivalent to 
crucial experiments. 
(3) They inspire research programs to determine the precise mechanisms in the 
causal chain initiated by the postulated substances. 
(4) The crucial experiments generated by the research programs are often 
interpreted as supporting the crucial resolutions more strongly than the evidence 
allows. 
 
In what follows, I present arguments for both views concerning hormones and 
physical development, as well as some explanatory problems they face.  I then discuss the 
crucial resolution of this debate, and the reaction of the scientific community.  My main 
point is that crucial resolutions are postulated to resolve conceptual problems, and are so 
postulated in advance of unambiguously confirming empirical evidence.  In addition, 
crucial resolutions are accepted in spite of ambiguous empirical evidence.  
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II. One Hormone or Two? 
 
Researchers in the 1930’s discovered that injecting androgens into the developing 
fetuses of female rats and rabbits masculinized both their internal and external genitalia.40
Advocates of the di-hormonic theory held that both androgens and estrogens are 
actively involved in sexual differentiation. Wiesner presents the di-hormonic view as 
follows: 
  
This started a debate about the organizing potential of androgens and estrogens in utero.  
Scientists knew that androgens could masculinize female embryos, but could estrogens 
feminize male embryos?  In other words, what role, if any, do the estrogens play in 
physical sexual development? 
 
It is believed that the primordial of the genital organs are forced into male 
differentiation if and when the gonad develops into a testis and secretes male 
hormone; they become female if the gonad anlage assumes female type and 
produces a female hormone.41
 
   
A belief that echoes the initial presumption of inducing “material substances” 
(e.g., Conklin, 1933). 
                                                 
40 E.g. Moore, C., and Dorothy Price (1930). "The Question of Sex Hormone Antagonism." 
Proccedings of the Society for Experimental Biology and Medicine 28: 38 - 40. and Dantchakoff, 
V. (1937). "Embryogenie Experimentale." Compte Rendue de Seances de L'academie des 
Sciences: 195 - 200. 
 
41 Wiesner, B. P. (1934). "The Post-Natal Development of the Genital Organs in the Albino Rat." 
The Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology of the British Empire 61: 867 - 922. 
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One proponent of this view was R. R. Greene, who injected high levels of 
estrogens and androgens into pregnant rats in order to determine the effects on the 
offspring.  He found, contrary to the mono-hormonic theory, that estrogens have a 
profound effect on embryonic development.  Genetic males born from treated mothers 
exhibited a marked inhibition of the internal genitalia.  In one experiment, fourteen out of 
nineteen treated males had visible nipples, which were not normally seen in the male rats 
of the colony used.  Furthermore, in six of the animals, “there was a vagina which was 
comparable in development to that found in a normal new-born female.”42
These results, combined with his later studies of the effects of androgens on 
females, led Greene to conclude that “the available facts concerning mammalian 
development are more compatible with the di-hormonic theory.”
   
43
While the results of Greene provide convincing support for the di-hormonic 
theory, they are not definitive.  As will be discussed, other experimental results appeared 
  In addition, the di-
hormonic theory was more compatible with otherwise inexplicable facts.  Researchers at 
this time (and far into the future) did not know why the Müllerian ducts (which, if not 
inhibited, develop into the fallopian tubes, uterus, cervix and inner vagina) disintegrated 
in genetic males with typical androgen exposure.  The di-hormonic theory could give a 
putative answer to this question: female hormones were required to stimulate them.  
Without this stimulation, they disintegrated.  
                                                 
42 Greene, R. R., Burrill, M. W., and Ivy, A. C. (1938). "Experimental Intersexuality: The 
Production of Feminized Male Rats by Antenatal Treatment with Estrogen." Science 88(2275): 
130 - 131. 
  
43 Greene, R. R., Burrill, M. W. and Ivy, A. C. (1939). "Experimental Intersexuality: The Effect 
of Antenatal Androgens on Sexual Development of Female Rats." The American Journal of 
Anatomy 65: 416 - 455. 
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to undermine the theory.  In addition, while the di-hormonic theory could offer a solution 
to the long-standing question about Müllerian duct disintegration, it could not explain 
another persistent anomaly, what I call the “wrong medium” problem.   
In contrast to the di-hormonic view, the “mono-hormonic” theory “recognizes the 
absolute dominance of the male hormone in developmental processes and it describes the 
conditions under which female differentiation may occur in the absence of any, rather 
than in the presence of a specific, sex hormone.”44
In defense of the mono-hormonic theory, its advocates pointed out that earlier 
results had shown that androgen exposure masculinizes female fetuses.  In itself, these 
experimental results do not conflict with the di-hormonic theory.  However, those arguing 
in favor of the mono-hormonic theory make the additional claim that female hormones do 
not feminize male fetuses – implying that female hormones are inactive during 
embryonic development. 
  In short, only the male hormone is 
active in sexual differentiation in mammals; females develop as a result of the lack of 
androgens, as a “default,” or “neutral” developmental path.   
Wiesner’s studies of castrated female rats support this latter claim.  He discovered 
that, macroscopically, there was no difference between controls and gonadectomized 
females in 23 out of 29 cases.  Even though internal measurements of the uteri revealed 
underdevelopment in five of these cases,45
                                                 
44 Wiesner, B. P. (1935). "The Post-Natal Development of the Genital Organs in the Albino Rat." 
The Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology of the British Empire 62: 8 - 75. 
 Wiesner concludes: 
  
45 Wiesner, from his experiments, notes that: 
 
It appears that the uterus of the oopherectomized [female gonadectomized] animals is, in 
most instances, of about the same diameter as that of the control females . . . Deviations 
in either direction appear, but are, as a rule, of insignificant magnitude. 
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Prepubertal development of the genital organs thus appears to be independent of 
ovarian hormones. . . This conclusion appears not to be invalidated by the partial 
inhibition of development that occurred in five cases.46
 
   
Thus, even though the empirical results were ambiguous, Wiesner considers the 
mono-hormonic theory to be a better explanation of embryonic development.  I suspect 
that this is not (merely) a case of dismissing a small number of unexpected results as 
“noise,” but an attempt to address the general finding that male hormones induced 
masculinization of fetuses, while female hormones (for the most part) did not.  In short, 
there appeared to be an asymmetry in their developmental effects. 
As a result of this apparent asymmetry, one advocate of the mono-hormonic 
theory, R. K. Burns, writes: 
 
One is impressed with the apparent unimportance of female hormone contrasted 
with the ability of male hormone to remodel female external parts.  We have long 
been puzzled by the fact that in the fetus of mammals male development pursues 
its normal course untroubled by large quantities of female hormone in the 
placenta and amniotic fluid.  We should seriously consider the possibility that in 
mammals a mon-hormonic system of control largely prevails, perhaps especially 
evolved as an adaptation to intrauterine development.47
 
  [My emphasis] 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Wiesner, B. P. (1934). "The Post-Natal Development of the Genital Organs in the Albino Rat." 
The Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology of the British Empire 61: 867 - 922.  
 
46 Ibid. 
47  Burns, R. K. (1938). "Hormonal Control of Sexual Differentiation." The American Naturalist 
72(740): 207 - 227.  
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Here, Burns is referring to the “wrong medium” problem: how can typical male 
differentiation occurs within a female medium?  Specifically, pregnant mammals produce 
high levels of estrogens that can traverse the placenta and reach the fetus.  From this 
advocates of the mono-hormonic theory conclude that, if estrogens had any effect on 
sexual differentiation, all genetic male embryos would be feminized. 
Wiesner, for instance, offers this argument.  In addition, he claims that the mono-
hormonic theory is to be preferred because it explains a wide variety of developmental 
etiologies in a more simple fashion: 
 
When discussing the dihormonic theory attention was directed, in the first 
instance, to the limitations of its experimental basis.  But the main objections 
which were brought forward against the dihormonic theory, and which caused one 
to reject it, were derived from its failure to explain adequately and with 
reasonable economy of hypothesis, certain experimental facts, observations 
relating to normal embryonic development and, last but not least, teratological 
cases.48
 
   
“Economy of hypothesis” is with respect to explaining both (1) the typical male 
development, even after embryonic exposure to female hormones, and (2) ovarian 
activity over the course of normal female development.  (“Tetratological” refers to cases 
of intersexuality.)  We should note that the “economy” is not with respect to entities (that 
is, the number of hormones) but with respect to causal roles (the number of agents needed 
to instigate both typical and atypical outcomes).  As I discuss in chapter 7, this appeal to 
economy of hypothesis echoes the Kitcherian ideal of simplicity 
                                                 
48 Wiesner, B. P. (1935). "The Post-Natal Development of the Genital Organs in the Albino Rat." 
The Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology of the British Empire 62: 8 - 75. 
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The economy of hypothesis that explains the former problem (that of the wrong 
medium) by postulating that female hormones – both embryonic and maternal – have no 
effect on the development of the fetus.  In other words, female hormones don’t act as a 
causal agent during embryonic development.  
The latter involves a second unresolved problem: that of timing.  Because female 
puberty is defined in terms of “sex cycles” (estrus in lab animals), and these cycles are 
absent before puberty, it was generally assumed that ovarian function does not begin until 
puberty.  Combining this with the di-hormonic theory of embryonic development, 
Wiesner points out that: 
 
Thus some authorities are inclined to regard puberty as marking the inception of 
gonadic function in the female while, on the other hand, it is assumed with almost 
equal assurance that female differentiation proceeds under the influence of, and is 
dependent on, secretions of the ovary.  It is astonishing that this contradiction 
could not only persist in the literature without being subjected to experimental 
examination, but could be expressed by one and the same author.49
 
 
In other words, some scientists advocating the di-hormonic theory had put forth 
the inconsistent claims that female embryonic development requires hormones secreted 
by the ovary and the claim that female gonads do not become active until puberty.50
                                                 
49 Wiesner, B. P. (1934). "The Post-Natal Development of the Genital Organs in the Albino Rat." 
The Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology of the British Empire 61: 867 - 922.  Perhaps for 
reasons of professional diplomacy, Wiesner does not name specific authors. 
   
 
50 Contemporary endocrinology supports a more subtle version of this view: the gonads secrete 
“sex” hormones (of both types) during embryonic development, then they become dormant, and 
become active again during puberty. This theory of etiological development resolves the 
contradiction mentioned by Wiesner.   
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Wiesner offers the mono-hormonic theory as a means of resolving this 
contradiction (as well as the problem of the wrong medium): 
 
It will be seen that the occurrence of male differentiation in the female medium 
can hardly, if at all, be reconciled with the dihormonic theories; but it does not 
present any difficulty to the monhormonic theory.  The latter submits that ovarian 
hormones are neither necessary for female differentiation nor capable of 
accelerating it.  It was concluded that female hormone must meet with a 
differentiated female system in order to exert any noticeable effects, but cannot 
evoke the system upon which it is to act.  If feminization is not an effect of female 
hormone but a condition for the activity of the hormone, then it is clear why a 
male embryo (in which female differentiation has not occurred) does not react to 
female hormone.51
 
  
Given the presence of female hormones in the pregnant female, the di-hormonic 
theory cannot explain why this does not interfere with male development.  However, the 
mono-hormonic theory can provide an explanation for this - female hormones are not 
necessary for female embryonic development.  As such, female hormones are necessary 
only for the activation of puberty.  Ovarian hormones act only upon a differentiated 
female system, but do not stimulate this system to differentiate in utero.  This solves the 
initial question of why female hormones do not interfere with typical male 
development.52
                                                 
51 Wiesner, B. P. (1935). "The Post-Natal Development of the Genital Organs in the Albino Rat." 
The Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology of the British Empire 62: 8 - 75. 
  
 
52 Wiesner concludes that “the physiology of the sex cycle thus can hardly be identical with the 
physiology of the prepuberium.” Wiesner, B. P. (1934). "The Post-Natal Development of the 
Genital Organs in the Albino Rat." The Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology of the British 
Empire 61: 867 - 922.  
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It should be noted that Wiesner adopts the mono-hormonic hypothesis for reasons 
of simplicity.  Specifically, the etiological development of the pre-pubertal pubertal 
female is solely the result of genetic constitution, not hormonal influence:  
 
For reasons of simplicity, in view of the general physiological considerations, and 
in accordance with the principal assumption of this discussion, it may be assumed, 
therefore, that the differentiation in female direction of the indifferent genital 
anlagen occurs independently of ovarian hormones.  In other words, it may be 
concluded that the genetic constitution of the somatic cells of the zygotic female 
is sufficient to invoke their female differentiation.53
 
   
In addition to the appeal of explanatory simplicity that embodies Kitcher’s ideal 
of unification, this history of scientific investigation also accords beautifully with 
Craver’s discussion of the distinction between “how possibly” and “how actually” 
explanatory models.  Both the mono- and di-hormonic hypotheses fit the data, although 
with notable incongruities; they are, at this point in time, “how possibly” models.    
However, the resolution of the contradiction mentioned above, as well as that of 
the “wrong medium” problem, were not regarded as “crucial.”  Because of conflicting 
and ambiguous results (such as those from Greene), laboratory tests do not provide 
incontrovertible proof of the mono-hormonic theory.  But the mono-hormonic theory 
could provide a theoretical resolution where the di-hormonic theory could not: a 
resolution of the “freemartin problem.”   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
53 Wiesner, B. P. (1935). "The Post-Natal Development of the Genital Organs in the Albino Rat." 
The Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology of the British Empire 62: 8 - 75. 
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III. The Freemartin Problem and Frank Lillie’s Resolution 
 
Freemartins were an etiological mystery as well as an economic problem (and are 
to this day).54
However, the male halves display no pseudo-hermaphroditism.  The cause of this 
asymmetry was a long-standing problem in the field of endocrinology.  Frank Lillie, the 
subject of this section, is famous for the initial resolution of the freemartin problem.  
 Freemartins are the female half of male-female bovine twins, exhibiting 
pseudo-hermaphroditism in the form of masculinized internal genitalia and behavior.  
Specifically, freemartins display markedly inhibited Müllerian ducts, and moderately 
masculinized Wolffian ducts.  One of the key facts that distinguish freemartins from other 
pseudo-hermaphrodites is that the internal, but not the external, genitalia are profoundly 
masculinized.   
When endocrinologists refer to the resolution of the “freemartin problem,” I have 
discovered that they can refer to one of two related, but conceptually distinct, resolutions.  
In the history of endocrinology, there have been two “resolutions” to this problem – the 
first proposed by Frank Lillie, who deduced the general mechanisms behind the 
freemartin, the second proposed in terms of the mono-versus di-hormonic debate.  The 
latter of these resolutions is crucial, the former is not.  The important philosophical point, 
for my purposes, is not there were two resolutions, but that the first was radically re-
interpreted in light of the latter.  In other words, Lillie’s resolution became crucial after 
the fact.  
                                                 
54 “In a dairy production system, freemartins are of little economic value because their ability to 
conceive and subsequently lactate is impaired, unless a market for dairy beef exists.” Padula, M. 
(2005). "The Freemartin Syndrome: An Update." Animal Reproduction Science 87: 93 - 109. 
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Lillie’s initial resolution had several important impacts on the field of 
endocrinology: it crystallized a method of investigation; shifted the emphasis of 
developmental etiology from genetic to hormonal factors; and provided a crucial platform 
for the triumph of the mono-hormonic theory of embryonic sexual differentiation. 55
Lillie came to the realization that studying deviations from the typical 
developmental process could shed light on both deviant and typical outcomes.  In other 
words, studying the “exceptions” to the (observed) rules could illuminate the 
(mechanisms of) rules themselves.  According to Blanche Capel and Doug Coveney: 
 
 
This monumental contribution re-focused the field of mammalian reproduction, 
laying the framework for advances in reproductive endocrinology and sex 
differentiation in the 20th and 21st centuries.56
 
 
                                                 
55 Witschi notes: 
A closer analysis of the inductor activity indicates, furthermore, that the visible 
morphological differentiations are evoked by special chemical substances which are 
produced and released by the inductors.  This assumption was probably first suggested 
and supported by F. R. Lillie in his classical studies on the cattle free-martins.  The now 
well equally established fact that in primates a similar exchange of blood between male 
and female embryos does not interfere with normal sex development cannot reduce the 
importance of the free-martin case; though it proves that the mechanism of induction 
deserves a more detailed investigation. 
 
 Witschi, E. (1937). "Stimulative and Inhibitive Induction in the Development of Primary and 
Secondary Sex Characters." Proccedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America 23(1): 35 - 39. 
 
56 Capel, B., and Coveney, Doug (2004). "Frank Lillie's Freemartin: Illuminating the Pathway to 
21st Century Reproductive Endocrinology." Journal of Experimental Zoology 301A: 853 - 856. 
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Lillie’s basic methodology remains to this day the core of developmental 
endocrinological research: induce57
Before Lillie’s resolution, many biologists (including, initially, Lillie himself) 
believed the freemartin to be an insufficiently masculinized genetic male.  In terms of 
causation, this meant that the genes determining sex, rather than hormones, were the 
primary agents of sexual differentiation.
 and investigate deviations from the norm in order to 
understand the mechanisms of both typical and atypical development. 
58
 
  However, subsequent examinations of 
male/freemartin fetuses revealed them to be dizygotic, rather than monozygotic, twins.  
According to Capel and Coveny: 
Because internal organs are phenotypically male in freemartins, most breeders 
and other biologists believed that the freemartin must be an insufficiently 
masculinized genetic male. . . . Lillie questioned this interpretation on the grounds 
that it did not explain why the occurrence of freemartins was limited to cattle 
while other animals gave rise to twins of normal sexual phenotypes.59
                                                 
57 Importantly, Lillie did not induce freemartins – he examined those post-natal specimens 
brought to his attention, or embryos from slaughtered cows.  Due to the lack of knowledge about 
the causes of the freemartin phenotype (which is distinct from other sorts of female pseudo-
hermaphroditism), endocrinologists have not been able to reproduce the freemartin effect under 
laboratory conditions until approximately 20 years ago. With other animals, however, advances in 
hormone isolation allowed for inducement.  
 
   
58 For instance: 
 
Hart argued that the freemartin phenotype formed as a consequence of monozygotic 
twinning in  a male embryo.  At the time of twinning, the gonad-forming region was 
segregated to only one twin which became the male while the other twin became the 
freemartin. 
 
Freeman, G. (2007). "Explaining the Freemartin: Tandler and Keller vs. Lillie and the Question 
of Priority." Journal of Experimental Zoology 308B: 105 - 112. 
 
59 Capel, B., and Coveney, Doug (2004). "Frank Lillie's Freemartin: Illuminating the Pathway to 
21st Century Reproductive Endocrinology." Ibid. 301A: 853 - 856. 
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For Lillie, the freemartin problem became not just a question of its developmental 
etiology, but also why the condition was (apparently) exclusive to cattle.  He believed 
that answering the second question would answer the first.   
Lillie concluded that, because the placentas of bovine twins can fuse in utero, the 
developing testis of the male produces a substance that influences the development of the 
female, thus producing a freemartin.  Crucially for my argument, Lillie did not describe 
the substance as an androgen, but simply as a “male factor.”  The crucial resolution (to be 
discussed later) made the assumption that freemartins were the result of androgen 
exposure.  While freemartins are the result of a “male factor,” the primary factor is not an 
androgen, but the Müllerian inhibiting substance: 
 
In the case of a heterosexual twin pregnancy the female foetus exposed to AMG 
[anti-Müllerian gonadotropin] (produced by the testes of its male twin and 
circulating through placental vascular anastomoses), shows ovarian stunting and 
develops various degrees of masculinization, including uterine and vaginal 
hypoplasia, accompanied by occasional presences of male genital tract 
derivatives.60
 
 
Lillie correctly concluded that freemartins occur in cases of dizygotic twinning 
where one twin is genetically male and the other genetically female.  This fundamental 
shift in view had profound implications for sexual development.  First, it implied that the 
                                                 
60 Rota, A., et. al. (2002). "Age Dependent Changes in Plasma Anti-Mullerian Hormone 
Concentrations in the Bovine Male, Female, and Freemartin from Birth to Puberty: Relationship 
Between Testosterone Production and Influence on Sex Differentiation." General and 
Comparative Endocrinology 129: 39 - 44. 
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internal reproductive organs may not always be the most reliable measure of genetic sex.  
Second, it indicated that the freemartin was not the result of sub-male development, but 
rather the result of active disruptive influences of the male twin on female development.61
Lillie proposed that sex characteristics in mammals are controlled by (1) a 
primary zygotic determinant (which we now refer to as “genetic sex”) and (2) secondary 
internal secretions that play specific roles in the differentiation of certain sex 
characteristics.
 
62  Lillie also pointed out “that the female zygote must contain factors for 
both sexes; the primary determination of the female sex must therefore be due to the 
dominance of female factors over the male.”63
Lillie’s studies were published at the time when the mono- versus di-hormonic 
debate still raged.  It is interesting to note that Lillie phrases his conclusions in such a 
way that could be read to support either of the competing theories. 
 
On the face of it, it is not clear whether the dominant “female factors” are those of 
genetic sex, female hormones, or both.  To account for the one-way effect of sex reversal 
in freemartins (i.e., why male embryos subvert the development of their female co-twin, 
but females do not affect their anastomosed male partner), Lillie hypothesized a 
combination of both kinds of factors.  He pointed to evidence for the earlier appearance 
of steroidogenic cells in males, and concluded that differentiation of males occurs early 
                                                 
61 Capel, B., and Coveney, Doug (2004). "Frank Lillie's Freemartin: Illuminating the Pathway to 
21st Century Reproductive Endocrinology." Journal of Experimental Zoology 301A: 853 - 856. 
 
62 Hartman writes: “The principle of hormone influence in fetal life, first demonstrated by Lillie, 
constitutes the most important contribution to the subject as yet made.” Hartman, C. (1920). "The 
Free-Martin and its Reciprocal: Opossum, Man, Dog." Science 52(1350): 469 - 471. 
 
63 Quoted in Capel, B., and Coveney, Doug (2004). "Frank Lillie's Freemartin: Illuminating the 
Pathway to 21st Century Reproductive Endocrinology." Journal of Experimental Zoology 301A: 
853 - 856. 
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enough to influence female development whereas development of females occurs too late 
to affect development of the male co-twin.  When it comes to bovine twins: 
 
If both are males or both are females no harm results from this; but if one is male 
and the other female, the reproductive system of the female is largely suppressed, 
and certain male organs even develop in the female.  This is unquestionably to be 
interpreted as a case of hormone action.  It is not yet determined whether the 
invariable result of sterilization of the female at the expense of the male is due to 
more precocious development of the male hormones, or to a certain natural 
dominance of male over female hormones.64
 
 [Original emphasis] 
In other words, Lillie did not interpret his results as providing a resolution to the 
mono- versus di-hormonic debate. 
 
 
IV. Resolution of the Freemartin Problem as Crucial 
 
In spite of Lillie’s agnosticism, later scientists interpreted Lillie’s findings as 
conclusive proof of the mono-hormonic theory.  One reason for this was that the mono-
hormonic theory could explain the freemartin problem in a much more simple and 
straight-forward fashion than the di-hormonic theory.  
According to the di-hormonic theory, the hormones of the female twin should 
effect the development of the male twin, not just the female.  Both male and female 
embryos sharing the same womb should become pseudo-hermaphrodites (even though 
                                                 
64 Lillie, F. (1916). "The Theory of the Free-Martin." Science 43(1113): 611 - 613. 
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this demonstrably is not the case in primates).  Wiesner points out that di-hormonic 
theory cannot: 
 
[E]xplain why the presence of female hormone in the amniotic fluid of certain 
species does not affect male differentiation of the embryo.  It has been suggested, 
in the resulting embarrassment, that the female hormone (oestrin) present in the 
amniotic fluid is not identical with the embryonic ovarian hormone which directs 
female differentiation; it still remains to be explained why the hypothetical 
embryonic female hormone of the free-martin fails to disturb the differentiation of 
the male twin of the free-martin.65
 
   
Thus the problem: the di-hormonic assumption that the female hormone is 
“active” during embryonic development cannot explain why only the female bovine twin 
displays pseudohermaphroditism.  To resolve this problem, Wiesner and others advocate 
the mono-hormonic theory: only the male hormone is active during embryonic 
development, thus affecting both male and female fetuses alike.66
                                                 
65 Wiesner, B. P. (1934). "The Post-Natal Development of the Genital Organs in the Albino Rat." 
The Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology of the British Empire 61: 867 - 922. 
   On the face of it, this 
is an entirely plausible interpretation.  Unfortunately for mono-hormonic advocates, 
attempts to replicate the freemartin effect in laboratory animals were completely 
unsuccessful.  Specifically, exposing female embryos to testosterone, while 
 
66 Capel writes: 
 
Based on these observations, Lillie developed a hormone theory of the freemartin effect, 
in which he proposed that partial male development is imposed on the female twin by 
circulating sex hormones produced by her male co-twin. 
 
 Capel, B., and Coveney, Doug (2004). "Frank Lillie's Freemartin: Illuminating the Pathway to 
21st Century Reproductive Endocrinology." Journal of Experimental Zoology 301A: 853 - 856. 
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masculinizing the external genitalia, did not masculinize the internal genitalia.  This 
discrepancy is, in part, the motivation for Jost’s work, discussed in the following 
chapter.67
This resolution, unlike those of the “timing” and “wrong medium” is crucial.  In 
what follows, I present some initial reasons why the resolution of the freemartin problem 
was regarded as crucial, while those of timing and media were not.  
 
As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, crucial resolutions are often 
presented in advance of unequivocal experimental confirmation.  Although the mono-
hormonic theory was held to have resolved questions of timing and medium, the 
experimental data were in fact ambiguous.  In contrast to those earlier issues, the 
resolution of the freemartin problem avoided troublesome empirical results of the sort 
discovered by Greene and Wiesner. 
Because cattle are not often used as laboratory animals, the freemartin data took 
on the character of a thought experiment.  Very few endocrinological experiments were 
performed on large mammals – including cattle – on account of financial, spatial and 
temporal issues.68
                                                 
67 As Rota points out:  
  Lillie was able to complete his studies only because he owned a large 
cattle farm and had developed good connections with some Chicago stockyards.  Because 
 
Jost (1953) was the first to suspect that testicular tissue not only produced testosterone, 
the chemical responsible for the development of male external genitalia in rabbit fetuses, 
but also produced a substance that induced regression of the Müllerian ducts. 
 
Rota, A., et. al. (2002). "Age Dependent Changes in Plasma Anti-Mullerian Hormone 
Concentrations in the Bovine Male, Female, and Freemartin from Birth to Puberty: Relationship 
Between Testosterone Production and Influence on Sex Differentiation." General and 
Comparative Endocrinology 129: 39 - 44.  
 
68 Interestingly, after Lillie offered his initial resolution, very little work was done on freemartins.  
Contemporary research is published primarily in veterinary journals. 
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of its resemblance to a thought experiment, Lillie’s work could be idealized by later 
commentators as containing no empirical ambiguities.  
The resolution of the freemartin problem also solved those of timing and media.  
This specific resolution shares many similarities with another: Einstein’s resolution of the 
conflict between the constant speed of light and the addition of velocities.  His theory of 
special relativity depended heavily upon thought experiment; it resolved several 
outstanding problems and was presented (and largely accepted) in advance of 
experimental confirmation.  Much like the initial resolution presented by Lillie, the 
famous Michelson-Moreley experiments were reinterpreted in light of special relativity.  
The answer to the freemartin problem, moreover, resulted in:  
 
[T]he end of a problem of long standing and the beginning of a period of 
experiments on the mechanisms of sex differentiation, differing widely in method 
but having in common the theoretical conception developed for the freemartin – 
that sex-specific hormones are produced, circulate with the blood and act upon the 
appropriate embryonic structures during the plastic stages of development.69
 
 
In other words, the resolution of the freemartin problem, like the adoption of 
special relativity, initiated a new research program devoted to understanding the 
mechanisms behind androgen-stimulated embryonic development.  
 
 
V. Conclusion 
                                                 
69 Burns, R. K. (1938). "Hormonal Control of Sexual Differentiation." The American Naturalist 
72(740): 207 - 227. 
 47 
 
    
The scientific community of endocrinologists during this time period, in the main, 
accepted the resolution of the freemartin problem as crucial.  This resolution is crucial 
because it solved not just the freemartin problem, but also was perceived as conclusive 
evidence for one of two elaborated hypotheses.  In spite of its “thought-experiment” like 
character, this resolution not only inspired a general research program, but also 
influenced how scientists interpreted the results of this program.  (I address this in the 
following chapter.) 
More generally, crucial resolutions are sometimes formulated in response to 
initial, anomalous test results, but in advance of convincing empirical experiments, and 
thus are more like thought experiments than those performed in the laboratory.  Which 
solutions to problems (and hence which problems) turn out to be crucial is not determined 
solely by the formal features of the hypothesis or its content.  Instead, crucialness is a 
construction placed upon the “problem-solution” field at a particular point of time: those 
problems deemed the most important, and the elaborated hypotheses proposed to solve 
them, set the stage for crucial resolutions. 
That a hypothesis offers a crucial resolution sometimes leads to an over-
estimation of the evidence in its favor, as well as a simplification of the results.  This can 
be seen in the scientific community’s general interpretation of Lillie’s initial resolution 
and, as discussed in the next chapter, the experimental results of Jost.  Part of the reasons 
for this were the assumptions made about the nature of the competing hypotheses.  A 
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more interesting part (for my purpose) is due to the importance of the resolution to the 
field of endocrinology in general. 
These resolutions inspire research programs – in the case of endocrinology, a 
program to determine the precise mechanisms in the causal chain initiated by the 
postulated substances.  Because of the tendency to give crucial resolutions more weight 
than the evidence merits, as well as the tendency to over-simplify the results, they can 
determine the course of a discipline and, as such, the actual body of knowledge.  This is 
discussed more thoroughly in the following three chapters. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
The Logic of Discovery and Jost’s Experimental Confirmation 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 
While it has been a standard view in philosophy of science that there can be no 
logic of discovery, I argue that the phenomenon of crucial resolutions demonstrates that 
there can be.  Specifically, the formulation of elaborated hypotheses and the crucial 
resolutions that decide between them contitute a logic of discovery.  This claim, on the 
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face of it, is ambiguous: for, as I argue, several discussions have equivocated on the term 
‘discovery,’ and have been less than clear about what it means for discovery to have a 
‘logic.’  In what follows, I aim to disambiguate these terms. 
 In his 1973 article, “Does Scientific Discovery Have a Logic,”70 Herbert Simon 
argues that it does, albeit not in the narrow, Popperian sense.71
 Simon argues that this underlying problem of induction is a red herring.  If one 
understands the process of discovery as that of interpreting, in a “parsimonious” fashion, 
sets of empirical data, and a normative theory of scientific discovery as a set of criteria 
for evaluating this discovery process, then, if we can give both a descriptive account of 
scientific discovery and a normative account of the process of discovery, we will have 
constructed a logic of discovery.  
 Simon suggests that this 
disbelief in the possibility of a logic of discovery rests upon the assumption that any 
normative theory of discovery invokes the long-standing philosophical problem of 
induction: if the discovery of theories proceeds by induction upon (limited) data sets, how 
can we be sure that those inductions are correct?  Because data sets outside the field of 
theoretical mathematics are, almost by definition, limited, any induction upon them must 
involve a “creative element.”   
 In what follows I detail how Simon’s philosophical claims apply to the processes 
of discovery in the history of behavioral endocrinology.  I claim that many, but not all, of 
Simon’s arguments can be substantiated using examples within the history of the field.  
                                                 
70 Simon, H. (1973). "Does Scientific Discovery Have a Logic?" Philosophy of Science 40(4): 
471 - 480. 
 
71 While Reichenbach argues that the context of discovery is irrelevant to the context of 
justification, Popper makes the stronger claim that there can be no logic of justification. 
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In particular, I draw upon the mono- vs. di-hormonic debate discussed in the previous 
chapter although, as we shall see in later chapters, Simon’s arguments can be instantiated 
with other examples.  Both the elaborated hypotheses and the crucial resolutions that 
decide between them – the “discoveries” – contain a normative element.  Their discovery 
is not capricious, but due to “good reasons.”72
In addition, the logic of discovery influences the process of confirmation – and 
not merely by determining which problems to investigate.  As I demonstrate with Jost’s 
experimental confirmation of the mono-hormonic theory and, more importantly, the 
scientific community’s reaction to it, many of the normative elements of discovery 
influence the process of confirmation.  I discuss this in the final section of this chapter. 
  
  
II. The Distinction 
 
The distinction between the process of discovery (or invention) of scientific 
theories73
                                                 
72 Carl Kordig’s phrase. 
 and the practice of justifying those theories – as famously articulated by Karl 
Popper and Hans Reichenbach – implies that the process of discovery contains an 
irrational element.  As such, there can be no normative theory of scientific discovery.  
While the claim that there can be no logic of discovery has been disputed by several 
  
73 Traditionally, this claim is phrased in terms of scientific laws.  Because I discuss a particular 
sub-field of biology – a field that is traditionally more “messy” than that of, say, physics – I 
prefer to use the term ‘theory’ due to its less stringent implications. 
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philosophers,74
Popper, in his philosophical classic The Logic of Scientific Discovery, makes the 
strong claim that there is no logic to scientific discovery.  He argues that: 
 few have undertaken detailed historical examinations to support this 
claim. 
 
The initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me neither 
to call for logical analysis nor be susceptible of it.  The question how it happens 
when a new idea occurs to man – whether it is a musical theme, a dramatic 
conflict, or a scientific theory – may be of great interest to empirical psychology; 
but it is irrelevant to the logical analysis of scientific knowledge . . . my view of 
the matter, for what it is worth, is that there is no such thing as a logical method of 
having new ideas, or a logical reconstruction of this process.  My view may be 
expressed by saying that every discovery contains an ‘irrational element’, or a 
‘creative intuition’, in Bergson’s sense.75
 
 
 Popper’s claim brings up two questions: (1) is it the case that every scientific 
discovery contains an irrational element?  It is certainly the case that some do.76
                                                 
74 Including Kevin Kelly (1987), Andrew Lugg (1985), Nelson Hanson (1958), and, most 
famously, C. S. Pierce (1960).  
 And (2): 
is it the case that the process of discovery is solely irrational?  Interpreting Popper’s claim 
 
75 Popper, K. (1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York, Basic Books.  
 
76 Perhaps the most famous example of the “irrationality” of discovery is the case of Kekule’s 
realization of the benzene ring structure through a dream.  For a discussion of the potential 
rational aspects of Kekule’s discovery, see. Koertge, N. (1982). "Explaining Scientific 
Discovery." PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 
1: 14 - 28.  
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in light of the second question construes it in much broader terms than that of the first 
question: discovery takes on a “mystical”77
Viewing Popper’s claim in light of the first question brings up two additional 
questions.  First, is it true?  Are there cases of scientific discovery that do not contain 
irrational (or ‘creative’) elements?  Second, if it is true, if there are irrational elements in 
every scientific discovery, does this automatically disbar it from logical analysis?  As I 
argue later, the existence of irrational elements in hypothesis formation (in the case of 
behavioral endocrinology, cultural preconceptions about gender) does not preclude 
logical analysis.  As such, Popper’s strong claim is, strictly speaking, false. 
 quality. 
But what about Reichenbach’s weaker claim, that the logic of discovery is 
irrelevant to the logic of justification?  Reichenbach introduces the terms ‘context of 
discovery’ and ‘context of justification’ to distinguish between the psychological origin 
of a claim and the epistemological evaluation of said claim.  This distinction relies upon 
another: that of the distinction between psychology and epistemology.78
                                                 
77 Simon’s term.  Several philosophers, while upholding the distinction, deny that the process of 
discovery is (in general) lacking of all rational elements.  One such is Siegel, who points out that, 
for example: 
 If the initial 
 
[I]t is perfectly compatible with Reichenbach’s position that a scientist who keeps certain 
principles of justification in mind (say, that hypotheses must survive attempts at 
falsification; that they are likely to be “limiting cases” of previous theory; that they must 
not overlook crucial types of observational data; etc.) will be aided, by doing so, in the 
attempt at discovery. 
 
Siegel, H. (1980). "Justification, Discovery, and the Naturalizing of Epistemology." Philosophy 
of Science 47(2): 297 - 321. 
 
78 Harvey Siegel claims: 
 
These distinctions are closely related, in that the context of discovery is primarily 
concerned with the psychological origins of (scientific) ideas, while the context of 
justification is primarily concerned with the epistemological evaluation of such ideas.  
(Indeed, for Reichenbach, at any rate, the two distinctions may collapse into one.) 
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distinction between discovery and justification holds, and if there can be some sort of 
“logic” to the process of justification, is the same true for the process of discovery? 
While some philosophers claim that the discovery/justification distinction, as 
initially introduced, contains an ambiguity in the notion of ‘discovery,’ I claim that there 
is also an ambiguity in the notion of justification.  In particular, the acceptance of a 
hypothesis does not always coincide with its empirical justification; the acceptance of a 
resolution as crucial influences the interpretation of empirical attempts at confirmation.  I 
address this later, in my discussion of Jost’s experimental confirmation.  But first, I 
present arguments in support of a logic of discovery. 
  
III. Towards a Logic of Discovery 
 
 Several philosophers of science claim that there can be a logic of discovery.  
Historically, the arguments of C. S. Peirce have been the most influential.  Peirce coined 
the term ‘retroduction’ as a label for the systematic processes leading to the discovery of 
scientific theories.  Norwood Hanson adopts this term in his Patterns of Discovery, and 
gives as an example an account of the retroductive path, inferred from Tycho Brahe’s 
data, that led Kepler to discovery the elliptical orbits of the planets. 
 Arguing against a “mystical” account of discovery, Hanson claims: 
 
H-D [hypothetical-deductive] accounts all agree that physical laws explain data, 
but they obscure the initial connexion between data and laws; indeed, they 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Ibid.  
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suggest that the fundamental inference is from higher-order hypotheses to 
observation statements.  This may be a way of setting out one’s reasons for 
accepting a hypothesis after it is got, or for making a prediction, but it is not a 
way of setting out reasons for proposing or for trying an hypothesis in the first 
place.  Yet the initial suggestion of an hypothesis is very often a reasonable affair.  
It is not so often affected by intuition, insight, hunches, or other imponderables as 
biographers or scientists suggest.  Disciples of the H-D account often dismiss the 
dawning of an hypothesis as being of psychological interest only, or else claim it 
to be the province solely of genius and not of logic.  They are wrong.  If 
establishing an hypothesis through its predictions has a logic, so has the 
conceiving of an hypothesis.79
 
 
 Hanson describes Kepler’s retroductive thought process as struggling with 
Tycho’s observational data of the orbit of Mars until he perceived a pattern in the 
phenomena: that the surprising data could be explained easily were the orbit an ellipse.  
Unlike proponents of the H-D view, Hanson interprets Kepler to have based his 
retroductive inference on the fact that there is a certain pattern within Tycho’s data: 
“Perceiving the pattern in the phenomena is central to their being ‘explicable as a matter 
of course.’”80 As a result, Kepler’s perception managed to pull together the “enormous 
heap of calculations, velocities, positions and distances which had set [him] his problem . 
. . into a geometrically intelligible pattern.”81
                                                 
79 Hanson, N. (1958). Patterns of Discovery. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.  
 
 
80 Ibid.  
 
81 Ibid.  After a careful reconstruction of Kepler’s thought patterns, Lugg concludes: 
 
By thinking his [Kepler’s] thoughts after him, we can follow him through the various 
stages of his inquiry and conclude – as Hanson does at the end of his description of the 
discovery – that he never projected explanations capriciously but always had good 
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 But this intelligible pattern involves more than (merely) scrutinizing the data.  
Hanson claims that the conceiving of a hypothesis can appeal to the virtues of 
“explanatory fertility,” “aesthetic elegance,” “symmetry,” as well as “simplicity.”82
 But herein lies one of the ambiguities alluded to earlier.  On both Hanson’s and 
Simon’s account, “initial plausible suggestions” can mean either what I have been calling 
elaborated hypotheses, or it can refer to suggestions made during an earlier stage in the 
development of the field and, as such, can consist of plausible suggestions made initially 
(such as the suggestion that internal secretions play an important role in mammalian 
sexual development, as opposed to genetic factors per se.)   
  
These virtues, he claims, have a “rational function” in the process of formulating initial, 
plausible suggestions.  
More abstractly, philosopher Carl Kordig, for instance, agrees with Hanson (and 
Simon) that there can be a logic of discovery, he claims that Hanson, in his discussion, 
equates “discovery” in general with initial plausibility.83
                                                                                                                                                 
reasons for proposing the modification [of previous theories] he did.  Kepler’s 
investigations were certainly complicated and ingenious, but they were never recondite.  
Although his discovery was a work of great genius, we can in retrospect understand 
explain both his successes and failures.  The brilliance of Kepler’s achievement lay in the 
quality of his argument, not in its inscrutability. 
 This reflects an underlying 
ambiguity in philosophical discussions of discovery: the failure to distinguish between 
initial suggestions and plausible initial suggestions.  To remedy this, Kordig proposes a 
tripartite distinction: initial thinking, plausibility, and acceptability. 
 
Lugg, A. (1985). "The Process of Discovery." Philosophy of Science 52(2): 207-220. 
 
82 Hanson, N. (1971). The Idea of a Logic of Discovery. What I do not Believe and Other Essays. 
T. a. Woolf. Dordrecht, D. Reidel.  
 
83 Kordig, C. (1978). "Discovery and Justification." Philosophy of Science 45(1): 110 - 117. 
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Initial thinking – the imagining or guessing of hypotheses regardless of their plausibility 
– is, according to Kordig, a creative act.  Here, Kordig concedes, relativists like Kuhn 
might be correct: cultural and psychological factors can influence initial thinking (as we 
have seen with the initial, gendered discussion of hormones).  As such: 
 
The phrase “discovery of” often means “initial thought of.”  Here logic is not 
essential to discovery, as logical empiricists stress.  Good reasons are not required 
to think, as all of us know at least sometimes.  Initial thoughts – Kekule’s dream 
of the Benzene ring, Poincare’s intuition boarding a train, Ramanujan’s divine 
illuminations, etc. – at times lack evidential reasons.84
 
 
 Because of this lack of evidence, not every initial suggestion survives.  Initial 
thought is prior to both plausibility and acceptance.  Good reasons, essential to 
plausibility and justification, are not essential to initial suggestions.  As such, initial 
thinking is logically distinct from both. 
The second distinction Kordig makes, plausibility, is more difficult to 
disambiguate.  Why might one initial thought be considered worthy of further pursuit, 
and not another?  Kordig does not address this,85
                                                 
84 Ibid. 
 but discusses what makes one initial 
thought (hypothesis) more plausible than another.  He points out that: 
 
85 Kordig’s (brief) discussion of plausibility is ambiguous on this point.  He writes: 
 
There are many ways to express this.  Hypotheses are initially plausible prior to test.  
They are worthy of further consideration, though not yet acceptance.  Consideration of 
one hypothesis rather than another is often reasonable.  Good reasons may support an 
hypothesis’ possible truth and promise. 
 
Ibid. 
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Scientists aware of two hypotheses, sometimes reasonably suggest that only one 
be considered further.  One may be simpler than the other.  Before test good 
reasons often support an hypothesis’ being at least somewhat reasonable.  After 
its initial psychological occurrence, an hypothesis may be elaborated, seriously 
proposed, deemed promising and plausible to explore.86
 
 
From Kordig’s wording, it is not clear if initially plausible hypotheses, on his 
account, would count as elaborated hypotheses, with the choice between them a crucial 
resolution, or if the postulations take place earlier in the research process.  For the sake of 
argument, I concentrate on the plausibility, or “reasonableness,” of elaborated 
hypotheses. 
 We can see the virtues mentioned by Hanson at play in both the mono- and the di-
hormonic theories of development.  In terms of explanatory simplicity, the di-hormonic 
theory could not resolve the “wrong medium” or the “wrong timing” problem, while it 
appeared that the mono-hormonic theory could.  It is worthwhile to reiterate Wiesner’s 
(negative) arguments for the mono-hormonic theory: 
 
But the main objections which were brought against the dihormonic theory, and 
which caused one to reject it, were derived from its failure to explain adequately 
and with reasonable economy of hypothesis, certain experimental facts [the wrong 
medium], observations relating to normal embryonic development [wrong timing] 
and, last but not least, teratological [intersexual] cases.87
 
 
                                                 
86 Ibid. 
 
87 Wiesner, B. P. (1935). "The Post-Natal Development of the Genital Organs in the Albino Rat." 
The Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology of the British Empire 62: 8 - 75. 
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 The virtue of aesthetic elegance is more difficult to illuminate (as well as 
illustrate), in part because whats counts as an elegant hypothesis, much like what counts 
as a descent mousseline, depends upon context, the available “ingredients,” and personal 
and professional taste.  Complicating matters further, personal and professional taste are 
often strongly influenced by the prevailing cultural milliue.  Nonetheless, both the mono 
and the di-hormonic theories can be described as possessing aesthetic elegance of a sort.  
The di-hormonic theory, in assuming there to be two inductive “stuffs,” accords with the 
presumption of two different physiological developmental endpoints.  On the face of it, it 
makes sense that two different physiologies are the result of two different inducing 
factors.  The mono-hormonic theory, with its presumption of only one active element, 
proposes a more simple causal pathway. 
 Likewise, both elaborated hypotheses can claim the virtue of explanatory fertility.  
In a negative sense, the mono-hormonic theory is “fertile” in that it can answer the 
problems of media and timing.  In a positive sense, the di-hormonic theory accounts for 
the empirical results of Greene and the “noise” encountered by Wiesner. 
 In the context of biology (as opposed to that of physics) the virtue of symmetry is 
difficult to elucidate.  Nonetheless, one of the outstanding questions of mammalian 
sexual development was that of the “asymmetry in potential,” a question that inspired 
Jost’s experimental work.  
 Although, as Simon points out, Hanson does not provide an explicit formal theory 
of the retroductive process,88
                                                 
88 Simon, H. (1973). "Does Scientific Discovery Have a Logic?" Philosophy of Science 40(4): 
471 - 480. 
 I claim that a ‘formal’ (in the sense of universal) logic is not 
necessary.  This is for two reasons.  First, as later philosophers point out, different 
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scientific fields have different methods of confirmation.  As such, there can be no 
singular, explicit ‘formal’ logic of justification.  If there is no formal logic of 
justification, how can there be an explicit formal logic of discovery?  Second, scientific 
discoveries are made with respect to overarching cognitive goals – goals that vary from 
field to field, research project to research project.  In what follows, I discuss a specific 
research project: that of Alfred Jost. 
 
IV. Jost’s Experimental Confirmation 
 
The mono-hormonic theory was largely experimentally confirmed by Alfred Jost, 
who, beginning in the late 1940’s, worked out the basic mechanisms of sexual 
differentiation in mammals.89 Jost was especially puzzled by the fact that the male duct 
system degenerated without a fetal testis, but the female system could develop in the 
absence of an ovary, and even develop in male embryos.  He wondered why the two 
systems displayed such different development potentials.90
                                                 
89 For instance, Jean Wilson writes: “The fundamental mechanism of sexual differentiation of the 
male and female phenotypes was elucidated by Alfred Jost between 1947 and 1952.”  In Wilson, 
J. D. (1989). "Sexual Differentiation of the Gonads of the Reproductive Tract." Biology of the 
Neonate 55(6): 322 - 330.  Melissa Hines credits Jost with first describing genital feminization in 
the absence of gonadal hormones in Hines, M. (2004). Brain Gender. New York, Oxford 
University Press.  Finally, Breedlove and Hampson write: “The chain of events during sexual 
differentiation is well understood in placental mammals such as ourselves, and was largely 
worked out by Alfred Jost.” Breedlove, S. M., and Hampson, Elizabeth (2002). Sexual 
Differentiation of the Brain and Behavior. Behavioral Endocrinology. B. Becker, Crews and 
McCarthy. Cambridge, MIT Press. 
  Because males have no 
 
90 Jost writes: 
 
On peut naturellement se demander si cette différence entre les deux sortes de gonoductes 
ne relève pas de causes plus generales.  La persistance des canaux des Müller des 
femelles castrées est-elle due à une action précoce des ovaires s’exerçant avant le 
moment de la castration? Pour répondre à cette question, il faudra ovariectomiser des 
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ovaries, fetal gonadal secretions could not be responsible for the development of the 
female reproductive system.  He speculated that maternal estrogen or perhaps estrogen 
produced in the male adrenal system might cause female duct development.91
Jost’s innovative procedural method set the stage for future methodology in the 
field.  He developed his procedure (what Simon calls a class of discovery processes) to 
achieve the goal of resolving the question of inequality of potential in particular, and, 
more generally and importantly, the mono- vs. di-hormonic debate. 
 
To resolve the mono versus di-hormonic debate, Jost removed the gonads of 
rabbit fetuses still in utero, before the gonads became sexually differentiated.92
The results were dramatic. In all the male embryos (which Jost castrated between 
eighteen and twenty three days of development), the developing Wolffian ducts regressed 
  This 
technique controlled for the potential influence of fetal gonads on sexual development, 
and was a marked improvement upon earlier techniques of simply injecting large doses of 
purified hormones.  His approach produced information about the roles played by the 
embryo’s own gonadal hormones.   
                                                                                                                                                 
embryons plus jeunes. On doit cependant remarquer que les canaux des Müller persistent 
dans les males castres, ce qui donne bien à penser qu’une stimulation ovarienne n’est pas 
indispensable pour assurer l’évolution des voies femelles. 
 
 Jost, A. (1947). "Reserches sur la Differenciation Sexuelle de l'Embryon de Lapin: Role des 
Gonades Foetales dans la Differenciation Sexuelle Somatique." Archives d'Anatomie 
Microscopique et de Morphologie Experimentale 36(4): 18 - 314. 
  
91 “Mais d’autres secretions expliquent peut-être la persistance des voies Mülleriennes: on songe 
à la folliculine maternelle ou a l’activite des surrenales foetales.” Ibid. 
  
92 “Pour analyser le role endocrine des gonades foetales, on a essaye´ de castrer les embryons ou 
jeunes individus avant ou pendant la différenciation sexualle somatique.” Jost, A. (1946). 
"Recherches sur la Differenciation Sexuelle de l'Embryon de Lapin: Introduction et Embryologie 
Genitale Normale." Archives d'Anatomie Microscopique et de Morphologie Experimentale 36(2): 
151 - 194.  
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as they do in female development.  In those castrated the earliest, the structures forming 
the oviducts, uterus, and part of the cervix developed as if the embryo were female.93
In contrast, the female embryos (whose ovaries had been removed) displayed only 
slightly altered sexual development.  Those castrated latest (at twenty-three days) 
developed as normal females.
   
94  In those castrated earlier, the oviducts, uterus, cervix and 
vagina differentiated almost normally, but would not grow to full size if the ovary were 
removed early enough.95
To test the speculation that maternal or adrenal estrogen could cause female 
development in males, Jost castrated five male embryos, and placed a crystal of androgen 
(methyltestosterone or testosterone propionate) in place of the fetal testes.  He wanted to 
see if androgen itself would counteract the trend towards female development.  Unlike 
the previous male castrates, these embryos displayed normal masculine development of 
both the prostate and external genitals.
  
96
Jost concluded that the female duct system developed (for the most part) without 
stimulation by hormones from the embryonic ovary.  This would explain how female 
 However, the Müllerian ducts did not regress, 
implying that normal male development relied upon more complicated factors than the 
mere presence of testosterone. 
                                                 
93 Jost, A. (1947). "Reserches sur la Differenciation Sexuelle de l'Embryon de Lapin: Role des 
Gonades Foetales dans la Differenciation Sexuelle Somatique." Archives d'Anatomie 
Microscopique et de Morphologie Experimentale 36(4): 18 - 314. 
  
94 “Apres la castration, la femelle se differencie comme une femelle normale (il en a ete de même 
pour un enbryon castré a 23 j. 20h.)” Ibid. 
 
95 “La femmelle ovarietomisée acquiert les characteres de son sexe, mais ses organes müllériens 
sont moins volumineux que normalement.” Ibid.  
  
96 Ibid. 
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structures could differentiate in both males and females whose gonads had been removed 
in utero.  He theorized that, in addition to testosterone, the testes made some substance 
that inhibited female duct development. (This substance, later called Müllerian Inhibiting 
Substance or the Anti-Müllerian Hormone, was not chemically isolated until 1986.)  
Jost interpreted these results to support the mono-hormonic theory more strongly 
than the di-hormonic.  He noted that the male and female duct systems, while originating 
from the same basic structure, had different development potentials.  Specifically, female 
development occurs unless actively suppressed, while it appeared that male development 
occurs only when actively promoted.  Regardless of the genetic sex of the embryo, 
female ducts would develop unless suppressed by a testicular secretion, and male ducts 
degenerated unless exposed to testosterone.   
But Jost’s results did not provide unequivocal support for the mono-hormonic 
theory.  Remember that when the ovaries were removed early in fetal development, the 
female duct system did not grow to normal size.  From this, Jost concluded that it was 
“probable that the ovary also produces a morphogenetic secretion, but there is no doubt 
that it plays a more limited role than the testicular secretion.”97  In addition, he pointed 
out that, while ovarian secretions did not cause the breakdown of the male duct system, 
this was no indication that the ovaries played no role in sexual differentiation: they could 
act as a “double assurance.”98
                                                 
97 “Il est donc probable que l’ovaire produit également une sécrétion morphogéne, mais celle-ci 
joue sans doubte un role plus limité que la sécrétion testiculaire.” Ibid. 
 
  
98 “D’autre part, constater que les ovaires ne sont pas indispensables a la régression des canaux de 
Wolff par exemple, ne prouve pas que normalement ils ne jouent aucun role: ils pourrait y avoir 
une ‘double assurance’.” Ibid. 
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In other words, Jost’s work – that is, Jost’s interpretation of his work – did not 
provide a “crucial experiment” that confirmed wholesale a particular scientific theory, but 
rather acted as a process of discovery intended to explore the viability of various 
elaborated hypotheses.  But because Lillie’s resolution of the freemartin problem was 
considered crucial, the scientific community’s interpretation of Jost’s work took on a 
different flavor. 
 
 
V. Response of the Scientific Community 
 
In spite of his subtle interpretation of the results, most of Jost’s contemporaries 
understood his experiments to support the mono-hormonic theory.  The consensus of the 
scientific community moved rapidly from an initial, cautious interpretation of the results 
of Jost’s work to an outright acceptance of his work as confirming the mono-hormonic 
theory.  Mandel Schechtman, summarizing investigations of hormone manipulation in the 
1949 Annual Review of Physiology, notes that the “results of hormone injections indicate 
relative sensitivities but do not inform us as to factors actually operative in the embryo,” 
although the results of Jost’s experiments with prenatal gonadectomy produced 
“information more pertinent to the latter.”99
L. G. Wells, reporting on the work of Jost and others in the 1952 Review, claims 
that:  
   
                                                 
99 Specifically, the information that the “testis seems to act by secretion since the Wolffian ducts 
are maintained after unilateral, thought not after bilateral, castration.” Schechtman, A. M. (1949). 
"Developmental Physiology." Annual Review of Physiology 11: 1 - 17.  
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[I]t has been virtually proven that the testes of fetal rats produce a hormone 
(androgen) which stimulated the prenatal growth of the genitalia . . . it is reported 
[by Jost] that in some cases the genitalia of castrated fetuses are feminized.100
 
   
However, in spite of his acceptance that prenatal testes produce androgen: 
 
The reviewer believes that it remains to be determined whether the first 
production of testicular androgen antedates (a) the earliest step in the 
differentiation of the accessory reproductive organs and (b) the “modulation” of 
the primordia of these organs.101
  
 
This skepticism soon disappeared.  By 1954, “androgen production by the fetal 
testes has gained support,”102 and in 1959 the “pituitary gonadotrophins [released while in 
utero] are indispensable for testicular functions.”103
 
   By the 1960’s, most scientists 
accepted that androgens were (solely) responsible for the transformation of an 
undifferentiated fetus into a male.  For instance, the 1961 edition of Sex and Internal 
Secretions relies heavily on Jost’s results to explain sexual differentiation in mammalian 
embryos, concluding that: 
                                                 
100 Wells, J. L. (1952). "Growth." Ibid. 14: 31 - 43. 
  
101 Ibid. 
  
102 Leathem, J. H. (1954). "Reproduction." Ibid. 16: 445 - 459. 
 
103 Caldeyro-Barcia, R., et. al. (1959). Ibid. 21. 
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Altogether, the evidence clearly indicates that the male hormone is the essential 
determining factor in the survival and sexual differentiation of the male sex ducts 
and seminal vesicles.  Notwithstanding the minor exceptions noted above [having 
to do with a particular species of marsupial], the female hormone evidently has 
little role.104
 
  
Jost himself later referred to females as the “neutral” sex type.  At a conference 
more than two decades after he initially published his findings, he claims the “genital 
structures obey an inherent trend (or programme) for femaleness, unless the fetal testes 
oppose the feminine programme and impose a masculine orientation.”105
The reaction of the scientific community brings up two questions.  First, why was 
the acceptance so rapid?  Scientists are usually more hesitant to adopt one particular 
theory over another based on a single series of experiments performed by one individual.  
Second, why did so many endocrinologists and biologists interpret Jost’s work as 
unequivocally supporting the mono-hormonic theory? 
  Females 
become females because they lack testes. 
The answers to these questions lie in the fact that many researchers at this time 
considered the two hormonic theories to be completely incompatible and the fact that the 
                                                 
104 Burns, R. K. (1961). Role of Hormones in the Differentiation of Sex. Sex and Internal 
Secretions. W. C. Young. Baltimore, The Williams and Wilkins Company. I: 76 - 158.  In 
addition, the author of a 1960 endocrinology text book, citing Jost, writes: 
 
The experiments on fetal castration indicate strongly that in placental mammals the testis 
plays the principle part in differentiating the sexes.  In the absence of the testis, as in 
normal females and castrated fetuses of either sex, the female type is realized.  
 
Turner, C. D. (1960). General Endocrinology. Philadelphia, W. B. Saunder Company. 
  
105 Jost, A. (1979). Sexual Trends in Vertebrate Development. Ciba Foundation Symposium, 
London, Excerpta Medica. 
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crucial resolution took place before, not after, Jost’s work.106  As such, Jost was perceived 
by many107
For instance, Wells, in the 1952 Annual Review of Physiology, describes Jost’s 
conclusion as: 
 as providing empirical support for the crucial resolution (mono-hormonic 
theory), and that support provided no reasons for a “compromise theory.”   
 
A recent view of sexual differentiation in mammals is (a) that the testicular 
secretion induces the formation of the “male genitalia” and prevents the 
appearance of “female genitalia”108 in males; (b) that the action of the testicular 
secretion is largely local or unilateral; and (c) that the embryonic ovaries do not 
influence sexual differentiation.109
 
 
 Wells describes this view as “problematic” because of experiments wherein 
gonadectomized female laboratory animals, when injected with androgens, “fails to 
                                                 
106 In addition to other reasons.  Helen Longino, in Science as Social Knowledge (1990), argues 
that mono-hormonism was accepted, in part, because it reaffirmed cultural the tropes of 
masculine activity and feminine passivity. 
 
107 Not all, of course.  In their introduction to the 1953 Annual Review of Physiology, Krohn and 
Zuckerman write: 
 
In spite of extensive studies on intersexuality, the new chapter [of the Review] also 
shows that the freemartin condition in cattle has still not been reproduced experimentally 
in the lab, and that the role of maternal and foetal sex hormones in the embryonic 
differentiation of the reproductive tract remains a controversial topic. 
 
Krohn, P., and S. Zuckerman (1953). "Reproduction." Annual Review of Physiology 15: 429 - 
455. 
 
108 By which Wells means the Mullerian ducts. 
 
109 Wells, J. L. (1952). "Growth." Annual Review of Physiology 14: 31 - 43. 
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prevent the formation of derivatives of the Müllerian ducts.”110
 On the other hand: 
 In addition, other 
experiments demonstrated that androgen injections were effective in inducing 
masculinization no matter where they were injected (that is, androgenic influences were 
not limited to specific areas). 
 
[T]he conception that the ovaries fail to influence differentiation is acceptable 
despite the report that the destruction of the ovaries of fetal mice by irradiation is 
followed, in some cases, by a failure of retrogression of the lower portion of the 
Wolffian ducts.111
 
 
 In other words, Jost’s “default” model is acceptable in spite of its inability to 
explain certain anomalies.  On this approach, anomalies (such as androgen failing to 
prevent the development of Müllerian ducts) become experimental “noise.”  
More generally, Jost’s work was seen as providing confirmation of the commonly 
accepted interpretation of Lillie’s work.  This interpretation of Jost’s work, especially the 
model of female development as the result of a lack or absence of hormonal influence, is 
widely accepted to this day.112
                                                 
110 As mentioned earlier, Jost suggested that the embryonic testes secrete a substance that inhibits 
the formation of the Müllerian ducts – a suggestion which turned out to be correct. 
  In an issue of Biology of the Neonate devoted to the 
influence of Jost, Jean Wilson writes: 
 
111 Wells, J. L. (1952). "Growth." Annual Review of Physiology 14: 31 - 43. 
 
112 Capel and Coveney write:  
 
Meanwhile, basing a set of experiments on the theories set forth by Lillie, Alfred Jost 
developed the Jost paradigm, which has directed the field ever since.  Jost showed that 
while a testis placed near the genital ducts of a female would support development of the 
Wolffian duct and induce regression of the Müllerian duct, a crystal of testosterone, 
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According to the Jost formula – now the central dogma of sexual development – 
sexual differentiation is a sequential, ordered, and relatively straightforward 
process.  Chromosomal (or genetic) sex, established at the time of conception, 
directs the development of either ovaries or testes.  If testes develop, their 
hormonal secretions elicit the development of the male secondary sex 
characteristics, collectively known as the male phenotypes.  If an ovary develops 
or if no gonad is present, anatomical development is female in character.113
 
   
This demonstrates not only the strong influence of Jost, but the interpretation of 
his work as an unequivocal confirmation of the mono-hormonic theory.  This 
interpretation of Jost’s default model is more sophisticated than its original form: it is not 
simply the presence of the testes, but of the genetic precursor to the testes that is 
responsible for sexual differentiation.  This more sophisticated form of the default model 
is still espoused in a number of contemporary endocrinology textbooks.114
                                                                                                                                                 
though capable of inducing many aspects of male differentiation, did not lead to the 
degeneration of the Müllerian duct.  These experiments strongly argued for the existence 
of a discrete substance produced by the testis that caused Müllerian regression and was 
capable of exerting a freemartin-like effect on the ovary. 
 
 
Capel, B., and Coveney, Doug (2004). "Frank Lillie's Freemartin: Illuminating the Pathway to 
21st Century Reproductive Endocrinology." Journal of Experimental Zoology 301A: 853 - 856. 
 
113 Wilson, J. D. (1989). "Sexual Differentiation of the Gonads of the Reproductive Tract." 
Biology of the Neonate 55(6): 322 - 330. 
 
114 In Behavioral Endocrinology, S. Marc Breedlove and Elizabeth Hampson write:  
Early in development, both XX and XY individuals have gonads that do not yet resemble 
either testes or ovaries, and are therefore called “indifference gonads.”  The one crucial 
task performed by at least one gene on the Y chromosome [called the sex-determining 
region of the Y (Sry)] is the transformation of this originally indifferent gonad into a 
testis . . If the cells of the indifferent gonad contain a Y chromosome with the Sry gene, 
they begin to develop as a testis.  In the absence of a Sry gene, the gonad will develop as 
a ovary. 
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In addition, many scientists outside the field of endocrinology adopted the Jostian 
default model.  This includes not just biologists in general,115 but psychologists as well.  
As will be discussed later, an important extension of Jost’s default model of genital 
development is that of applying it to brain development.116
 
  Developmental psychologist 
June Reinish, reflecting upon recent research and models concerning the effect on 
behavior of prenatal gonadal hormones, proposes the following hypothesis: 
During the fetal period, the androgens have a fundamental influence on the 
organization and differentiation of the neural tissues (substratum) designed to 
mediate, at least partially, dimorphic behavior in human males and females.117
 
 
 Note that it is the androgens that do the organizing – not just of the genital tissues 
but of the brain itself.  This updated version of the mono-hormonic hypothesis has the 
advantage of simplicity.  Instead of two causal agents in the general theory of eitiology, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Breedlove, S. M., and Hampson, Elizabeth (2002). Sexual Differentiation of the Brain and 
Behavior. Behavioral Endocrinology. B. Becker, Crews and McCarthy. Cambridge, MIT Press. 
 
115 E. g., Carlson, B. (1999). Human Embryology and Developmental Biology. St. Louis, Mosby. 
 
116 One textbook author writes: 
 
In most mammal studies to date, the brain in either sex is feminine until it is converted to 
a masculine form in males through the action of testosterone.  This masculinization, or 
defeminization, of the brain affects not only sexual behavior but also a wide range of 
behaviors relating to aggression, play, and ingestions, as well as a number of key 
physiological processes. 
 
in Schulkin, J. (1999). The Neuroendocrine Regulation of Behavior. New York, Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
117 Reinish, J. M. (1974). "Fetal Hormones, the Brain, and Human Sex Differences: A Heuristic, 
Integrative Review of Recent Literature." Archives of Sexual Behavior 3(1): 51 - 91. 
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there is only one.  This extension of the Jostian model of genital development to brain 
development forms the theoretical foundation for the development of behavioral 
endocrinology as a particular subfield of endocrinology.  
As may be apparent from this extension of the Jostian model, many scientists 
accept it as the theoretical foundation for further research.  Wilson writes:  
 
This paradigm has had a profound impact on biology and medicine and has 
influenced all subsequent investigations in this field . . . this discussion has been 
designed to focus on some specific aspects of this impact . . . and the current 
challenge to explain the Jost model in molecular terms.118
 
 
By “paradigm,” Wilson does not mean a world-view in the Kuhnian sense, but 
rather as the foundation of a disciplinary matrix.  The desire to explain Jost’s model in 
terms of genetic and molecular mechanisms is a reasonable consequence of the “genetic 
revolution” that occurred shortly after Jost published his findings.  
 Thus far, I’ve demonstrated that the process of discovery – from the initially 
postulated elaborated hypotheses of mono- and di-hormonism, to the experimental 
procedures for Jost – that eventually led to the adoption of mono-hormonism was not 
capricious, but based on good reasons.  One might even claim that, given the specific 
goals of endocrinologists at this time, it was logical. 
 
VI. Scientific Goals and the Logic of Method 
 
                                                 
118 Wilson, J. D. (1989). "Sexual Differentiation of the Gonads of the Reproductive Tract." 
Biology of the Neonate 55(6): 322 - 330. 
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What does it mean for a method – either of discovery or of justification – to be 
logical?  Most generally, we consider a method or process to be “logical” if it satisfies 
certain procedural norms established for it.  These norms, in turn, derive from our 
concern that the method accomplish the purpose for which it was established in an 
efficacious manner. 
Simon defines the logic of scientific method, in general, as consisting of a 
normative set of standards for judging the processes used to discover or test scientific 
theories.  One implication of this definition is that the norms can be derived from the 
goals of scientific activity.  If this is the case, we can generalize the logic of scientific 
method as follows: 
 
Let 
G = a particular goal of discovering valid scientific laws 
P = a class of discovery processes (with p ∋ P) 
C = set of conditions (with c ∋ C) 
 
The set of conditions can be attributed to processes, such that c(p) is a function 
from C X P to dichotomous truth-values.  If, for all c, c(G ⊃ c), C is a set of norms for P 
with respect to G.  In other words, if the attainment of goal G implies that the conditions, 
C, be satisfied, then we ought to employ the process p that satisfies C.119
 Simon claims that:  
 
                                                 
119 Simon, H. (1973). "Does Scientific Discovery Have a Logic?" Philosophy of Science 40(4): 
471 - 480. 
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If G is the goal of discovering valid scientific laws, and P is a class of discovery 
processes, then C provides a normative theory of scientific discovery.  If G is the 
goal of testing the validity of proposed laws, and P is a class of test procedures, 
then C provides a normative theory of testing laws.120
 
 
As such, the logic of scientific method is, in general, the same for both the process 
of discovery and justification.  For those scientists attempting to discover the mechanisms 
of hormone action, the discovery processes consisted of proposing hypotheses that could 
explain the physical phenomena while, at the same time, embody the explanatory virtues 
mentioned by Hanson.  For instance, Ross Harrison, in his discussion of the general 
problem of embryonic “determination” (development), points out that the field of 
experimental embryology “will be placed on a sounder basis” if the questions addressed 
by researchers are more broadly framed: 
 
In dealing with such a complex system as the developing embryo it is futile to 
inquire whether a certain organ rudiment is “determined” and whether some 
particular feature of its surroundings, to the exclusion of others, “determines” it.  
A score of different factors may be involved and their efforts most intricately 
interwoven.  In order to resolve this tangle we have to inquire into the manner in 
which the system under consideration reacts with other parts of the embryo at 
successive stages of development and under as great a variety of experimental 
conditions as possible to impose.  Success will be measured by the simplicity, 
                                                 
120 Ibid. 
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precision and completeness of our descriptions rather than by a specious facility 
in ascribing causes to particular events.121
     
 
 Harrison calls for explanations that are not only empirically adequate, but also 
simple and broad in scope.  In other words, the process of discovery of developmental 
hypotheses should conform to Wiesner’s ideal of “economy of hypothesis.”  We have 
seen this general ideal – or normative theory – at work in both the formulation of the 
mono- and di-hormonic theories, as well as in Jost’s experimental confirmation. 
 Simon points out that norms can have either a logical or an empirical basis.  For 
instance, when playing the game of tic-tac-toe, a move that puts a second cross at the 
intersection of two unblocked arrays, each of which has one cross already, is an optimum 
(winning) move.  As such, a normative procedural theory of tic-tac-toe recommends 
strategies that make facilitate such a move, when possible.  The adequacy of this 
condition can be deduced solely from the rules of tic-tac-toe.122
 In contrast, a norm of chess strategy – that one should consider attacking the King 
only when superior mobility has been achieved – is an empirical rule.  That it, it has been 
established as a norm based upon the cumulated wisdom of centuries of chess players, 
rather than a deduction from the rules of chess alone.
   
123
                                                 
121 Harrison, R. (1933). "Some Difficulties of the Determination Problem." American Naturalist 
67(711): 306 - 321. 
 Because it does not come with a 
stringent pre-established set of rules, the field of biology is more akin to the game of 
 
122 Simon, H. (1973). "Does Scientific Discovery Have a Logic?" Philosophy of Science 40(4): 
471 - 480. 
 
123 Ibid. 
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chess than that of tic-tac-toe.  As we shall see, crucial resolutions build upon each other, 
forming a sort of “cumulated wisdom,” although not one of centuries. 
 Simon speculates that, because of the presence of an empirical component in 
norms, those philosophers who subscribe to the sharp descriptive/normative distinction 
might entertain the notion that certain processes cannot be the subject of logical analysis, 
but only that of description.  He has two responses to this.  First, if the notion of logical 
analysis is interpreted broadly, one can undertake a normative logical analysis of any 
goal-directed process.  Second, upon a narrow interpretation – that of excluding 
deductions from empirically based premises – the dichotomy between logical analysis 
and description is false.124
 Simon points out that the use of a recommended strategy in pursuit of a goal does 
not guarantee the achievement of that goal.
 
125
Why have philosophers of science, in general, shied away from the possibility of 
a logic of discovery?  Simon suggests that this reticence is due to the assumption that any 
logic of discovery invokes the long-standing philosophical problem of induction.  As a 
  While the goal appeared to be achieved 
with the resolution of the mono- vs. di-hormonic debate, such is not the case with other 
elaborated hypotheses in the history of endocrinology (as we shall see in later chapters.)  
In spite of potential failures, Simon claims that there can be – in fact, there is – a logic of 
discovery. 
                                                 
124 Ibid. 
 
125 Ibid. 
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result, philosophers would prefer to cut through the Humean knot, rather than untangle 
it.126
Simon also claims that this problem, vis a vis the process of discovery, is 
misappropriated: 
 
 
Law discovery means only finding pattern in the data that have been observed; 
whether the pattern will continue to hold for new data that are observed 
subsequently will be decided in the course of testing the law, not discovering it.127
 
 
In other words, Humean concerns about induction apply to the process of 
justification, not the process of discovery.  Given the limited nature of data sets, 
justification is an ongoing – and perpetually incomplete – process.   
Simon proposes to banish the problem of induction from the process of discovery 
by defining: 
 
A law-discovery process is a process for recoding, in a parsimonious fashion, sets of 
empirical data. 
 
A normative theory of scientific discovery is a set of criteria for evaluating law-discovery 
processes.128
 
 
                                                 
126 The phrase Simon uses is “untie the Gordian knot of induction.” Ibid. 
 
127 Ibid. 
 
128 Ibid. 
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 It is apparent that, for Simon, the parsimonious recoding of data sets is not 
equivalent to simple induction upon those sets. But if we can give a descriptive account 
of how scientists make such discoveries, and a normative account of the means by which 
they make them, then, according to Simon, we have constructed a logic of discovery.  
Unfortunately, Simon does not elaborate on what he means by the terms ‘recoding’ and 
‘parsimonious.’129
 However, several examples from the history of endocrinology can help to clarify 
these terms, the debate between mono- and di-hormonic theories of development being 
one of them.  Both the mono- and the di-hormonic theories recode data sets in a 
parsimonious fashion, albeit in different ways.  The “parsimony” of the di-hormonic 
theory has the advantage of explanatory completeness: it recodes the data sets in such a 
fashion so as to explain laboratory findings while respecting the initial (dichotomous) 
gendered assumptions about the nature of hormones.  The “parsimony” of the mono-
hormonic theory is more abstract: its invocation of a more simple causal pathway reflects 
the virtue of explanatory “simplicity” triumphed by researchers such as Harrison. 
 
 But what of Simon’s normative theory of scientific discovery?  In the history of 
endocrinology, this involves not the testing of laws, but the crucial resolution between 
elaborated hypotheses.  Although Simon does not elaborate on the criteria for evaluating 
law-discovery processes, presumably this involves the comparison of different methods 
of parsimonious encoding.  But this, again, brings to the fore Humean problems of 
induction. 
                                                 
129 This isn’t exactly true: he uses examples amenable to computational recoding.  Unfortunately, 
the practice of biology is, in this respect, significantly different from the practice of knitting. 
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Simon points out that, traditionally, the logic of justification was thought to rest 
on deductive logic, while any normative theory of discovery has been thought to require a 
quite different logic as its foundation: that of induction.130
As an initial response to this problem, Simon provides a concrete example of 
discovery which, he claims, does not rely on induction.   Consider the following 
sequence: 
  Were this to be true, the logic 
of discovery would inherit the philosophical difficulties of induction.   
 
ABMCDMEFMGHMIJMKLM 
 MNMOPMQRMSTMUVMWXMYZMABMC . . . . 
 
If we know our alphabet, we can see a pattern.  In particular, “it is redundant, and 
can consequently be described more parsimoniously by defining the pattern than by 
exhibiting the sequence itself.”131
 
 In particular, the pattern can be described in terms of 
triples: the first two letters in each triple progress through the alphabet, with the third 
being “M.”  We can schematize this pattern as follows: 
(1) n(α)n(α)s(β);  α = Z, β = M 
 
                                                 
130 Simon, H. (1973). "Does Scientific Discovery Have a Logic?" Philosophy of Science 40(4): 
471 - 480. 
 
131 Ibid. 
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Where ‘n(α )’ means replacing a letter by the letter next to it on the alphabet, α;  
‘s(β)’ means repeating the same letter as β; while the expressions ‘α = Z’ and ‘β = M’ set 
the initial values on the alphabets, at Z and M, respectively.132
One (anonymous) reviewer of an early draft of this paper objects that Simon uses 
examples that prejudice the argument in his favor.  Specifically, the range of alternatives 
is already delimited.  Simon replies that this objection rests on the distinction between 
“well-structured” problems and “ill-structured” problems.  This distinction, he claims, 
recalls the Kuhnian distinction between normal and revolutionary science.
 As such, Simon claims that 
the normative theory of discovery processes can be viewed as a branch of computational 
theory.   
133
There are several problems with Simon’s reply to this objection, especially vis a 
vis the field of endocrinology.  First, it is not clear that the distinction between well-and-
ill structured problems is a valid one.  Second, it is not clear how this maps onto Kuhn’s 
distinction between normal and revolutionary science. 
   
Say, for the sake of argument, that well-structured problems are those amenable to 
computational analysis and, as such, can be distinguished clearly from ill-structured 
problems.  On this account, problems within the field of endocrinology are ill-structured.  
In particular, etiological theories of development cannot be recoded as schema like the 
type of (1).  Earlier researchers did not know the “alphabet” of hormones: elucidating not 
just the number but also the nature of these internal secretions was the order of the day.  
Even after hormones came to be defined in terms of chemical composition, it was not 
                                                 
132 Ibid. 
 
133 Ibid. 
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clear how these hormones had an “order.”  (As we have seen, one of Jost’s goals was to 
determine the chronological “order” – that is to say, timing – of the various hormones in 
order to solve the riddle of inequality of potential.)  
Even if the problems in endocrinology could be described as well-structured, the 
Kuhnian distinction between normal and revolutionary science does not hold for 
endocrinology.  Competing elaborated hypotheses do not present alternative world-views, 
but build upon earlier research, theorizing, and general presuppositions.  As such, the 
choice between them does not rely upon a potentially irrational gestalt-switch, but 
invokes ideals of explanatory virtue. 
  
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
 Just as there is a logic of discovery to the formulation of elaborated hypotheses, 
there is also a logic to the crucial resolutions between them.  Elaborated hypotheses are 
not merely irrational, creative, or mystical suggestions, but attempts to explain a 
particular problem in a reasonable, albeit ultimately limited, fashion.  Likewise, crucial 
resolutions also possess a logic of discovery (rather than a purely empirical logic of 
confirmation) in that they are proposed in advance of unambiguous empirical evidence. 
 As seen in the case of Jost, the process of discovery can strongly influence the 
process of confirmation.  The general explanatory goals of endocrinological research – 
answering the largest number of conceptual problems with the greatest economy of 
hypothesis – inform not just the formulation of elaborated hypotheses but also the 
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interpretation of empirical results.  As such, Lillie’s resolution of the freemartin problem 
was seen as crucial after the fact, and Jost’s work was seen as unambiguous confirmation 
of the mono-hormonic theory, in spite of both authors’ subtle and cautious interpretations 
of their own results. 
 That the mono- vs. di-hormonic debate was resolved through a crucial resolution 
implies that the “logic” of discovery involves more than simple empirical confirmation or 
disconfirmation.  The choice between elaborated hypotheses, while not capricious, cannot 
be explained by appeal to crucial experiments.  Rather, the process (and logic) of 
discovery “blurs in” to the process (and logic) of confirmation. 
 To reinforce this point, the following chapters examine another crucial resolution 
in the history of endocrinology: that of the etiology of sexual behavior.   
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
Of Rats and Men: From the Bisexual to the Heterosexual Model of Sexual 
Behavior 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 
 
From the 1920s to the 1940s, there were two main areas of controversy in 
endocrinology: whether estrogen plays any developmental role in the formation of the 
fetus; and whether all mammals have the potential to display both masculine and 
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feminine behavior.  That is, whether mammals, when born, have the capacity to display 
behaviors typical of either sex, or if there is an “inequality of potential” wherein animals 
are predisposed towards behavior specific to their anatomical sex.  This second 
controversy concerns the development of sexual and gendered behavior: whether these 
behaviors require socialization to be manifested, or are “hardwired” in during fetal 
development.   
This controversy, like the one discussed in the previous chapter, was resolved 
through a crucial resolution.  The first crucial resolution, that of the freemartin problem, 
inspired Jost’s research program.  This research program (and, in particular, its mono-
hormonic interpretation) defined the basic physiological mechanisms that served as a 
foundation for the crucial resolution of the second controversy.  Animal models 
developed in attempts to resolve this second controversy are the primary source for the 
current general explanatory model of human sexual and gendered behavior. 
Sexual development involves more than anatomy. It also involves development of 
behavioral characteristics that allow an individual to compete for mates, and produce, 
rear, and protect young.  After the basics of anatomical sexual development had been 
largely worked out (by Jost), the next target for endocrinological investigation was the 
development of sexual behavior.  At this time, there were two general hypotheses 
concerning the origination of sexual behavior: (1) that sexual behavior requires 
socialization to be manifested and thus implying that all mammals are undifferentiated at 
birth in terms of predispositions towards sexual behavior; and (2) that sexual behavior is 
innate (in the sense that most mammals are predisposed to display the behavior typical of 
their sex).    
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In time, the majority of endocrinologists rejected the first hypothesis in favor of 
the second, which remains to this day the dominant explanatory model of mammalian 
sexual behavior.  To understand why this happened, a bit of intellectual history is in 
order.  In what follows, I outline the historical progression of the development of two 
competing hypotheses of animal sexual behavior, as well as the implications each has had 
for conceptions of human sexual and gendered behavior, focusing on the work of Frank 
Beach and William Young.  My goal is to provide an outline of the lines of evidence and 
reasoning endocrinologists used to arrive at the current explanatory model. 
The lines of evidence and reasoning bear a structural similarity to those used to 
resolve the first dispute, with some important differences.  The debate concerning the 
etiology of sexual behavior was a debate between two general, rather than elaborated 
hypotheses, and thus was not as sharply defined as that between mono and di-hormonism.  
Until 1959, the debate was framed as between the influences of external factors (the 
environment in general, socialization in particular) versus those of internal factors 
(genetics and hormones) on behavior.  
As such, the controversy concerned a general question about the etiology of 
behavior, not persistent anomalies and conflicting experimental results, as was the case 
with the mono versus di-hormonic debate.  But there was one specific question that had 
elaborated (and conflicting) hypotheses as well unclear (and conflicting) experimental 
results: the etiology of homosexuality.  The crucial resolution of this question is the topic 
of the next chapter. 
In what follows, I give some historical background concerning the importance of 
the emerging field of endocrinology and its contribution to the general debate, present 
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some initial hypotheses about the etiology of sexual behavior, and lay out the intellectual 
history leading up to the crucial resolution.  This intellectual history is necessary to 
understand the crucial resolution itself, with the intention of showing how it instigated the 
rapid acceptance of one general hypothesis over the other.  Indeed, like the resolution of 
the freemartin problem, it was accepted in advance of convincing empirical evidence (or, 
for that matter, any evidence at all) and influenced subsequent developments in the field 
of endocrinology. 
In addition to reinforcing the conclusions about crucial resolutions made in the 
previous chapter, I present some general conclusions about the methodologies discussed 
that have philosophical implications.  In the course of its development, the field of 
endocrinology has concerned itself with uncovering the causal pathways behind certain 
behavioral outcomes.  However, this general research program, as a result of 
encountering explanatory obstacles, has been forced to shift its attention from behaviors 
per se to capacities supporting behaviors.  This shift from behaviors to capacities was an 
attempt to delineate the respective influences of internal (“natural,” “innate”) factors and 
external (“environmental,” “socialization”) factors upon development. 
 
  
 
II. Frank Beach and the Importance of Learning 
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Human models of endocrinology, particularly models of hormonal influences on 
sexual and gendered behavior, draw most of their force from rodent studies.134
From the mid 1930s to late 1940’s, Frank Beach, one of the founders of modern 
behavioral endocrinology, accomplished three tasks: he determined and quantified 
behaviors that could be designated as masculine or feminine (including, but not limited 
to, lordosis and mounting); developed some sense of the behavioral differences among 
different species and among individuals of the same species; and studied the effects of 
gonadal steroids on adult sexual behaviors.
  Scientists 
in the field of behavioral endocrinology use results from experimental manipulation of 
rodent hormones to construct mechanisms that explain sex differences in behavior and 
cognitive ability in biological terms.  
135
Beach argued that, neurologically, all animals have a bisexual potential.  By 
“bisexual,” he meant that female rats had the potential to behave like males during 
mating, and vice versa.  (Later researchers refer to this type of behavior as, rather 
  In synthesizing the results of these 
investigations, he articulated a model of the origins of animal masculinity and femininity, 
a model that was promptly applied to humans. 
                                                 
134 In their 1954 review, Beach and Jaynes claim that their effort: 
 
[S]eems worth doing not only because of its usefulness to students of animal behavior, 
but also because scientists interested primarily or exclusively in human psychology very 
frequently turn to the literature dealing with lower animals in connection with discussions 
of human development. 
 
Beach, F. A., and Julian Jaynes (1954). "Effects of Early Experience Upon the Behavior of 
Animals." Psychological Bulletin 51(3): 239 - 263.  
  
135 See Young, W. C. (1961). The Hormones and Mating Behavior. Sex and Internal Secretions. 
W. C. Young. Baltimore, The Williams and Wilkins Company. II.; Goy, R. W. a. M. R. (1991). 
Heterotypical Behaviour in Female Mammals. Heterotypical Behaviour in Man and Animals. H. 
B. Aron. London, Chapman and Hall.; and Marler, P. (2005). "Ethology and the Origins of 
Behavioral Endocrinology." Hormones and Behavior 47: 493 - 502. 
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confusingly, ‘heterotypical behavior,’ that is, behavior typical of the opposite sex.)  
Beach observed a large amount of bisexual behavior in his lab animals, and wanted to 
know what biological factors lead to particular sexual expressions, whether they be 
heterosexual matings, male-male mounting, male lordosis, and female-female or female-
male mounting.  
However, this does not mean that rodents were just as likely to display behavior 
typical of the opposite sex as that of the same sex.  From his studies of castrated male 
rats, he concluded that “in the genetic male the threshold of responsiveness in the neural 
circuits for masculine coital performance is inherently lower than the threshold in the 
mechanisms for feminine behavior.”136
Beach emphasized the importance of environmental influences on behavior, 
especially in regards to learning.  In a paper about the influence of early experience, 
Beach notes that: 
  In other words, males displayed a stronger 
behavioral response to androgens then they did to estrogens. 
 
Many psychologists appear to conceive of learning ability in animals as 
genetically determined and relatively unmodifiable, but recent findings indicate 
the untenability of this thesis.137
 
 
A spate of studies at this time resulted in the discovery that “far from being purely 
“instinctive,” (like the scratch reflex) the reactions of animals to others of their own kind 
                                                 
136 Beach, F. A. (1947). "A Review of Physiological and Psychological Studies of Sexual 
Behavior in Mammals." Physiological Reviews 27: 240 - 307. 
 
137 Beach, F. A., and Julian Jaynes (1954). "Effects of Early Experience Upon the Behavior of 
Animals." Psychological Bulletin 51(3): 239 - 263.  One such psychologist was W. Kohler. 
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are in part dependent upon individual experience and learning which typically occurs in 
infancy.”138
 
  This process is similar to, but more complicated than, the phenomenon of 
“imprinting” commonly seen in very young birds.  After discussing a number of 
experiments that studied behavior after restricting visual or tactile stimuli, Beach 
concludes that: 
They point to the fact that even the simplest elements in the total behavioral 
repertoire are normally a product of early experience and therefore interference 
with the accumulation of such experience may profoundly alter adult activities.  
These experiments also make one suspect that more complex forms of behavior 
will be found to depend very heavily upon habits formed in early life.139
 
 
 
A series of investigations support the latter claim.  Female rats, when raised in an 
environment where nothing could be picked up or carried, failed to build nests for their 
first litters, even though building material was available.  Likewise, females raised under 
conditions that prevented self-grooming failed to clean their young upon delivery.  
Similar studies of chimpanzees (restricting their access to playthings) reinforced the 
notion that early experience matters greatly for a wide range of behavior.140
As the above-mentioned experiments with rats imply, not only does adult sexual 
behavior depend upon hormonal stimuli, it also depends on early experience.  In making 
 
                                                 
138 Beach, F. A. (1953). "Animal Research and Psychiatric Theory." Psychosomatic Medicine 
15(5): 374 - 388. 
 
139 Ibid. 
 
140 Ibid. 
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this claim, Beach is rejecting the common assumption at the time that sexual behaviors 
are primarily instinctive: 
 
Among the most species-specific behavior patterns in any particular species are 
those having to do with reproduction – courtship, fertilization, nest building, 
parturition, and the care of the young.  For a long time, these often unique 
stimulus-response organizations were classified as “instincts” and were thought to 
be exclusively determined by genetic constitution. Evidence which shows that the 
occurrence of these responses is heavily dependent upon other factors, especially 
the early experience of the animal, has recently been gathered from many widely 
divergent invertebrate and vertebrate species.141
 
 
One might wonder what motivated Beach and his colleagues to raise females in 
an environment where nothing could be picked up, in order to investigate nest-building 
behavior.  Likewise, one might wonder why they prevented young females from being 
able to groom themselves, in order to investigate pup-grooming behavior.  On the face of 
it, both lines of investigation appear extreme.  According to Beach’s general hypothesis, 
all that the organization of sexual capacities requires is socialization, with the attendant 
learning.  Indeed, Beach’s early experiments (merely) investigated the effects of social 
isolation.    
Beach’s rejection of the simple claim that sexual behaviors are solely due to 
instinct provides a hint about his motives in the afore-mentioned restriction experiments.  
Here it is important to note an ambiguity in the language of these early reports: 
socialization is assumed to carry learning in its wake, but the (assumed) key factor is the 
                                                 
141 Beach, F. A., and Julian Jaynes (1954). "Effects of Early Experience Upon the Behavior of 
Animals." Psychological Bulletin 51(3): 239 - 263. 
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learning.  It is not immediately obvious that socialization is the only vector for early 
learning, as there are many other kinds of early experience.  I suspect that Beach’s group 
began to doubt that learning occurred only through socialization, and were inspired to 
control for factors other than early social contact.   If early learning were the key causal 
factor for developing later capacities, “interference with the accumulation of such 
experience may profoundly alter adult activities,”142
However, Beach does not claim the etiology of sexual behavior is solely 
determined by environmental influences.  His is a more nuanced claim:  
 as Beach notes. 
 
It is worth stressing at this point that early experience appears to influence the 
kinds of stimuli that will later evoke reproductive activities, whereas the actual 
responses are less subject to modification.143
 
 
In support of this claim, Beach noted that partially decorticated male rats, when 
placed with estrous females, copulated in fewer tests.  But the number of copulations 
during each positive test was not affected.  Beach interpreted this to mean that 
decortication decreased arousal potential, but did not affect the actual copulatory pattern. 
Motor patterns of copulation were described (by Beach, among others) as being “innately 
organized.”  
To account for the influence of both instinct and learning, Beach divided sexual 
behavior into two broad components: capacity for sexual performance and susceptibility 
to sexual arousal.  Decoricated rats had a lower arousal susceptibility (thought to be 
                                                 
142 Beach, F. A. (1953). "Animal Research and Psychiatric Theory." Psychosomatic Medicine 
15(5): 374 - 388. 
 
143 Beach, F. A., and Julian Jaynes (1954). "Effects of Early Experience Upon the Behavior of 
Animals." Psychological Bulletin 51(3): 239 - 263. 
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controlled by the forebrain), but decortication did not interfere their capacity for sexual 
performance (thought to be mediated in the brain stem).     
 Capacity for performance involves not just instinctive motor patterns, but also, 
according to Beach, a learning process.  This process must take place during a critical 
period in development in order to successfully organize mating behavior.  If mating 
behaviors are not learned in this critical period, they will never be acquired. 
His hypothesis accounted nicely for individual variability within each sex, as well 
as for the fact that both sexes could, under some conditions, display both masculine and 
feminine mating patterns, and, finally, that both androgen and estrogen could induce 
either of these patterns in either sex.  One result of Beach’s model of sexual development 
was that he considered bisexual and homosexual behavior to be variations within a 
spectrum of behavior, rather than aberrations or abnormalities.144
In spite of Beach’s emphasis upon the continuum of sexual development and 
behavior, many endocrinologists and scientists in general continued to subscribe to the 
“exemplar” notion of sexual developmental endpoints, wherein any deviation from said 
exemplar results from a mismatch of gendered elements.  Even those researchers 
sympathetic to the civil and social rights of homosexuals (with rare exceptions) used the 
terminology of pathology – a terminology rooted in the notion that any sort of mixing of 
masculine and feminine elements is inherently “unnatural” or pathological.  For example, 
in his 1945 discussion of “hermaphrodites,” Albert Ellis notes that:  
 In other words, the 
“atypicality” of bisexual and homosexual behavior is that of frequency, not pathology. 
                                                 
144 In later years, Beach cautioned his fellow scientists against naively applying animal models to 
human behavior, as well as the assumption that “homosexual” behavior in any species is 
inherently abnormal.  See, for instance, Beach, F. A. (1978). Animal Models for Human 
Sexuality. Symposium on Sex, Hormones and Behaviour, London, Excerpta Medica.  
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It is particularly on this question [of homosexuality] of why some individuals 
become overtly homosexual – and why others do not – that the study of the sexual 
psychology of human hermaphrodites may shed much light.  For the study of 
hermaphrodites fortunately provides us with the materials of three crucial human 
experiments: first, the raising of somatic males and somatic females to act and 
think as members of the opposite sex to which their bodies and sexual apparatus 
tend; second, the raising of somatically mixed, masculine and feminine 
individuals as males, in some cases, and females in others; third, the raising of 
physiological males or females as members of one sex and later as members of 
the other.145
 
  
 
In Beach’s scheme, males and females differed quantitatively but not 
qualitatively.  In other words, he did not take an essentialist approach to masculinity or 
femininity, nor did he view males and females as pseudo-natural kinds.  He observed that 
“the masculine mating pattern is called forth in females by the same stimuli which evokes 
it in males, while the feminine responses of males are elicited by those external events 
which normally initiate these reactions in the female.”146
                                                 
145 Ellis, A. (1945). "The Sexual Psychology of Human Hermaphrodites." Psychosomatic 
Medicine 7(2): 108 - 123. 
   He noted that androgens 
increased the sensitivity to external stimulations that brought about masculine mating 
responses; likewise, estrogens increased the sensitivity of mechanisms for feminine 
responses.  However, this does not mean that rodents were just as likely to display 
behavior typical of the opposite sex as that of the same sex.  From his studies of castrated 
male rats, he concluded that “in the genetic male the threshold of responsiveness in the 
 
146 Beach, F. A. (1947). "A Review of Physiological and Psychological Studies of Sexual 
Behavior in Mammals." Physiological Reviews 27: 240 - 307. 
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neural circuits for masculine coital performance is inherently lower than the threshold in 
the mechanisms for feminine behavior.”147
As will be discussed later, Beach’s model of animal sexual behavior was quickly 
abandoned by the scientific community, without being definitively refuted, and replaced 
with more restrictive readings of animal sexuality.  By the late 1950’s scientists began 
importing Jost’s “default” model of physical sexual development into the study of 
behavior.  Beach’s model of animal sexual behavior was supersceded by what became 
known as the “organization/activation” model.  But first, I examine the historical 
development of this competing model. 
  In other words, males displayed a stronger 
behavioral response to androgens then they did to estrogens. 
 
 
III. William Young and the Influence of Genes 
 
Beach’s model dominated the field of behavioral endocrinology at this time.  One 
research group that accepted it was that of William Young and his graduate students 
(including Elliot Valenstein, Charles Phoenix and Robert Goy).  Where Beach 
investigated the causes of variations in behavior, Young wanted to discover the causes 
behind the relative homogeneity of animal behaviors.  While Young accepted Beach’s 
general model, he was more interested in exploring genetic components of behavior.  
This, he thought, could explain the overall stability in behavior patterns. 
                                                 
147 Ibid. 
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If the overall stability of sexual behaviors had a genetic (rather than hormonal) 
basis, variations in sexual behavior also could be due to genetic factors.  To investigate 
this, Valenstein et. al. compared the behavior of inbred guinea pigs to that of 
heterogeneous controls.  They were concerned that genetic variations might obscure the 
effects of hormonal variation.  
 They found that the inbred guinea pigs performed in a more homogeneous fashion 
than did the controls, suggesting a genetic basis for behavior. Valenstein et. al. are 
cautious to not claim that sexual behavior is just a matter of genetic influence: “Although 
alternative explanations cannot be excluded, the possibility that the character of mating 
behavior may have a genetic basis is suggested.”148
 In addition, the results of this experiment inspired a methodological conclusion: 
 
 
The homogeneity of performance found in two highly inbred families emphasizes 
the value of such animals for studies of sexual behavior.  In contrast, the larger 
interindividual [sic] variance of the heterogeneous animals necessitates the use of 
very large groups in order to ascertain the role of hormonal and experiential 
factors which may be contributing to the development of sexual behavior, but 
whose effect might otherwise be concealed by the differences between animals.149
 
 
With this insight, Young and his students developed several strains of inbred 
guinea pigs for further investigations.  Like the restriction and isolation experiments 
discussed by Beach, Young wanted to control experiential factors in order to tease out the 
                                                 
148 Valenstein, E., et. al. (1954). "Sex Drive in Genetically Heterogeneous and Highly Inbred 
Strains of Male Guinea Pigs." Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology 47(2): 162 - 
165. 
 
149 Ibid. 
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relative of internal versus external factors.  Unlike the above-mentioned studies, Young 
also had the goal of separating the effects of different kinds of internal influences.  With 
the factor of genetic variation under control, they hoped to isolate other factors 
responsible for the organization of sexual behavior.  
In 1955, Young and his colleagues published an article in which they adopted and 
expanded upon Beach’s model.  They begin by noting: 
 
The relative stability of the patterns of sexual behavior displayed by individual 
male and female mammals has led to speculation and inquiry into the nature of 
factors that might be responsible for the establishment of such patterns.  The 
possibility that gonadal hormones have an organizing action has long been 
questioned [by Ball, Beach, and Young himself, among others].  Genetic factors, 
on the other hand, may be influential. . . . Inasmuch as strains of guinea pigs exist 
in which the patterns of sexual behavior are relatively homogeneous, these strains 
seemed well suited for a study that would comprehend not only genetic 
contribution, but also the possible effect of experience on the development of 
sexual behavior in a rodent.150
 
   
   
The factors that establish these relatively stable patterns are what organize the 
behavior.  Beach had found that rats needed socialization at a critical period in 
development.  With genetic heterogeneity controlled as a factor, Young and his students 
could further investigate the effects of environment and learning on sexual behavior. 
                                                 
150 Valenstein, E., et. al. (1955). "Experiential and Genetic Factors in the Organization of Sexual 
Behavior in Male Guinea Pigs." Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology 48(5): 397 
- 403. 
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Upon testing the behavior of isolated and socialized males, they found differences 
in the inbred strains, but not in the heterogeneous control group.151 Importantly, they 
made the methodological decision to give specific behaviors different weights.  
Behaviors leading to “successful” mating (mounting, intromission, ejaculation) were 
given high weights, while “exploratory” behaviors (sniffling, nuzzling, aborted mounts) 
were given low weights.  There appears to be a teleological motivation to this weighting 
system: on the assumption that the goal of sexual behavior is pregnancy, those particular 
behaviors more likely to result in pregnancy are more “successful.”152
With this weighting system in place, they found that socialized inbred males 
exhibited higher levels of heavily weighted behaviors (mounting, intromission, 
ejaculation). In socialized males from inbred strain 2: 
 In this way, 
cultural preconceptions influenced methodological analysis.   
 
[T]he difference in the higher measures of sexual behavior (mounting, 
intromission, ejaculation) are also significant whether the average frequency per 
animal of the percentage of animals displaying the behavior is considered.153
 
 
Similarly, in inbred strain 13: 
                                                 
151 Valenstein et. al. write: 
 
The differences in average sexual behavior scores and in the separate measures that 
contribute to the scores of the isolated and social [heterogeneous] males are not striking.  
Again, the differences are in favor of the social males, but they are not significant. 
 
Ibid. 
 
152 (Pointed out by Dennis Des Chene.) 
153 Valenstein, E., et. al. (1955). "Experiential and Genetic Factors in the Organization of Sexual 
Behavior in Male Guinea Pigs." Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology 48(5): 397 
- 403.  
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An analysis of the individual measures contributing to the sexual behavior scores 
reveals that 57 per cent of the social males had intromissions and ejaculations 
while none of the isolated males exhibited those higher measures of behavior.154
 
 
In both strains, the isolated males displayed higher levels of less weighted 
behaviors (sniffling, muzzling, and aborted mounts) and lower levels of the higher 
weighted behaviors.  On the face of it, it would appear that successful mating behavior 
does require socialization. On the teleological account that informed the weighting 
system, the socialized males displayed more successful types of behaviors, and thus came 
closer to the goal of pregnancy.  
However, this teleological weighting system carries with it a distinction between 
quality and quantity.  An examination of the quantity of different types of behaviors 
indicates the need for socialization.  But when the authors figured the different weights 
into their calculations and averaged the scores of each group, they found no significant 
differences in the weighted averages.  The authors explain this lack of difference:  
 
[B]y the fact that the socially raised males did not exhibit a sufficiently large 
number of the higher measures of behavior to counter act the greater activity of 
the isolated males in the lower measures.155
 
  
In other words, the isolated males made up for their lack of higher weighted 
behaviors by displaying larger amounts of lower weighted behaviors. 
                                                 
154 Ibid. 
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Young (at this time) interpreted these results as reinforcing Beach’s model.  The 
authors conclude the article by claiming that:  
 
The work with the guinea pig also provides evidence for the existence of dual 
components of mating behavior, the organization of the sexual response, which 
would correspond roughly to the “capacity for sexual performance” as used by 
Beach, and sexual excitability, which would correspond to “susceptibility to 
sexual arousal.”156
 
 
From this, the authors conclude that socialization affects the quality, but not the 
quantity, of sexual behavior.  This is a more nuanced claim than Beach’s. 
The authors noticed one oddity: the performance of the strain 13 males (both 
isolated and socialized) was significantly below that of the strain 2 and heterogeneous 
males.  The authors postulated that “the deficiency of some substance such as androgen 
accounted for the poor performance of these males even in the social situation.”157
To test this hypothesis, the authors castrated thirteen strain 13 males on the day of 
birth, then injected them daily with 500y of testosterone propionate per 100 gm of body 
weight (over 20 times the amount sufficient to restore the precastrational level of sexual 
behavior of adult castrates).  Six of the males were isolated, the remaining seven were 
socialized.  After the males reached adulthood, they found that the average behavior 
 
Presumably, the reasoning behind this claim is that the strain 13 socialized males have 
had their behavior organized, but they lack sufficient androgens to stimulate said 
behavior. 
                                                 
156 Ibid. 
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score of the socialized males was significantly better than both the isolated males and the 
intact social males from the first experiment.158
From the results of these experiments, Valenstein et. al. conclude that: 
 
 
The isolated animals gave evidence of being as much aroused by the presence of 
the female as were those from the social group, and there was no evidence of any 
emotional disturbance that could have interfered with their display of sexual 
behavior.159
 
 
In other words, isolated males were just as susceptible to arousal. To account for 
this discrepancy between motivation and behavior, the authors claim that the “best 
explanation of these results appears to be that the sexual behavior of the isolated animals 
had not been organized into an effective pattern.”160
But what causes successful organization? Is it just learning? On Beach’s model, 
motor patterns and sexual excitability were “innately organized,” but successful mating 
requires socialization.  In other words, the organization of adequate sexual behavior 
 [Original emphasis.] 
                                                 
158 Ibid. 
 
159 Ibid. However, these males had difficulty in mating successfully: 
 
An attempt to improve the performance of the strain 13 males by administering large 
quantities of exogenous androgen met with only limited success.  The performance of the 
socially raised castrate males receiving androgen was significantly better than that of the 
untreated males, but it was still significantly below the level of either the strain 2 or the 
heterogeneous males raised under comparable conditions.  
 
Valenstein, E., et. al. (1955). "Experiential and Genetic Factors in the Organization of Sexual 
Behavior in Male Guinea Pigs." Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology 48(5): 397 
- 403. 
 
160 Valenstein, E., et. al. (1955). "Experiential and Genetic Factors in the Organization of Sexual 
Behavior in Male Guinea Pigs." Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology 48(5): 397 
- 403.  
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requires learning (environmental factors), and this learning must take place during a 
critical period.  If animals do not organize their sexual behavior during the critical period, 
successful matings, regardless of the level of arousal, will not occur. 
 
 
IV. Questioning the Importance of Critical Periods for Learning 
 
 
In 1957, Young’s group decided to investigate the possibility that isolated males, 
if given enough later socialization, could mate successfully.  In other words, the question 
was whether early isolation, in and of itself, prevented the display of mature sexual 
behavior.  What inspired this line of inquiry was the earlier finding that isolated males 
were as active as the socialized males during the tests, although their behavior was 
limited sniffing, licking, and unsuccessful attempts to mount estrous females (the “lower 
weighted” behaviors).  Instead of an indication that their lack of organization of sexual 
behavior was a permanent state, Valenstein and Goy argue it could be: 
 
That these lower measures of sexual behavior are in part exploratory, and it was 
necessary for the isolated males to engage in more of this type of activity before 
intromission and ejaculation could be achieved.  Or, it might have been proposed, 
that had more tests been given, the full copulatory pattern would eventually have 
been displayed.161
 
 
                                                 
161 Valenstein, E., and Robert Goy (1957). "Further Studies of the Organization and Display of 
Sexual Behavior in Male Guinea Pigs." Ibid. 50(2): 115 - 119. 
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Contrary to their previous conclusion, the observed lack of success of isolated 
males could be due to lack of experience per se, rather than “to a limited opportunity to 
organize their sexual behavior.”162 The implicit claim is that Beach conflates environment 
and learning; that rearing pups in isolation does not mean that they could never learn 
successful mating techniques.  If Beach did indeed make an erroneous conflation, if lack 
of experience does not result in an inability to learn, then how does sexual behavior 
become organized?  The answer to this question “has a bearing on whether or not we are 
dealing with a behavior pattern that has an early critical period for its emergence.”163
 Valenstein and Goy conducted five different experiments, which can be divided 
into two general categories: testing the hypothesis that social isolation, either before or 
after the critical period, affects mating behavior; and investigating the effects on the 
organization of sexual behavior of pups raised in non-standard conditions.  The first three 
experiments explored the former, the remaining two the latter. 
  
In the first experiment, Valenstein and Goy tested whether or not a male, which 
has been able to organize its sexual behavior, displays altered behavior after prolonged 
isolation.  After allowing five pups to mature in group situations, they isolated them for a 
                                                 
162 Ibid.  Valenstein and Goy note that: 
 
To support conclusion it was necessary to show that males reared with a minimum of 
contact with other animals (separation from other members of the litter from time of birth 
to weaning and complete isolation for designated periods thereafter) were not prevented 
from displaying the sexual behavior pattern by some effect of the prolonged isolation. 
 
Valenstein, E., and Robert Goy (1957). "Further Studies of the Organization and Display of 
Sexual Behavior in Male Guinea Pigs." Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology 
50(2): 115 - 119. 
 
163 Valenstein, E., and Robert Goy (1957). "Further Studies of the Organization and Display of 
Sexual Behavior in Male Guinea Pigs." Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology 
50(2): 115 - 119. 
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period of seven weeks to fourteen months.  During this period of isolation, the males 
were placed with a female on one week to three month intervals.  The authors found that 
isolation did not affect mating behavior, provided that it was already organized.164
The second experiment tested if mature isolated males, when briefly exposed to 
test females, are able to organize their sexual behavior.   Using three males, each animal 
was given a series of tests at intervals.  As long as the animals remained isolated, they did 
not display any of the heavier weighted behaviors.
  In this 
way, organization was permanent. 
165
The third, and ultimately the most important, experiment investigated the 
question: can a male in which organization of the higher measures of sexual behavior not 
occurred improve his sexual performance at a more advanced age?  To test this, 
Valenstein and Goy used five males from the heterogeneous stock (including the three 
from the second experiment) and five from inbred strain 2.  While the three were unable 
to mate with females when briefly exposed, after being placed with females for an 
extended period of time, “all three demonstrated for the first time the ability to mounts, 
have intromissions, and ejaculate.”
  These first two experiments support 
Beach’s notion of a critical period.   
166
                                                 
164 Ibid. 
 The authors took this to imply that, at least for these 
three males, successful mating behavior could be learned late in life.  More evidence for 
 
165 Ibid. 
166 Ibid.  Perhaps because of their “lack of vigor,” inbred strain 13 are never mentioned again by 
Young’s research group.  Presumably (and this is only a presumption) they abandoned all 
research involving strain 13. 
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this implication came from the remaining two isolated males, who showed distinct 
improvement after prolonged exposure to females.167
In contrast, the five males from inbred strain 2 did not improve as dramatically
    
168
 
, 
with the exception of one male.  This male, after achieving initially promising results:  
Was then given female cage mates for an additional 25 days, and when retested, 
he scored 5.8 [a middling score] with several mounts, but still did not have any 
intromissions or ejaculations.  Once again female cage mates were provided, this 
time for a 30-day period, and three tests were made between days 275 and 295 [of 
life].  The male’s score was raised to 6.6, and now ample evidence was given (two 
ejaculations and a number of intromissions) of its ability to engage in the 
complete the copulatory act.169
 
   
   
Interestingly, Valenstein and Goy read these results as evidence for, not evidence 
against, the idea that sexual behavior could be learned later in life.  While the results 
from the isolated heterogeneous strain tell against Beach’s notion of critical periods in 
development, the results from the inbred strain do not.170
                                                 
167 Ibid. 
 
 
168 Valenstein and Goy write: 
 
The results were somewhat different with strain 2 males.  In general it was more difficult 
for them to acquire the copulatory pattern at older ages.  . . . Two males were then placed 
with females for 23 days and retested between days 165 [of life] and 195.   
 
Ibid. 
 
169 Ibid. 
 
170 Valenstein and Goy write: 
 
The remaining three [out of five] strain 2 males were left isolated until day 210 and then 
retested.  None displayed any of the higher measures of sexual behavior.  Placed with 
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 The last two experiments investigated the organization of inbred strain 2 male 
pups’ sexual behavior when raised in atypical environments, either an all-male 
environment or one in which all the females are spayed.  (The control group consisted of 
males raised with intact females.)  The goal was “to delimit the type of experiment 
necessary for the organization of the sexual response.”171
 
 Specifically:  
As estrous females and males initiate mounting whereas untreated, spayed 
females do not, the importance of mounting as a stimulant to the development of 
sexual behavior could be determined.172
 
 
In the fourth experiment, heterogeneous and inbred strain 2 males were paired 
together, and (to control for higher levels of aggression in strain 2) strain 2 males were 
caged in groups of two or three.  When these males were placed with females, they mated 
successfully.  Because males will occasionally mount other males (an act usually 
interpreted as dominance behavior)173
                                                                                                                                                 
females for 23 days, they were retested between days 250 and 265.  Following these tests 
they were provided with female cage mates for an additional 30 days and then retested 
between days 300 and 320.  During these tests no mounts, intromissions, or ejaculations 
were displayed. 
 the results from the males raised with other males 
were not unexpected.   
 
Ibid.  
 
171 Ibid. 
 
172 Ibid. 
 
173 Earlier results demonstrated that the acquisition of the copulatory varied with the genetic 
background of the animals.  Specifically, strain 2 males reared with males performed better than 
those caged with intact females, while heterogeneous animals did not perform so well.  The 
authors postulate that “the strain 2 males may have been aroused by the great amount of mounting 
that takes place among males caged together.” Ibid. 
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In the sixth experiment, sixteen strain 2 males were each placed with two spayed 
females, with a control group of ten males placed with intact females.  Upon testing, the 
authors found that:   
 
The average score of the strain 2 males reared with spayed females is significantly 
lower than either that of the males which had intact female cages mates or the 
males caged with males. . . It would appear that, at the time of testing, these males 
[reared with spayed females] were in the act of acquiring the degree of 
organization of behavioral necessary, but had not as yet completed the process.174
  
 
From these experiments, the authors make three conclusions.  First, once the 
copulatory pattern has been organized, prolonged isolation does not affect mating 
behavior.  Second, if the pattern is not organized, the males cannot acquire it upon 
testing.  Both of these conclusions accord with Beach’s model.  The final conclusion, 
however, does not. 
In contradiction to Beach’s conception of critical periods for sexual behavior 
development, Valenstein and Goy claim that:  
 
The results from experiments I, II, and II support the conclusion that learning 
process is involved in the organization of the copulatory behavior pattern of male 
guinea pigs.   It seemed unlikely that males reared with a minimum of contact 
with other animals were prevented from displaying the full sexual behavior 
pattern as a direct result of prolonged isolation, but the possibility had not been 
tested.  In the present experiment it was shown that isolation per se does not 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
174 Ibid. 
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prevent a male from displaying the full sexual pattern provided the behavioral 
skills had been previously acquired.175
 
  
In other words, while the organization of mating behavior requires (in part) 
learning, there does not appear to be a critical period for learning sexual behavior.  This 
conclusion is a radical break from both the Beach model and Young’s earlier, tentative, 
suggestion that the organization of sexual behavior has an important genetic component.  
On the face of it, the empirical results do not support this conclusion.  In particular, the 
first and second experiments confirm Beach’s etiological model, while the third is 
inconclusive at best.  Of the five heterogeneous males, the three from the second 
experiment are unequivocal challenges to Beach’s notion of critical periods.  However, 
the authors’ claim that the remaining two improved “dramatically” upon repeated testing 
is questionable. 
More problematic is their dismissal of the results from the five inbreds.  The fact 
the five out of ten test subjects confirms a hypothesis, while the other five do not, is still 
far from conclusive evidence for the authors’ thesis.  This reflects both the “messiness” 
of endocrinological research and, relatedly, the power of hypotheses with “thought-
experiment” like characteristics.  Additionally, granting that the results cast doubt upon 
Beach’s hypothesis, it would appear that, given the dramatic differences between the 
heterogeneous and inbred strains, these results point to the importance of genetic, rather 
than environmental, factors on the acquisition of mating behavior.    
                                                 
175 Ibid. 
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Without acknowledging these potential complications, the authors further 
reinforce their rejection of Beach’s notion of critical periods for behavioral development 
by claiming that: 
 
The demonstration that organization of the complete copulatory pattern can occur 
in older animals is of interest.  Apparently, this learning process is not restricted 
to a critical developmental period. To be sure, some of the older males did not 
organize this pattern.176
 
 
 As such, incongruous results were interpreted as “noise.”  This glossing over of 
anomalous results echoes the conclusions of early advocates of the mono-hormonic 
theory and, more generally, reflects the “messiness” of endocrinological research.  
 
 
The question about the inequality of potential for sexual behavior, as addressed by 
Beach and further explored by Young, is a question about the relative influences of 
external versus internal factors.  As such, the debate concerning the etiology of sexual 
behavior was a debate between two general, intead of elaborated, hypotheses.  Young et. 
al.’s questioning of Beach’s notion of critical periods for learning in their 1957 paper set 
the stage for the crucial resolution of the “problem” of homosexuality. 
In conclusion, there are three points of philosophical interest here.  First, the 
rejection of the dominant explanatory model of the etiology of mammalian sexual 
                                                 
176 Ibid. 
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behavior is challenged on the basis of one research project.177  Second, prima facie, 
experiments 1 and 2 do not support the authors’ conclusion that sexual behavior is not 
organized during critical periods of development.  If anything, the results from these two 
experiments reinforce Beach’s learning theory.  Third, “exceptions to the rule” – older 
isolated males incapable of organizing a successful mating pattern – do not figure into the 
general conclusions.178
 In spite of this, Young and his colleagues used the results of this experiment as a 
catalyst for a radical new model of the etiology of psychosexual development: the 
organization/activation model. 
  
 
 
 
V. The Organization/Activation Model 
 
If there is no critical period for the learning of sexual behavior, how does it 
develop?   Two years after the publication of paper questioning the existence of critical 
periods, Young proposed a radical answer: prenatal exposure to androgens does the 
organizing.  This “organization/activation” model preserves the notion of a critical 
period, but claims the causal factor to be hormones rather than learning. This model, 
which is the dominant model of psychosexual development today, is much more 
                                                 
177 Valenstein and Goy note that “several of the groups contain only a few animals; however, 
these are believed to be sufficient in view of the unambiguous results and the long period that the 
animals were followed.” Ibid.  
 
178 This may be a result of Young’s decision to focus on homogeneity rather than variability.  
Nonetheless, this dedication to the typical, at the expense of the atypical, has had serious 
ramifications.  These will be discussed in following chapter.    
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restrictive in what it considers to be normal or typical masculine or feminine behavior 
than Beach’s model.   
Like the work of Frank Lillie and Alfred Jost, investigations into the etiology of 
sexual behavior make the foundational methodological assumption that one can explain 
typical development by focusing on atypical development.  Underlying this 
methodological approach is an ontological premise about the difference between typical 
and atypical development: atypical development is not a part of the normal spectrum of 
variation, but the result of perturbations in the developmental process.  In short, 
developmental atypicality is pathological.  (Though, as we shall see, not all investigators 
made this assumption.)  This assumption immediately raises problems of categorization: 
what counts as atypical, and why? 
As discussed in the previous sections, Young’s focus on the relative heterogeneity 
of behavior suggests that atypicality and typicality can be defined solely in terms of 
numerical frequency.  However, as I demonstrate in the present section, the 
organization/activation model incorporates prevailing cultural tropes concerning typical 
and atypical sexual behavior. 
In 1959, Charles Phoenix, Robert Goy, Arnold Gerall and William C. Young 
published “Organizing Action of Prenatally Administered Testosterone Propionate on the 
Tissues Mediating Mating Behavior in the Guinea Pig,” which proposed the 
organization/activation model of sexual development and behavior.  This model 
suggested that prenatal hormones organize the central nervous system (or “tissues”) so 
that at puberty hormones could activate particular behaviors.  Specifically, Phoenix and 
his colleagues theorized that testosterone primes the male brain, readying it for sex-
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related activities such as intercourse and territory defense.  The female brain acquires 
gender179
Adopting Jost’s model of female development as the “default” pathway, Phoenix 
and his colleagues theorized that if femininity were the inherent state, adding testosterone 
should promote sex-specific neural differentiation in the brain and/or the central nervous 
system.  This sex-specific differentiation would have the effect of permanently fixing an 
individual’s behavior as masculine. 
 in the absence of testosterone.  
To test this theory, they injected pregnant guinea pigs with testosterone, 
producing females “in which the external genitalia at the time of birth were 
indistinguishable macroscopically from those of their male siblings and untreated 
males,”180
                                                 
179 While the distinction between sex and gender, first proposed by feminist thinkers in the early 
1970’s, helped clarify discussions of sex-dimorphism in both body and behavior, contemporary 
endocrinologists (and many psychologists) use these terms interchangeably.  Melissa Hines, for 
instance, writes: 
 whom the authors designated ‘hermaphrodites’.  The authors then performed a 
series of estrogen and progesterone injections designed to induce estrus, and observed the 
results.  The hermaphrodites (and castrated males) displayed lordosis significantly less 
 
Some authors try to distinguish between gender differences and sex differences, with 
gender differences being socially determined and sex differences biologically based.  
Given our limited knowledge of what is socially or biologically determined, I believe it is 
impossible to make this distinction.  In addition, it is likely that many behavioral sex 
differences result from complex interactions among different types of influences, some 
generally considered biological, others social.  Finally, the distinction between biological 
and social influences is in some senses false.  All of our behavior is controlled by our 
brain and, in this sense, is biologically based.  For these reasons, the terms sex difference 
and gender difference as used in this book will not have different causal implications. 
 
Hines, M. (2004). Brain Gender. New York, Oxford University Press.  
 
180 Phoenix, C., et. al. (1959). "Organizing Action of Prenatally Administered Testosterone 
Propionate on the Tissues Mediating Mating Behavior in the Female Guinea Pig." Endocrinology 
65: 369 - 382. 
  
 109 
often than the control females.  In addition, among the hermaphrodites and castrated 
males, “the low gutteral growl which is so frequently a part of the pattern of lordosis in 
normal females, was commonly, and in some individuals always, lacking.”181
What made Phoenix et. al.’s 1959 paper special was not the results (which had 
been uncovered earlier), but their explanations of the results.  Previous researchers had 
noticed an increased responsiveness of masculinized rodents to doses of androgens in 
adulthood, but had explained this as a manifestation of an inherent bisexuality.  In 
contrast, Phoenix et. al. theorized that prenatal hormones organized the neural tissue in 
“the direction of masculinization or feminization.”
  The 
authors also determined that the larger the quantity of androgens injected prenatally, the 
greater the suppression of lordosis.   
182
Importantly, the authors considered their findings to be an extension of the work 
done by Jost on the differentiation of the genital tracts. They interpreted Jost’s work as 
demonstrating an “inequality in potential”: while prenatal exposure to androgens will 
only slightly affect male genital development, it has a profound effect on female 
development.
  Gonadal hormones secreted in 
adulthood “activate” the previously organized tissues to induce masculine or feminine 
behavior.  
183
Phoenix et. al. concluded that the altered behavior of the hermaphrodites 
demonstrated that testosterone “acts on the central nervous tissues in which patterns of 
  
                                                 
181 Ibid. 
 
182 Ibid. 
 
183 Ibid. 
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sexual behavior are organized.”184
 
  The authors acknowledged the widespread existence 
of bisexual behavior, but downplayed its importance.  While untreated females in the 
experiments occasionally mounted other rats, and untreated males occasionally displayed 
lordosis, this behavior did not figure into their explanations.  For instance, in their 1957 
paper, two of Young’s colleagues speculated that mounting behavior stimulated the 
learning process in young males.  To explain their reasoning for placing some young 
males with spayed females and others with intact females, the authors point out that as: 
Estrous females and males initiate mounting whereas untreated, spayed females 
do not, the importance of mounting as a stimulant to the development of sexual 
behavior could be determined.185
 
  
 However, the authors express no interest in investigating the causes of female 
mounting.  Indeed, the authors reinterpret previous results in light of the 
organization/activation model, pointing out that earlier researchers, with their assumption 
of potential bisexuality, had failed to explain properly the masculinized behavior of 
androgen-treated animals:  
 
The possibility that there might have been a suppression of the capacity to 
respond as females and therefore an inequality of potential does not seem to have 
                                                 
184 Ibid. 
 
185 Valenstein, E., and Robert Goy (1957). "Further Studies of the Organization and Display of 
Sexual Behavior in Male Guinea Pigs." Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology 
50(2): 115 - 119. 
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been considered. . . We suggest, however, that in the adult this bisexuality is 
unequal in the neural tissues as it is in the case of the genital tissues.186
  
 
This extends the default model from physical to neural development and, 
ultimately, behavior.  The notion that there is an “inequality in potential” has fueled a 
host of studies trying to determine the relationship between not just hormones and 
behavior, but also hormones and intellectual capacities. 
Building upon the work of Lillie and Jost, the general explanatory mechanism of 
sex differences is as follows: The presence of a Y chromosome initiates a chain of events 
that causes primitive fetal gonads to develop into testes (without the Y chromosome, the 
fetus develops as a female).  The testes begin secreting androgens, which cause structural 
changes in both the genitalia and the brain.  The sex differences in brain structure 
underlie sex differences in behavior and cognitive abilities.  This general explanatory 
model serves to explain not just normal physical and behavioral development (including 
sex differences in aggression and cognitive abilities), but also the emergence of 
homosexuality, transsexualism, and gender-atypical behavior correlated with endocrine 
abnormalities.  This general explanatory mechanism is the foundation for current theories 
of human gendered behavior. 
There are four points of interest with this paper.  First, the authors only present 
positive arguments; there is no discussion of the deficits of Beach’s model.  On the face 
of it, it appears the Young and his students have dismissed Beach’s model out of hand.  
Second, the model itself influences how the data are interpreted.  For instance, the 
                                                 
186 Phoenix, C., et. al. (1959). "Organizing Action of Prenatally Administered Testosterone 
Propionate on the Tissues Mediating Mating Behavior in the Female Guinea Pig." Endocrinology 
65: 369 - 382. 
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masculine behavior of untreated adult females is considered “noise.” Third, the 
organization/activation model does not require the mono-hormonic hypothesis.  While 
building upon the Jost paradigm, mono-hormonism is not necessary for the 
organization/activation model.  Neural tissues could be organized by both estrogens and 
androgens (as, in fact, they are).187
By the mid 1960’s the organization/activation model was widely accepted, not 
just in the field of endocrinology,
  This reflects the power of crucial resolutions and how 
they shape the development of a field.  Finally, past results were reinterpreted in light of 
the model, implying that a field’s past is also reformed upon the acceptance of a new 
model.  
188
 
 but in other scientific fields as well, including 
psychology.  One of the authors of the 1959 paper, William C. Young, enthusiastically 
emphasized the potentially broad impact of the organization/activation hypothesis.  If, as 
he predicted, prenatal hormones influenced a wide variety of behaviors, adopting the 
organization/activation hypothesis would unite:  
[T]he work of experimental embryologists who have concerned themselves so 
completely with all that is involved in the development and differentiation of the 
genital tracts, and the work of psychologists and psychiatrists for whom the 
                                                 
187 See, for instance, Toran-Allerand, C. D. (1981). "Gonadal Steroids and Brain Development: In 
Vitro Veritas?" Trends in Neurosciences 4: 118 - 121. 
 
188 See, for instance, Lehrman, D. (1961). Gonadal Hormones and Parental Behavior in Birds and 
InfraHuman Mammals. Sex and Internal Secretions. W. Young. Baltimore, The Williams and 
Williams Company. III: 1268-1383.; Whalen, R. (1991). Heterotypical Behaviour in Man and 
Animals: Concepts and Strategies. Heterotypical Behaviour in Man and Animals. B. a. A. Haug. 
London, Chapman and Hall.  
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development and differentiation of neural tissues presents problems of equal 
interest and importance.189
 
  
Human behavior, once strictly the province of psychology, came under the rubric 
of behavioral endocrinology.  
The organization/activation model provided (and still provides, as I show later) 
the impetus to search for the neurological basis of sexually dimorphic behavior – not 
merely the brain structures underlying the positive feedback loop that supports ovulation, 
but also sexual orientation and, eventually, gender identity.  To put this in more 
philosophical terms, the organization/activation model inspired many scientists to 
embrace a new framework for developing hypotheses.  In Lakotos’s sense, it became a 
new research program.   
This widespread acceptance coincided with a decrease in the importance 
attributed to individual genetic variation, environmental cues and learning in the 
development of sexual behaviors.190
                                                 
189 Young, W. C. (1961). The Hormones and Mating Behavior. Sex and Internal Secretions. W. 
C. Young. Baltimore, The Williams and Wilkins Company. II. 
 For example, early on in the history of behavioral 
endocrinology, researchers noticed that lab animals varied widely in their levels of sexual 
activity.  More interestingly, most males, after being castrated and then treated with 
 
190 Slijper, in his concluding remarks of his 1984 article criticizing the work of Ehrhardt and 
Meyer-Bahlburg, notes that: 
 
Although it is impossible to separate the influence of androgen hormones from that of 
psychosocial factors on behavior, most studies have not even considered environmental 
influences.  
 
Slijper, F. (1984). "Androgens and Gender Role Behaviour in Girls with Congenital Adrenal 
Hyperplasia (CAH)." Progress in Brain Research 61: 417 - 422. 
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testosterone replacement therapy, eventually returned to their earlier activity levels, 
regardless of the amount of testosterone given.191
 
  Beach had attributed these variations in 
behavior to individual differences in temperament and learning as well as to different 
hormone levels.  After the introduction of the organization/activation theory, these 
variations were explained as due to different levels of prenatal androgens: after the brain 
had been organized in a certain way, later injections of androgens would simply activate 
the brain to cause certain behavior, no matter what the dose (so long as it was above a 
certain threshold level).  William C. Young, one of the authors of the 1959 paper, claims 
that this particular reaction to testosterone: 
[C]ould be likened to an exposed but undeveloped photographic film or plate, the 
hormone to the developer.  The pattern of behavior or “picture” that would be 
brought out by the hormone would depend on what had been taken; with this the 
character of the soma [somatic or constitutional factors] was held to be 
analogous.192
  
 
Few scientists mentioned that prenatally “ordered” males still needed postnatal 
organization through social contact in order to display adequate mating behavior.193
                                                 
191 Young, W. C. (1961). The Hormones and Mating Behavior. Sex and Internal Secretions. W. 
C. Young. Baltimore, The Williams and Wilkins Company. II. 
 As a 
  
192 Ibid. 
 
193 Earlier findings demonstrated that male rats needed social contact in order to learn how to 
mate properly.  For a summary and further investigation, see Hard, E., and Larsson, Knut (1968). 
"Dependence of Adult Mating Behavior in Male Rats on the Presence of Littermates in Infancy." 
Brain, Behavior and Evolution 1(5): 405-419. 
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result, male and female rodent behaviors emerged as more stereotyped than they had 
previously seemed, and more rigidly determined by prenatal hormone exposure.194
Sex differences in the brain have long been accepted as providing the underlying 
neurological structure supporting ovulatory competence.  But ovulatory competence, 
gender identity, and sexual orientation are, on the face of it, radically different 
phenomena.  As will be discussed in detail in chapter seven, an explanatory schema that 
explains phenomena previously thought to be dispirit is a hallmark of unification. 
  
This general model of psychosexual development serves as the basis of research 
in behavioral endocrinology to this day.  For example, in his review of male 
psychosexual development, Dick Swaab writes: 
 
Sexual differentiation of the brain is thought to be ‘imprinted’ or ‘organized’ by 
hormonal signals from the developing male gonads. . . . Male sexual 
differentiation of the human brain is thought to be determined in the first two 
periods during which sexually dimorphic peaks in gonadal hormone levels are 
found – during gestation and the perinatal period, while from puberty onwards, 
sex hormones alter the function of previously organized neuronal systems 
(‘activating effects’).195
 
 
                                                 
194 Beach continued to challenge the organization/activation thesis, although his criticism fell on 
mostly deaf ears. See “get name of article” in Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 
1966, p. 532. 
 
195 Swaab, D. (2004). "Sexual Differentiation of the Human Brain: Relevance for Gender Identity, 
Transsexualism and Sexual Orientation." Gynecological Endocrinology 19: 301-312. 
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Part of the reason for this rapid and continued widespread acceptance was the 
unifying explanatory promise of the model.  In “Sexual Differentiation of the Vertebrate 
Brain: Principles and Mechanisms,” Cooke et al. write: 
 
Perhaps the most important contribution of the organizational hypothesis was to 
draw attention to the question of why males and females behave differently.  After 
this landmark paper [1959] the question was refined to, “what is different about 
males and females that causes them to behave differently?” Once this question 
was posed, the most obvious potential answer was that the brains of males and 
females were structurally different.196
 
 
Delineating one causal factor behind the developmental pathway – hormones – 
streamlines the explanatory model. 
Another reason for the rapid acceptance of the organization/activation model is 
given by Professor Jacob van der Werff ten Bosch, an endocrinologist at Erasmus 
University in Rotterdam who conducted research on hormones and brain development in 
the 1960s: the organization/activation model provided a possible solution to the “vexing 
question of homosexuality.”197
                                                 
196 In “Sexual Differentiation of the Vertebrate Brain: Principles and Mechanisms,” Cooke et. al., 
claim: 
  
 
 
Cooke, B., et. al. (1998). "Sexual Differentiation of the Vertebrate Brain: Principles and 
Mechanisms." Frontiers in Neuroendocrinology 19: 323 - 362. 
 
197 From an interview by the author in van den Wijngaard, M. (1997). Reinventing the Sexes: The 
Biomedical Construction of Femininity and Masculinity. Bloomington, Indianna University 
Press. In Sexing the Body, Anne Fausto-Sterling claims three factors contributed to the rapid 
acceptance of the organization/activation model: it built on Jost’s already accepted accounts of 
anatomical development; it had an apparent widespread applicability; and it focused on the 
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The two explanations mentioned for the widespread and rapid acceptance of the 
organization/activation model are not incompatible.  Whatever their particular reasons, 
scientists not only accepted the model without the same sort of caution that initially 
characterized the reception of Jost’s ideas, they quickly extended the 
organization/activation model to other “gendered” behaviors, including maternal care, 
aggression, activity level, play fighting, maze learning, and taste preference. 
 
 
VI. Challenges to the Organization/Activation Model 
 
The main challenge to the organization/activation hypothesis was the discovery in 
the mid-1960’s that early estrogen treatment can masculinize the central nervous system.  
Specifically, a single injection of estradiol, when given to newborn male rats that had 
been castrated in utero, drastically masculinized their behavior.198
This discovery challenged the organization/activation hypothesis on two fronts.  
First, and most generally, it raises the question of how an ovarian steroid can cause 
masculinization.  The fact that it can do so threatens the mono-hormonic theory of sexual 
development for both body and brain; that it is the androgens, and only the androgens, 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
socially acceptable heterosexual development. Fausto-Sterling, A. (2000). Sexing the Body. New 
York, Basic Books. 
 
198 Feder, H., and Richard Whalen (1965). "Feminine Behavior in Neonatally Castrated and 
Estrogen-Treated Male Rats." Science 147(3655): 306 - 307. The authors did not interpret their 
results as discrediting the organization/activation hypothesis, but as confirming the mono-
hormonic theory of development: “feminization is induced by lack of neonatal androgen rather 
than by the presence of estrogen.” Feder, H., and Richard Whalen (1965). "Feminine Behavior in 
Neonatally Castrated and Estrogen-Treated Male Rats." Science 147(3655): 306 - 307. 
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that organize.  The second question raised is more specific: why doesn’t estradiol from 
the newborn female’s ovaries (or from the mother while in utero) masculinize the 
females? 
To preserve the organization/activation hypothesis, two groups of researchers 
proposed the “aromatization” hypothesis. In 1970, a group of scientists at the Royal 
Veterinary College in London discovered that a metabolite of testosterone that cannot be 
aromatized into estradiol did not stimulate copulatory behavior in rats.199  They 
speculated that the influence of androgens upon sexual behavior depended upon their 
metabolic conversion to an estrogen.  Because testosterone and estradiol are structurally 
similar, a single chemical reaction can convert testosterone to estradiol.200
Two years later, a group of researchers at the University of California at San 
Diego discovered that the developing human brain itself is a site of aromatization.
  This type of 
process is known as “aromatization,” and is facilitated by the enzyme aromatase. Thus, 
tissues containing aromatase can convert testosterone to estradiol and thereby make use 
of estrogen receptors.   
201
                                                 
199 McDonald, P., et. al. (1970). "Failure of 5-alpha-dihydrotestosterone to Initiate Sexual 
Behavior in the Castrated Rat." Nature 227: 964 - 965. 
  This 
prompted them to “look for the presence of the same system in the central nervous 
 
200 The substitution of a hydroxy-group for a double-bonded oxygen while, at the same time, 
losing both a hydrogen atom and a methyl group.  
 
201 Naftolin, F., et. al. (1971). "Aromatization of Androstendione by Limbic System Tissue from 
Human Foetuses." Journal of Endocrinology 51(4): 795 - 796. 
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system and anterior pituitary gland of adult male and female rats,”202 which they 
subsequently found.203
Combining the chemical and behavioral findings, these two groups of researchers 
theorized that it is estradiol that masculinizes the brain, not testosterone.  Systemic 
testosterone could be converted to estradiol and stimulate estrogen receptors in the 
hypothalamus.  This was why injections of estradiol to newborn females could 
masculinize their behavior. 
   
 The aromatization hypothesis was bolstered by later studies finding the same 
system of conversion in the hypothalmi of young and fetal rats.204  The subsequent 
observation that injecting neonatal female rats with an estrogen antagonist blocked the 
effects of testosterone treatment provided additional support.  Specifically, blocking the 
aromatization process or blocking estradiol receptors during early development prevented 
the development of male-typical behavior patterns.205
This answers the general question, but not the specific one: how do females 
escape masculinization?  While the ovaries of fetuses and newborns secrete very little 
  
                                                 
202 Naftolin, F., et. al. (1972). "Aromatization of Androstenedione by the Anterior Hypothalmus 
of Adult Male and Female Rats." Endocrinology 90(1): 295 - 298. 
 
203 Naftolin and McLusky discovered aromatase in the adult rat hypothalamus, For a summary, 
see MacLusky, N., and Naftolin, Frederick (1984). Aromatization Hypothesis. Differentiation: 
Basic and Clinical Aspects. Reddy et. al. discovered it in newborns: Reddy, V. V. R., et. al. 
(1974). "Conversion of Androstenedione to Estrone by Neural Tissues from Fetal and Neonatal 
Rats." Endocrinology 94(1): 117 - 121.  See also Baum, M. (1979). "Differentiation of Coital 
Behavior in Mammals: a Comparative Analysis." Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 3(4): 
265 - 284.  
   
204 Reddy, V. V. R., et. al. (1974). "Conversion of Androstenedione to Estrone by Neural Tissues 
from Fetal and Neonatal Rats." Endocrinology 94(1): 117 - 121. 
 
205 Doughty, C. (1975). "Inhibition, by Anti-Estrogen MER-25, of Defeminization." Journal of 
Endocrinology 67: 459 - 460. 
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hormone, all fetuses are exposed to fairly high levels of estrogens produced by the 
mother’s ovaries during pregnancy.  Thus it would appear that, not only should females 
be masculinized, they should be more masculinized than their male womb-mates.  In 
other words, the aromatization hypothesis, while resolving one anomaly, raised another. 
  The solution is a protein (called the ‘α-feto protein’) in the blood of rat fetuses. 
Found in both sexes, this protein binds estradiol from both the mother and fetal ovaries, 
but not testosterone, thus limiting the developing brain’s exposure to estradiol. The 
developing yolk sac and fetal liver synthesize this protein, which circulates at high 
concentrations during the latter part of gestation and then gradually disappears over the 
first few weeks of postnatal life.206  But the testosterone secreted by the male fetuses is 
not bound by the α-feto protein. This testosterone enters the brain cells, beyond the reach 
of the binding protein, and is locally aromatized to estradiol.  The estradiol triggers (via 
estrogen receptors) some cascade of neural events that inhibits the expression of 
ovulation and lordosis.207
 The aromatization thesis rescues the hypothesis that prenatal androgens organize 
the brain (even if it is, technically, an estrogen that does the organizing).  But the 
aromatization thesis, unlike the organization/activation model, was initially resisted by 
the scientific community.  Richard Whalen, in 1974, writes: 
   
 
                                                 
206 Plapinger, L., et. al. (1973). "Ontogeny of Estradiol-Binding Sites in the Rat Brain." 
Endocrinology 93(5): 1129 - 1139. 
 
207 McEwen, B. S., et. al. (1975). "Role of Fetoneonatal Estrogen Binding Proteins in the 
Associations of Estrogen with Neonatal Brain Cell Nuclear Receptors." Brain Research 96(2): 
400 - 406. 
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This hypothesis is intriguing because it has been known since our early work that 
the administration of estrogen to newborn female rats will work like testosterone 
to inhibit the later display of lordosis behavior . . . Of course, these findings in no 
way prove that sexual differentiation is controlled by an estrogen.  The data are 
cited to raise the critical issue of the role of steroid metabolism in the 
differentiation process.208
 
    
Other scientists described aromatization as a process whereby estrogens mimic 
androgens. One textbook author theorizes that: 
 
Since both types of steroid hormone [estrogens and androgens] inhibit 
gonadotrophin secretion, one hypothesis states that it is not action of the steroid 
[estradiol] directly, but the suppression of gonadotrophin secretion at a critical 
stage, which affects the hypothalamus.209
 
 
 It took several years for scientists to accept the aromatization hypothesis.  Roger 
Gorski, initially resistant to the hypothesis, appears to have accepted it by 1979: “we have 
the seemingly unusual situation where estradiol appears to be the vehicle for 
                                                 
208 Whalen, R. (1974). Sexual Differentiation: Models, Methods and Mechanisms. Sex 
Differences in Behavior. R. Friedman, and van de Wiele. New York, Kruger. 
 
209 Martin, C. (1976). Textbook of Endocrine Physiology. Baltimore, The Williams and Wilkins 
Company.  Almost twenty years later, in their review of sex differences in the human 
hypothalamus, Swaab and Hofman write: 
 
The presence of aromatase in the developing brain explains the extraordinary ability of 
oestrogens to mimic, at least partly, the organizing actions of androgens. 
 
Swaab, D., and Hofman, Michel (1995). "Sexual Differentiation of the Human Hypothalamus in 
Relation to Gender and Sexual Orientation." Trends in Neurosciences 18(6): 264 - 270. 
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masculinization of the brain.”210  It is now generally accepted that “though it may be 
counterintuitive that a female hormone is ultimately responsible for development of the 
male brain, the data reported thus far demonstrate that such is the case.”211
But the aromatization hypothesis did not solve all the challenges raised by the 
theory that estradiol masculinizes the brain.  Recall that the general challenge to the 
organization/activation model was resolved by the aromatization thesis, while the 
discovery of the α-feto protein resolved the specific one.  The aromatization thesis 
appeared to uphold the essence of the idea that androgens are responsible for masculine 
brain differentiation.  But later research cast these solutions into doubt. Testosterone 
aromatization, thought to be responsible for dimorphism in the rat brain, does not occur 
in primates.  Specifically, scientists soon discovered that the equivalent of α-feto protein 
in primates did not bind estradiol, or at least bound it inefficiently.
 This initial 
resistance may be due to cultural preconceptions about differing inducing factors.  (See 
my earlier comments about the initial gendering of hormones.) 
212
                                                 
210 Gorski, R. A. (1979). "The Neuroendocrinology of Reproduction: An Overview." Biology of 
Reproduction 20(1): 111 - 127. 
    
  
211 Schulkin, J. (1999). The Neuroendocrine Regulation of Behavior. New York, Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
212 MacLusky and Naftolin note that 
 
There is no a priori reason to suppose that aromatization does not play a part in the 
response of the developing human or guinea pig CNS to prenatal androgen.  Yet, in both 
man and guinea pig, we apparently cannot invoke α-fetoprotein as a mechanism for the 
regulation of free circulating estrogen levels during gestation. 
 
MacLusky, N. J., and Naftolin, Frederick (1981). "Sexual Differentiation of the Central Nervous 
System." Science 211(4488): 1294 - 1303. 
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 There are basically two solutions to this challenge to the aromatization 
hypothesis.  The first is an invocation of a version of the di-hormonic theory: androgens, 
as well as estrogens, act directly on the brain.  Simon LeVay, for instance, claims that 
“testosterone’s effects do not requires this conversion [to estradiol]” in primates.213
 
 
Although generally accepted by the scientific community, the exact mechanisms behind 
this updated version of the di-hormonic remain elusive.  In their study of interactions 
between gonadal hormones and gene expression, van Nas et. al. write: 
The organizational and activational effects of testosterone may be mediated by 
two primary metabolites of testosterone: nonaromatized metabolites such as 
dihydrotestosterone (DHT), which bind to androgen receptors, and aromatized 
metabolites such as estradiol (E2), which bind to estrogen receptors.214
 
   
The second solution is to postulate that the primate placenta protects the 
developing fetus from maternal estrogens by rapidly metabolizing them.  Specifically, 
some endocrinologists surmise that the placenta converts estradiol to the much weaker 
hormone, estrone.215
                                                 
213 LeVay, S. (1993). The Sexual Brain. Cambridge, The MIT Press. 
  In both cases, the organization/activation model remains firmly in 
place as the dominant model in theories of psycho-sexual differentiation.  
 
214 van Nas, A., et. al. (2009). "Elucidating the Role of Gonadal Hormones in Sexually Dimorphic 
Gene Coexpression Networks." Endocrinology 150(3): 1235 - 1249. 
 
215 In his extensive review of research on the etiology of homosexuality, Heino Meyer-Bahlburg 
writes: 
 
Endogenous estradiol is believed to be largely inactivated before it reaches the fetal brain, 
in rats by binding to alpha-fetoprotein, in the rhesus monkey and, possibly, in man by 
placental conversion to the relatively ineffective estrone. 
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VII. Conclusion 
  
 Beach’s notion of organization set the conceptual framework for the succeeding 
organization/activation model, but with the “organization” due to prenatal hormones, not 
early learning.  This shift in emphasis to prenatal hormones had several effects on the 
field of endocrinology. 
 First, it reinforced the mono-hormonic model of development, and extended it 
from physical to behavioral development.  The initial resistance to the role of estrogens, 
and later interpretation of of that role in terms of the mono-hormonic theory, indicates the 
extent of this reinforcement.  This is in spite of the fact that mono-hormonism is not 
necessary for the organization/activation model: an underlying assumption of the di-
hormonic theory could support the model just as well.  Second, “typical” male and female 
development came to be seen in a more dichotomous fashion, as opposed to the 
“continuum” approach of Beach.  This rejection of bisexuality (in the general sense) is 
logically incidental, but had tremendous social and scientific consequences, as will be 
discussed in the following chapter.  
 More broadly, the history discussed in this chapter sheds light on the processes of 
determining factors.  In particular, initial hypotheses concerning causal factors 
occasionally must be refined to account for temporal points in development.  The 
                                                                                                                                                 
Meyer-Bahlburg, H. (1984). "Psychoendocrine Research on Sexual Orientation: Current Status 
and Future Options." Progress in Brain Research 61: 375 - 398.  See also Jensen, E., and Eugene 
DeSombre (1973). "Estrogen Receptor Interaction: Estrogenic Hormones Effect Transformation 
of Specific Receptor Proteins to a Biochemically functional Form." Science 182(4108): 126 - 
134.  
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investigations into early learning experience revealed the important of both proximal 
causes (such as giving pregnancy and giving birth instigating nest-building) and distal 
causes (such as learning to pick up and carry materials as developing the capacities 
necessary for nest-building).  More dramatically (in terms of the development of the 
field) the basic innovation of the organization/activation model was to push the critical 
influence of hormones back from adulthood to embryonic development.   
 Finally, the history discussed demonstrates the power of crucial resolutions.  The 
crucial resolution of the freemartin problem lead to the adoption of mono-hormonism, a 
conception of development adopted by the organization/activation model, even though it 
was not necessary.  As discussed in the next chapter, the resolution of the “problem” of 
homosexuality was crucial, in that it was the deciding factor between two general theories 
of sexual development (Beach’s versus the organization/activation model). 
The organization/activation model promised to extend the Jostian model of 
physical sexual development to the brain and, ultimately, behavior.  Because this model 
serves to explain not just normal physical and behavioral development, but also 
pathological development, it was rapidly adopted by the scientific community.  As the 
theoretical foundation for contemporary behavioral endocrinology, scientists (including 
not just endocrinologists but psychologists and the medical community in general) 
consider the model applicable to humans as well as laboratory animals.    
 As I discuss in the next chapter, the acceptance of the organization/activation 
model was not because it solved a number of persistent anomalies.  Instead, it was rapidly 
accepted by the majority of the scientific community, in part, because it provided the 
groundwork for a crucial resolution of one persistent “anomaly,” that of homosexuality.  
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But the rapid acceptance of this model is also due to a more general factor: the appeal of 
explanatory unification.  I explore this in chapter six. 
 
 
Chapter 5 
The “Problem” of Homosexuality 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 Until the advent of the organization/activation model, the primary model of the 
etiology of sexual behavior was due to Frank Beach.  As a result, scientists in general 
(and the medical community in particular) were faced with one of two choices: accept 
homosexuality as a normal variation within the spectrum of behavior; or regard it as 
pathological, even though no satisfactory biological model existed able to explain the 
pathological aspects of homosexuality. 
For those researchers who considered homosexuality to be a pathology,216
                                                 
216 It should be noted that there was, within the field, a minority but influential view that did not 
consider homosexuality (and transsexuality) to be pathological, most notably that of Frank Beach 
and, as I discuss in the tenth chapter, Harry Benjamin.  
 two 
elaborated hypotheses were available.  One hypothesis posited early psychological 
experience as the causal agent, which, in emphasizing environmental factors, presumes 
that mammals are undifferentiated at birth in terms of capacity to exhibit sexual 
behaviors.  The other hypothesis claimed that homosexuality was due to persistent 
hormonal imbalances in adulthood.  In emphasizing biological factors, this second 
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hypothesis presumes that mammals are differentiated inherently in terms of sexual 
behavior (and thus sex-atypical behavior is a pathology).    
Much like Lillie’s resolution of the freemartin problem, the resolution of the 
“vexing problem of homosexuality”217
 In what follows, I detail the early hypotheses of the etiology of homosexuality, as 
well as how the organization/activation model provides a crucial resolution to the 
“problem” of homosexuality.  Finally, I present a research program dedicated to 
providing empirical confirmation of this resolution. 
 was crucial.  It made possible a resolution to the 
more general controversy concerning the etiology of sexual behavior, was formulated in 
advance of convincing empirical experiments (and thus took on the character of a thought 
experiment), and inspired a research program dedicated to uncovering the mechanisms 
responsible for specific developmental outcomes.  I address this issue in detail in this and  
following chapters. 
 
 
II. Early Hypotheses 
 
Early endocrinological studies did not distinguish between homosexuality, 
hermaphroditism, and tranvestitism.  This is in part due to the lack of information about 
the relative influences of hormonal, genetic, and environmental contributions of 
phenotypic and behavioral outcomes.  In their 1942 review, Witschi and Mengert note 
                                                 
217 Professor Jacob van def Werff ten Bosch, an endocrinologist at Erasmus University in 
Rotterdam, quoted in van den Wijngaard, M. (1997). Reinventing the Sexes: The Biomedical 
Construction of Femininity and Masculinity. Bloomington, Indianna University Press. 
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that the study of human hermaphrodites (what they also call “sex-reversed” individuals) 
raises the question: 
 
[A]s to what extent homosexuality may rest upon sex reversal.  That a large 
proportion of homosexuals is of a purely environmental type is clearly brought 
out by studies like the most recent one by Henry.  However, indications of the 
existence of a congenital and probably hereditary type are numerous.218
 
 
This parsing of internal versus external causal factors in terms of environment 
versus “heredity” (genes) reflects the early, and eventually abandoned, emphasis upon the 
genetic factors underlying the etiology of sexual behavior.219
More fundamental to the discussion of the etiology of homosexuality than the 
relative influence of internal versus external factors is that of typicality (or normality) as 
opposed to atypicality (or abnormality).  Albert Ellis, in his 1945 review of the literature 
on hermaphroditism in English, begins by pointing out that:   
 
 
                                                 
218 Witschi, E., and Mengert, William (1942). "Endocrine Studies on Human Hermaphrodites and 
Their Bearing on the Interpretation of Homosexuality." Journal of Clinical Endocrinology 2(5): 
279-286. 
 
219 In spite of their emphasis upon the possible genetic factors behind homosexuality, Witschi and 
Mengert conclude their study by noting that: 
  
We had become accustomed to look at human sex determination as a solved problem, as 
a toss-up between X and Y chromosomes.  Deviations of sex ratio, and of morphological 
and endocrine physiology, as well as of behavior, were only considered oddities.  Now as 
matters of sex are no longer shrouded with deep secrecy, we begin to realize that 
aberrations due to modifying genes and special hormonal conditions are much more 
prevalent than ever suspected. 
 
Ibid. 
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In the field of human sexuality, there are two major domains, the so-called 
“normal” and “abnormal,” in neither of which, as yet, we have definitive answers 
to even a fraction of the vitally important recurring behavioral question.  Thus, 
regarding the matter of homosexuality, there have been, and are still, two opposed 
viewpoints concerning its origins.  The orthodox sexological view has been that 
sexual inversion is “constitutionally” rooted: and that homosexuals are born, not 
conditioned; and that hormonal or/and genic imbalances cause homosexuality.  
Quite opposed to this view of homosexuality has been that which insists that the 
main etiological factors in homosexuality are psychogenic rather than genic.220
 
 
This “orthodox” view was held by many early endocrinologists, including such 
luminaries as Richard Krafft-Ebing (the first person to write about homosexuality in 
medical terms) and Magnus Hirschfeld (a medical doctor who championed the rights of 
homosexuals). 
Researchers investigating the orthodox view looked to human hermaphrodites to 
deduce the genetic and/or hormonal causes of homosexuality.  While this research plan 
appears dubious to contemporary eyes, Albert Ellis explains the reasoning behind it as 
follows: 
 
[W]hether human hermaphroditism is fundamentally caused by direct genetic 
factors or by hormonal imbalances (which may themselves be genetically caused), 
                                                 
220 Ellis, A. (1945). "The Sexual Psychology of Human Hermaphrodites." Psychosomatic 
Medicine 7(2): 108 - 123.  A later commentator writes: 
 
It is noteworthy that Havelock Ellis (1933) stressed the importance of constitutional 
factors, and, on the analogy of the intermediate sexual types produced by breeding moths 
of different species together, regarded homosexuality as a variety of hermaphroditism. 
 
Neustatter, W. L. (1954). "Homosexuality: The Medical Aspect." The Practitioner 172(1): 364 - 
373. 
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there seems little doubt that it is a somatic anomaly with deep physiological roots.  
The crucial question therefore arises: should not the same physiological factors 
which disturbed the soma of the hermaphrodite so drastically, equally affect his or 
her psyche?  If, as has been contended by many reputable geneticists, biologists, 
and psychiatrists, the direction of the human sex drive depends primarily on 
hormonal or genetic factors; if homosexuality actually is rooted in physiological 
rather than psychogenic influences, would it not then be reasonable to expect 
heavily masculinized hermaphrodites usually or invariably to have masculine 
libidos and very feminized ones to have feminine libidos.221
 
 
Contrary to this expectation: 
 
[T]here is nothing in our data to indicate that there is a significant difference 
between the amount of sexual deviation – homosexuality, bisexuality, and 
psychosexual immaturity – to be found among these hermaphrodites and among a 
presumably representative group of non-hermaphrodites.222
 
 
 
Thus implying the link between hermaphroditism and homosexuality to be 
tenuous at best.  (Also implying a disconnect between physical and psychological 
development.)  Eventually, they came to be regarded as two distinct phenomena. 
                                                 
221 Ellis, A. (1945). "The Sexual Psychology of Human Hermaphrodites." Psychosomatic 
Medicine 7(2): 108 - 123. 
 
222 Ibid. 
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Because the field of genetics was in its infancy,223
Even as the field of genetics progressed, many researchers were hesitant to invoke 
genetics as the (sole) cause of homosexuality, while still postulating an (as yet unknown) 
biological factor: 
 researchers subscribing to the 
orthodox view shifted their focus to hormones.  As such, the working hypothesis was that 
homosexuality was the result of persistent hormonal imbalances. 
 
Many regard the excess of male [as opposed to female] deviants as evidence of 
the operation of a biological factor . . . Other workers point to the universal 
identification of the young child with its mother.  In the female the mother model 
remains of prime importance, but the male child must turn towards his father as a 
model for later behaviour.  Genetic studies have been inconclusive, for while F. J. 
Kallman observed a 100% concordance rate for homosexuality between 
monozygotic twins others have cast doubt on his observations.  Chromosomal sex 
always corresponds to anatomical sex and in fact no abnormalities of the 
chromosomes have been detected in this condition.  At present no clear-cut 
genetic hypothesis is tenable, and it seems unlikely that inborn errors can ever 
provide a complete explanation of this disorder.224
 
 
                                                 
223 In his review of intersexual (hermaphroditic) development, Goldschmidt points out: 
 
In vertebrates we do not know anything about the primary sex-determining stuffs, 
produced by the sex-genes; but certainly [about] the secondary determining substances . . 
. whether they are identical with the sex-hormones sensu stricto or not. 
  
Goldschmidt, R. (1938). "Intersexuality and Development." American Naturalist 72(740): 228 - 
242. 
 
224 (1965). "Origins of Homosexuality." British Medical Journal 2(5470): 1077-1078. 
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Unfortunately, the orthodox view did not have unambiguous empirical support.225
 
 
This is in part because the laboratory techniques and chemical understanding at this time 
were simply too primitive to provide a convincing case.  With the gradual improvement 
in the accuracy and sensitivity of chemical assays, the initial hypothesis of endocrine 
imbalance became more and more dubious.  For instance, Robert Laidlaw writes: 
Coming now to the causes of homosexuality, I can assure you that this is a very 
muddy and debatable field. . . . Is this homosexual phenomenon something which 
is psychogenic, or is it something which comes from environmental conditioning?  
Or is it something which is inherent, constitutional in the individual?  Or is it 
something which goes even further back into hereditary trends?226
 
 
In other words, is the (presumably singular)227
                                                 
225 Hooker, in his review, notes that “attempts to relate homosexual behavior to sex hormones 
have not been uniformly successful.”  For example: 
 phenomenon of homosexuality due 
to what we would now loosely call mental illness, learning, hormonal factors, or 
genetics?  Or, as Laidlaw puts it: 
 
In one series of four eunuchoid homosexual males the administration of testosterone 
propionate converted all into normal males.  In another series of eleven, however, only 
three reported benefit, while five reported intensification of their homosexual drive under 
treatment with testosterone and chorionic gonadotrophin. 
 
Hooker, C. W. (1946). "Reproduction." Annual Review of Physiology 8: 467 - 495. 
 
226 Laidlaw, R. (1952). "A Clinical Approach to Homosexuality." Marriage and Family Living 
14(1): 39 - 46. 
 
227 It is interesting to note that Laidlaw, while assuming there to be multiple causes contributing 
to homosexuality, nonetheless treats it as a unitary phenomenon in his review, in spite of his 
earlier acknowledgment that: 
 
It would be so much easier (as Kinsey points out), in a search for causative factors, if we 
were looking for factors which would cause a total heterosexual pattern or a total 
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How much weight should we lend to hereditary and constitutional factors in the 
creation of the homosexual, as opposed to environmental and developmental 
factors?  I can assure you that this is a subject which is far from settled at the 
present time, and in the literature we find again a continuum where, at the one 
pole, Hirschfield feels that every homosexual is constitutionally predetermined, 
and going to Havelock Ellis, who feels that, although there is such a 
predisposition, there is more of an environmental factor – and then going on to 
Freud and to Brill and to Stekel, who progressively lay greater and greater stress 
upon environmental factors.228
 
 
Because of the clinical failures to uncover hormonal imbalances (discussed in 
more detail later), the prevailing, general hypothesis invoked ‘psychogenic’ factors.  
Accordingly, homosexuality is the result of external, environmental factors, rather than 
internal, ‘constitutional’ factors.229
Those psychologists investigating the causes of homosexuality, for the most part, 
tended to appeal to psychoanalytic explanations; a tend understandable due to the fact 
that Freudian-inspired theories of psychosexual development were the prevailing general 
explanatory model within the field.  For instance, in his review of the medical aspects of 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
homosexual pattern.  But where we are seeking for causes that will explain this 
continuum [Kinsey’s continuum of sexual behavior] going all the way from one pole to 
another, we are up against a very involved problem. 
 
Ibid. 
 
228 Ibid. 
 
229 Albert Ellis, commenting on Laidlaw’s paper, claims “at least ninety percent of recent 
authorities would agree that, basically, homosexuality is caused by psychogenic, or non-
hormonal, or psychological factors.” Ibid. 
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homosexuality, Neustatter divides ‘homosexuals’ into two groups: bisexuals and 
“complete inverts.” He postulates that: 
 
In the bisexuals [as opposed to exclusive homosexuals who, in his opinion, “are 
probably glandularly determined, although at present there is no proof of this”] 
psychological explanations are relevant, although even here one must assume 
some constitutional predisposition.  The main explanation is offered by the 
psychoanalytic school.230
 
 
In spite of this, beginning in the early 1950s, many biologists231 (and some 
psychologists232
                                                 
230 Although he concludes that “to my mind such explanations are too simple to account for such 
gross disturbances of function.” Neustatter, W. L. (1954). "Homosexuality: The Medical Aspect." 
The Practitioner 172(1): 364 - 373. 
) came to discount Freudian and Freudian-inspired theories concerning 
the origin and characteristics of homosexuality.  This is in part because biologists in 
general (and behavioral endocrinologists in particular) are more interested in discovering 
biological mechanisms behind behavior, and in part because it became apparent that 
 
231 See, for instance, Laidlaw, R. (1952). "A Clinical Approach to Homosexuality." Marriage and 
Family Living 14(1): 39 - 46. Karin Martin speculates: 
 
This move toward attributing homosexuality to physiological factors may have been one 
to draw more rigid boundaries around the scientific expertise of the medical profession 
and to move away from “unscientific” psychoanalytic claims. 
 
in Martin, K. (1993). "Gender and Sexuality: Medical Opinion on Homosexuality, 1900-1950." 
Gender and Society 7(2): 246-260. 
  
232 There have always been psychologists skeptical about the possibility of “curing” 
homosexuality through psycholanalysis.  Various review articles hace drawn attention to the 
difficulty of finding confirmation of successful “talking cures.” E.g., Curran, D., and D. Parr 
(1957). "Homosexuality: An Analysis of 100 Male Cases Seen in Private Practice." British 
Medical Journal 1: 767-801.  See also Saghir, M. a. E. R. (1973). Male and Female Sexuality. 
Baltimore, Williams and Williams. And finally, Hemphill, R., et. al. (1958). "A Factual Study of 
Male Homosexuality." British Medical Journal 1: 1317-1322.   
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Freudian and Freudian-inspired psychoanalytic attempts to “cure” homosexuality were 
demonstrable failures.233
 
 John Money, in his 1965 foreword, writes:  
In an earlier era, psychodynamic explanations captured enthusiasm and prompted 
research.  But psychodynamics did not follow through with the promised payoff 
in terms of scientific prediction and control of sexual pathology.234
 
 
A decade later, Acosta, in his historical review of the etiology and treatment of 
homosexuality, concludes: 
 
It seems that neither behavioral therapy nor psychoanalytic therapy has 
convincingly proven to be effective in the treatment of either male or female 
homosexuals.  What is clear is that both methods have had minimal successes and 
an overwhelming number of failures.235
 
 
Besides the inability to fulfill the goal of curing homosexuality, many researchers 
began to abandon Freudian and Freudian-inspired theories because they did not fulfill key 
                                                 
233 Laidlaw writes: 
 
Although in the past there have been complete cures of homosexuals claimed by 
psychoanalysts in various schools, I think that there is a trend, as time has gone on, 
among psychiatrists themselves to feel less confident that all cases are curable. 
 
 Laidlaw, R. (1952). "A Clinical Approach to Homosexuality." Marriage and Family Living 
14(1): 39 - 46. 
 
234 Money, J. (1965). Foreword. Sex Research: New Developments. J. Money. New York, Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston. 
 
235 Acosta, F. (1975). "Etiology and Treatment of Homosexuality: A Review." Archives of Sexual 
Behavior 4(1): 9 - 29. 
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scientific criteria – both conceptual236 and procedural.  Conceptually, psychoanalytic 
theories could not account for developmental outcomes that deviated from etiological 
predictions (e.g., male homosexuals who grew up with “warm and affectionate”237
 
 
relationships with their fathers.)  In terms of procedure, it is not clear how psychoanalytic 
studies (and hence attempts at cures) can utilize control groups or double-blind testing.  
In his historical review of methods used to alter (homosexual) sexual orientation, 
Timothy Murphy writes: 
Virtually every [psychodynamic] study mentioned above failed to establish any 
control mechanism for the intervention being tested.  It is thus impossible to tell 
whether the “successes” reported belong to the charm of the therapist or to the 
technique, were the result of psychosexual developmental changes occurring for 
reasons unrelated to the theory, were the consequence of the psychologically 
powerful placebo effect or lasted.  One study that did utilize a scientific control 
found that a psychotheraputic program of reorientation had no demonstrable 
benefit.238
                                                 
236 Gadpaille, summarizing his section giving a historical review of psychoanalytic theories of the 
etiology of homosexuality, concludes: 
   
 
The shortcomings in our present knowledge of homosexuality lie not necessarily in 
fallacies in that knowledge; all of the theoretical contributions have proven to explain 
some aspects and incidences of the disorder, and some of them may explain most.  But 
there remain so many unexplained cases, so many of which seem, at least, not to be 
adequately elucidated by existing [psychodynamic] concepts.  It is with the hope that 
newer biological research may illuminate a few of the obscure corners of its origin that 
this review is undertaken. 
 
Gadpaille, W. (1972). "Research into the Physiology of Maleness and Femaleness: Its 
Contributions to the Etiology and Psychodynamics of Homosexuality." Archives of General 
Psychiatry 26(3): 193-206. 
 
237 Ibid. 
 
238 Murphy, T. (1992). "Redirecting Sexual Orientation: Techniques and Justifications." The 
Journal of Sex Research 29(4): pp. 501 - 523. 
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Because of the failures of psychoanalysis to determine the etiology and treatment 
of homosexuality, endocrinologists, in general, looked to hormones as the causal factor. 
 
III.Endocrine Imbalance 
 
However, the only promising biological model (that, unlike Beach’s, treated 
homosexuality as a pathology), until the advent of the organization/activation model, was 
of persistent hormonal imbalances in adulthood.  While it had long been speculated that 
homosexuals had “humoral” imbalances, the chemical isolation of androgens and 
estrogens led some scientists to postulate an imbalance between these specific hormones 
as the cause of homosexuality.239  Specifically, male homosexuals240
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 were thought to have 
239 Beach argued consistently against this, pointing out that the results of numerous studies argue 
“against any interpretation of homosexuality as the direct consequence of endocrine pathology.” 
Beach, F. A. (1953). "Animal Research and Psychiatric Theory." Psychosomatic Medicine 15(5): 
374 - 388. 
 
240 Researchers have focused almost exclusively upon male homosexuality.  There are a number 
of reasons for this, both ideological and methodological.  The most obvious (methodological) 
reason for the focus on males is the perceived complication of the menstrual cycle in women.  In 
their study of androgen metabolism, Tourney and Hatfield write: 
 
Biological aspects of psychosexual disturbances in schizophrenia and homosexuality 
have been attempted by a number of investigators since the time of Kraepelin.  Various 
endocrine disorders were thought to play a role in both these disorders, but none of the 
results have been definitive.  Understandably, because of sex hormone differences 
between males and females, most investigations have been carried out in male subjects. 
 
Tourney, G., and Lon M. Hatfield (1973). "Androgen Metabolism in Schizophrenics, 
Homosexuals, and Normal Controls." Biological Psychiatry 6(1): 23 - 36. 
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lower levels of circulating androgens and higher levels of estrogens than found in 
heterosexual men, thus accounting for their “feminine” behavior.241
However, laboratory results did not support this hypothesis.  Studies of rats and 
guinea pigs could not find any differences in plasma testosterone and estradiol 
concentrations in males that responded by lordosis to male mounts and those who did 
not.
   
242  Human studies either found no difference, or were contradictory: some found 
lower plasma testosterone concentrations in homosexual men, while others found 
elevated levels.243
But as chemical assays and testing techniques became more accurate, the 
hormonal levels of male homosexuals proved to be frustratingly normal. For instance, 
William Perloff, reporting on the results of his endocrine clinic, notes that:  
     
 
Homosexuality is still considered by many to be a manifestation of endocrine 
imbalance, and reports purport to prove that abnormal ratios of androgen to 
estrogen may be the basis for homosexuality . . . In our experience, no patient, 
either male or female, has shown any consistent reversal of the endocrine pattern 
                                                 
241 The author of one study, finding higher levels of estrogens in a group male homosexuals (but 
normal androgen levels), concluded:  
 
In the face of such highly suggestive hormonal differences one may assume that such 
data point to a definite biologic mechanism in homosexuality.  Of course it is not possible 
at this time to evaluate the true significance of the difference, but it seems that the 
constitutional homosexual has a different sex hormone chemistry than the normal male. 
 
Glass, S. J., et. al. (1940). "Sex Hormone Studies in Male Homosexuality." Endocrinology 26(4): 
590 - 594.  
 
242 Aron, C., et. al. (1991). Heterotypical Sexual Behaviour in Male Mammals: The Rat as an 
Experimental Model. Heterotypical Behaviour in Man and Animals. B. Haug, Aron. London, 
Chapman and Hall. 
 
243 Nieschlag, E. (1978). The Endocrine Function of the Human Testis in Regard to Sexuality. 
Symposium on Sex, Hormones and Behaviour, London, Excerpta Medica. 
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to explain homosexual tendencies.  We have never observed any correlation 
between the choice of sex object and the levels of hormonal excretion.244
  
 
The etiology of homosexuality was (and remains, in spite of the protestations of a 
few psychoneuroendocrinologists) a mystery.  This mystery was, for those inclined 
towards “hormonal” explanations, a crucial one, as it appeared to involve the very 
activities mediated by gonadal hormones, yet could not be explained through laboratory 
findings.  The tremendous explanatory promise of endocrinology appeared to be at an 
impasse when it came to the phenomenon of homosexuality.   
In short, the presumed causal factor responsible for homosexuality was missing.  
When a presumed casual factor cannot be determined, one option is to propose another 
factor.  Some scientists did this, postulating a genetic component to homosexuality (a 
field of research that continues to this day).  However, because the field of genetics was 
still quite primitive at this time, the only venue for research was twin studies.  While 
these studies did provide some evidence of a genetic link, it was hardly conclusive.  Twin 
studies have the additional problem of only being able to control for one factor – genetic 
makeup – while being unable to account for experiential factors in particular and 
environmental factors in general.  For this reason, many researchers continued to look to 
hormones for an explanation of homosexuality. 
In addition to the ambiguities and uncertainties of genetics studies, there was also 
a train of thought from the history of endocrinology: behaviors whose manifestation were 
thought to be due primarily to genetic factors were considered instinctive (such as the 
“scratch reflex”).  While certain sexual behaviors (such as mounting and lordosis) could 
                                                 
244 Perloff, W. H. (1949). "Role of Hormones in Human Sexuality." Psychosomatic Medicine: 
Experimental and Clinical Studies 11(3): 133 - 139. 
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be considered “instinctive” in the broad sense of the term, endocrinologists had many 
lines of evidence indicating that these “instinctive” behaviors are heavily mediated by 
hormones.  As such, endocrinologists rejected the simple model of phenotypic outcome 
as the result of the combination of genotype and environment, and adopted a more 
complicated model of phenotypic development, one in which both genetic and 
environmental influences mediate and are mediated by hormones.   
More specifically, genetic factors can determine hormone production and 
influence (as in the cases of Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia, a genetically caused 
overproduction of androgens, and Complete Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome, wherein 
androgens are produced but cannot be recognized by the body) and environmental factors 
can influence the hormonal milieu (in terms of stress or early experience).  Thus, in spite 
of the disappointing results of the homosexuality studies, endocrinologists in general 
were loath to abandon hormones as a causal factor in the etiology of homosexuality. 
The organization/activation model provided a solution: hormonal abnormalities in 
utero were responsible for later abnormal behavior by preventing the normal masculine 
or feminine development of the fetal brain.  While the abnormal hormonal influences 
vanished after birth, their original imprint remained, thus explaining both the deviant 
behavior of homosexuals and their normal, adult, hormone levels.   
 
 
IV. Psycho-Neural Pseudo-Hermaphroditism 
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A major proponent of this model of the origin of homosexual behavior was 
Gunther Dörner, who explains heterosexual, bisexual and homosexual behavior as the 
result of “different degrees of androgen deficiency in males and androgen excess in 
females during sex-specific brain differentiation,”245
 
  As a result of atypical hormone 
levels during this critical period of development, the neural systems of these individuals 
develop in a “pseudo-hermaphroditic” fashion.  More specifically: 
An androgen deficiency in genetic males during a critical period of brain 
organization gives rise to predominantly female differentiation of the brain.  This 
androgen deficiency in early life can be largely compensated by increased 
hypophyseal gonadotropin secretion in later life.  Thus, the predominantly female-
differentiated brain is postpubertally activated by an approximately normal 
androgen level, leading to homosexual behavior.246
 
  
This model of the origins of homosexual behavior was appealing.  It combined the 
earlier doctrine of endocrine imbalances with the organization/activation model in such a 
way as to explain the phenomena of normal adult steroid levels.  In addition, and contrary 
to Beach’s model, homosexuality was pathological, and not part of the spectrum of 
normal development.  In their review of the role of prenatal hormones on psychosexual 
development, Anke Ehrhardt and Heino Meyer-Balhburg note that:  
 
                                                 
245 Dorner, G. (1978). Hormones and Sexual Differentiation of the Brain. Symposium on Sex, 
Hormones and Behaviour, London, Excerpta Medica. 
 
246 Ibid. 
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[S]ince the discovery of sex steroids, the development of homosexuality – defined 
as a lasting sexual orientation towards the same sex . . . has been repeatedly 
ascribed to endocrine abnormalities.  No wonder then, that the psychoendocrine 
hypothesis was reformulated in terms of prenatal hormone effects when animal 
research documented the important function of pre-and peri-natal androgens in the 
sexual differentiation of the brain and the subsequent development of sex-
dimorphic behaviour.247
 
    
Instead of dismissing hormones as a causal factor, this conception of the etiology 
of homosexuality simply changed the point in time at which hormones were causally 
effective.  
Dörner’s hypothesis has had tremendous staying power.  William Byne, in his 
critical historical review of psychobiological research on sexual orientation, writes: 
 
Some of the same hormones that participate in masculinization of the rodent brain 
also participate in masculinization of the external genitalia.  Thus, one might 
question how the prenatal hormonal theory could account for exclusive 
homosexuality in individuals with normal genitalia for their genetic sex.  The 
                                                 
247 Ehrhardt, A. A., and Meyer-Balburg, Heino (1978). Psychosexual Development: An 
Examination of the Role of Prenatal Hormones. Symposium on Sex, Hormones and Behavior, 
London, Excerpta Medica.  In his extensive 1984 review of psychoendocrine research into the 
etiology of sexual orientation, Meyer-Bahlburg writes: 
 
During the past decade, the major focus of psychoendocrine theories of sexual orientation 
has shifted from the hormone situation in adulthood to the role of prenatal hormones . . . 
Currently, this theory enjoys widespread acceptance not only among biologists and 
physicians but also by behavioral scientists who are dissatisfied with the status of 
psychosocial explanations and by behavior therapists frustrated by the low success rate of 
their methods in changing sexual orientation. 
 
Meyer-Bahlburg, H. (1984). "Psychoendocrine Research on Sexual Orientation: Current Status 
and Future Options." Progress in Brain Research 61: 375 - 398. 
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concept of the “critical period” [for sexual differentiation of the brain] is often 
invoked to account for this discrepancy.248
 
 
However, this tidy explanation of (male249
On this model, the causal efficacy of androgens (or lack thereof) is split into two 
points of development.  First, and most importantly, during the prenatal period, the neural 
tissues are permanently masculinized to various degrees depending upon the levels of 
circulating androgens.  Second, hormones released during puberty “activate” the already-
determined neural circuitry.   
) homosexuality did not have a scrap of 
experimental evidence to support it.  Much like Einstein’s solution to the incompatibility 
of Newtonian relative motion and the constant speed of light, Dörner’s solution to the 
“problem of homosexuality” explained the normal adult hormone levels of homosexuals 
while respecting the foundational assumption of its pathology.  Dörner’s hypothesis, 
though abstract in character, inspired a research program dedicated to finding the 
feminine in male homosexuals (a program in existence to this day).   
 
 
V. Empirical Confirmation through Behavioral Studies 
 
Six years after Pheonix et. al. initially presented it, a team of psychologists, led by 
John Money, attempted to extend the organization/activation model to humans.  He 
                                                 
248 Byne, W. (1995). "Science and Belief: Psychobiological Research on Sexual Orientation." 
Journal of Homosexuality 28(3/4): 303 - 344. 
 
249 While later researchers investigated Dörner’s initial, vague hypothesis of the origin of female 
homosexuality (studying women and girls with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia), Dörner focused 
on finding the female in male homosexual brains, and program continued by Simon LeVay. 
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postulated that the same endocrine abnormalities that produced ambiguous genitalia 
would produce ambiguously gendered brains.250
 Money and his team worked at the Johns Hopkins Medical School 
psychohormonal unit.  The unit was set up with the express purpose of researching “the 
possible effects of exposure to excess fetal androgen on subsequent behavior and gender 
identity in certain clinical populations.”
 
251
 But how to distinguish internal from external factors, that is, the effects of 
hormones from environmental influences?  Money and his collegues thought they could 
make this distinction by studying “Nature’s mistakes” – individuals with 
endocrinological or genetic defects that prevented normal hormonal development.
 Specifically, they wanted to test the hypothesis 
that, just as prenatal androgen organized the sexual behavior of lab animals, it also 
organized the sexual (and gendered) behavior of humans. 
252
                                                 
250 After reviewing Jost’s experiments, Money comments that 
  (A 
program of research that lasted until the mid-1990s.)  Because it was known in advance 
that these individuals had “mixed” causative factors (hormones), it was believed that 
these non-exemplary examples of the organizational hormonal milieu would produce 
 
Mammalian masculine anatomy, as these experiments show, is brought about by 
something added, failing which the more basic disposition of the embryo asserts itself.  
One wonders whether to look for a parallel in human psycho-sexual differentiation. 
 
 Money, J. (1965). Foreword. Sex Research: New Developments. J. Money. New York, Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston. 
 
251 Ehrhardt, A. A., et. al. (1968). "Fetal Androgens and Female Gender Identity in the Early-
Treated Adrenogenital Syndrome." The Johns Hopkins Medical Journal 122(3): 160 - 167. Note 
that the focus of the research is androgens in particular, rather than gonadal hormones in general.  
This is in part the result of Money’s adoption of the “default” model. 
  
252 The language of “normal” versus “pathological” development pervades the literature of this 
time. 
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neural structures intermediate between the paradigmatic male or female brain, which 
would in turn produce “mixed” behavior that could be studied.  Money explicitly adopted 
the organization/activation model for his investigations of “pseudohermaphrodites” – 
individuals with ambiguous genitalia as the result of abnormal hormone exposure.   
 Money became interested in the psychosexual development and behavior of 
pseudohermaphrodites as a part of his long-term work, which was: 
 
[E]nhanced by findings stemming from animal studies.  Phoenix, Goy, Gerall and 
Young . . . ventured the hypothesis that prenatal androgen had affected 
neurosexual organization [of the guinea pigs], and thus, the organization of 
behavior.253
 
 
As will be discussed in the final chapter, Money considered human psychosexual 
behavior to be a broad category, including sexual orientation, gender identity, aggression, 
physical activity, and career goals. 
 While the organization/activation model was assumed by many to apply to 
humans, the fact that the masculinized guinea pigs used in the original experiment were a 
laboratory creation (as well as the challenges inherent in finding an animal correlate to 
gender identity) created difficulties in extending the model to humans.  In order to 
determine if this extension was justified, researchers needed to find a human correlate to 
the hormonally manipulated laboratory animals.  Money came up with a solution to this 
difficulty:  
 
                                                 
253 Ehrhardt, A. A., and Money, John (1967). "Progestin-Induced Hermaphroditism: IQ and 
Psychosexual Identity in a Study of Ten Girls." The Journal of Sex Research 3(1): 83 - 100. 
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There is a somewhat suggestive human parallel to the animal experiments with 
androgen to be found in human female hermaphrodites with the adrenalgenital 
syndrome, virilized in utero from an excess of adrenal androgens.254
 
 
What Money here calls the “adrenogenital syndrome” later became known as 
“congenital adrenal hyperplasia,” or CAH, a condition that causes excess production of 
androgens in utero.   It was hoped that these females could be human models for the 
masculinization of the brain by androgens, and thus serve as a crucial test for the 
extension of the organization/activation hypothesis to humans.  Not only could scientists 
determine the effects of abnormal hormonal exposure on sexual orientation, they could 
also determine their effects on gender identity.255
 Two of Money’s students who published the most influential articles continuing 
his general project are Anke Ehrhardt and Heino Meyer-Balhburg.  One of their early 
  In this way, Money and his collegues 
hoped to tease apart the relative influences of internal and external factors on 
psychosexual development.   
                                                 
254 Money, J. (1965). Foreword. Sex Research: New Developments. J. Money. New York, Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston. 
 
255 In general, the scientific community accepted this uncritical extension of the model to humans 
at this time (and for the next twenty to thirty years).  For instance, in their 1981 review, Rubin et. 
al. note: 
 
Many investigators are attempting to extend the data regarding the postnatal gonadal 
steroid activation of sexually dimorphic behaviors from animals to man.  Relevant 
information is being obtained by the observation of behavior and concomitant evaluation 
of hormone levels in subjects whose hormonal status or behavioral repertoire furnishes an 
opportunity to study conditions other than normal ones. [Reflecting Lillie’s 
methodological emphasis on the atypical.]  These include individuals who exhibit 
unusually high or aberrant levels of sexually dimorphic behavior or who suffer from 
clinical endocrine syndromes that mimic certain experimental animal manipulations. 
 
Rubin, R., et. al. (1981). "Postnatal Gonadal Steroid Effects on Human Behavior." Science 
211(4488): 1318 - 1324. 
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(1968) studies found that, in comparison to controls, girls with the adrenogenital 
syndrome (CAH) displayed significantly higher incidences of tomboyism, which they 
rather vaguely defined as possessing a high energy level and a minimum interest in doll 
play, dresses and girls’ activities.256
 While Ehrhardt et. al. mention that increased tomboyism could be associated with 
higher socioeconomic class, they take more seriously the possibility that tomboyism 
could be related to high IQ.  In support of this possibility, they point to studies by Sontag 
and collegues at the Fels Institute at Temple University School of Medicine indicating 
that children or either sex with high IQs:  
 
 
[W]ere competitive, self-assertive, independent and dominant in interaction with 
other children – not very feminine characteristics according to traditional 
stereotype.  One of the Fels workers summarized the issue by saying that the 
simplest way to describe the developmental history necessary to make a girl into 
an intellectual person is that “she must have been a tomboy at some point in her 
childhood.”257
 
 
 Because of this purported connection between high IQ and tomboyism, Ehrhardt 
et. al. conclude that: 
                                                 
256 Ehrhardt et. al. note that: 
 
While there was no girl in the group who was labeled a tomboy for most of her life, 
eleven of the patients [out of a total of fifteen] were described as tomboys by themselves 
and their mothers throughout childhood.  
 
Ehrhardt, A. A., et. al. (1968). "Fetal Androgens and Female Gender Identity in the Early-Treated 
Adrenogenital Syndrome." The Johns Hopkins Medical Journal 122(3): 160 - 167. 
 
257 Ibid. 
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It would appear therefore that tomboyism in girls with the adrenogenital 
syndrome has something to do with the syndrome itself.  The responsible factor 
could be a genetic one, since the syndrome is known to be genetically recessive in 
etiology.  Or, it could be a fetal adreno-cortical effect . . . in each case on the 
hypothalamus or a related area of the brain.258
 
 
 It becomes clear that Ehrhardt et. al were inclined to believe the second scenario: 
that the relevant causal factor in tomboyish behavior was hormonal, not genetic.  This 
reflects the explanatory promise of hormones.  They summarize their conclusions as 
follows: “The findings of this present study suggest that certain aspects of gender 
dimorphic behavior can be modified by fetal androgens in the human female.”259
 In 1981, Anke Ehrhardt and Heino Meyer-Balhburg published “Effects of 
Prenatal Sex Hormones on Gender-Related Behavior” in Science, summarizing almost a 
decade of research, which was to become the most influential article inspired by Money’s 
project.  While Money and his students had published their findings before, it was the 
special issue of Science dedicated to the application of the organization/activation model 
to human beings, focusing on the work of Ehrhardt and Meyer-Balhburg, that caused a 
revolution in endocrinological and psychological thought. 
 (Later 
studies retracted this claim, noting that girls coming in for treatment tended to come from 
financially well-off families, whose parents themselves had above-average IQs.) 
                                                 
258 Ibid. 
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 To test further the hypothesis that prenatal androgen exposure could masculinize 
behavior (including sexual orientation), Ehrhardt and Meyer-Balhburg studied the 
behavioral and tempermental tendencies of girls with CAH.  They examined four areas of 
behavior within this context: gender identity, defined as an individual’s identity as 
belonging to one of the two sexes; gender role behavior, “including all those aspects of 
behavior in which normal boys and girls differ from one another in our culture and at this 
particular time in history;” sexual orientation; and general intelligence and cognitive sex 
differences.260
 In particular, the scientists were interested in noting the tendencies of CAH girls 
to exhibit “masculine” behavior, in part because this is the most plausible extension of 
animal experiments to human behavior.  While correlating animal models to human 
cognition, sexual orientation and, especially, gender identity is fraught with conceptual 
problems, Ehrhardt and Meyer-Balhburg (and others) could easily apply animal 
behavioral studies of energy expenditure, social aggression, parenting rehearsal, patterns 
of group interaction and grooming behavior to human gender role behavior.  For human 
children, “masculine” or “tomboy” behavior is operationally characterized as preference 
for outdoor activities, preference for male over female playmates, greater interest in a 
career than housewifery, and less interest in “play rehearsal of motherhood roles.”
 
261
 To determine the level of masculine or tomeboy behavior, Ehrhardt and Meyer-
Balhburg questioned the girls’ parents as well as their teachers about their activity levels, 
play and clothing preferences, and career ambitions.  In addition, older CAH girls were 
  
                                                 
260 Ehrhardt, A., and Meyer-Bahlburg, Heino (1981). "Effects of Prenatal Sex Hormones on 
Gender-Related Behavior." Science 211(20): 1312 - 1318. 
 
261 Ibid. 
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questioned about their sexual fantasies.  They used three different designs for their 
studies: comparing CAH girls with age-matched normal controls; with their unaffected 
siblings; and with a clinical contrast group. 
 In reviewing their studies, Ehrhardt and Meyer-Balhburg found that, while 
prenatal androgenization does not appear to affect gender identity formation directly, it 
seems to influence gender role behavior: 
 
[T]he behavior of the prenatally androgenized girls differed significantly from 
that of the controls in that they typically demonstated (i) a combination of 
intensive active outdoor play, increased association with male peers, long-term 
identification as a “tomboy” by self and others, probably all related to high energy 
expenditure, and (ii) decreased parenting rehearsal such as doll play and baby 
care, and a low interest in the role rehearsal of wife and mother versus having a 
career.262
 
 
 In terms of social aggression, the results were less conclusive.  While CAH girls 
were more likely to participate in “rough and tumble play,” they were no more likely to 
initiate fights than their unaffected siblings or controls. 
 The findings on sexual orientation proved to be more contentious.  Ehrhardt and 
Meyer-Balhburg note that: 
 
With the recent advances in psychoneuroendocrine research, prenatal hormones 
have also been implicated [in having a causal role in the formation of sexual 
orientation].  If early androgenization or deandrogenation can determine male and 
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female patterns of mating behavior in lower mammals, it is tempting to 
extrapolate from these findings to the human situation as suggested by Dörner.263
 
 
 Ehrhardt and Meyer-Balhburg refer to the theory proposed by Dörner as the 
“prenatal hormone theory.”  Because of their in utero androgenization, those CAH girls 
who have reached puberty provide an ideal test case of Dörner’s theory. 
 The prenatal hormone theory:  
 
[P]redicts that the effective presence of androgen in prenatal life contributes to the 
development of sexual orientation towards females, and that a deficiency of 
prenatal androgens or tissue insensitivity to androgens leads to a sexual 
orientation towards males, regardless of the genetic sex of the individual.264
 
 
 Accordingly, the prenatal hormone theory would predict that CAH girls, upon 
reaching puberty, would have a predisposition towards lesbianism.  In their earlier 1968 
article, Ehrhardt and Meyer-Balhburg did not find high levels of homosexuality.  
Focusing upon CAH women whose underwent early treatment, Ehrhardt et. al. found that 
the majority of CAH women interviewed were heterosexual, some were bisexual, and 
none were homosexual.265
                                                 
263 Ibid. 
 A similar study in the Soviet Union found that approximately 
 
264 Ibid. 
 
265 Ehrhardt et. al. conclude that: 
 
Their tomboyism did not include implications of homosexuality or future lesbianism, or a 
belief of having been assigned to the wrong sex. 
 
Ehrhardt, A. A., et. al. (1968). "Fetal Androgens and Female Gender Identity in the Early-Treated 
Adrenogenital Syndrome." The Johns Hopkins Medical Journal 122(3): 160 - 167. 
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half the subjects were heterosexual, half bisexual, and none homosexual.  From these 
results, Ehrhardt and Meyer-Balhburg conclude that “a rigidly deterministic effect of 
prenatal androgens on sexual orientation appears to have been ruled out.”266
 Later studies, however, provide more evidence is support of the prenatal theory.  
That is to say, as the initial clinical population of CAH girls grew into maturity, Ehrhardt 
and Meyer-Balhburg had a larger group to study.  These follow-up studies found that, not 
only did CAH girls display more “tomboy” behavior, they also had a higher tendency 
towards lesbianism.  Meyer-Balhburg, in his 1984 review of endocrinological research on 
sexual behavior, notes that:  
  
 
In a recent controlled follow-up study of the Hopkins sample of early-treated 
CAH women in comparison to women with androgen insensitivity or Müllerian 
duct aplasia, the CAH women had a significantly increased bisexuality in imagery 
and/or sexual experience although here also the majority were heterosexual.  
Although these results are compatible with the prenatal hormone theory, they are 
also open for a social-learning interpretation if one assumes that the awareness of 
the medical condition on the part of the parents or the patients may have 
influenced their psychosexual development.  Not enough data are available to 
clarify this point.267
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
266 Ehrhardt, A., and Meyer-Bahlburg, Heino (1981). "Effects of Prenatal Sex Hormones on 
Gender-Related Behavior." Science 211(20): 1312 - 1318. 
 
267 Meyer-Bahlburg, H. (1984). "Psychoendocrine Research on Sexual Orientation: Current Status 
and Future Options." Progress in Brain Research 61: 375 - 398. 
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 The prenatal hormone theory, as initially espoused by Dörner, was not directly 
supported by the evidence.  More data soon became available.  Follow-up studies by 
Money (1988) and Meyer-Balhburg (1993) lead the latter to conclude:  
 
The data suggest that, in either genetic male or female individuals (i.e., 
independent of chromosomal sex), some degree of prenatal exposure exposure to 
and utilization of androgens seems to “facilitate,” but not to fully determine the 
development of erotic atrraction to female individuals as postulated by the 
prenatal hormone theory.268
 
 
 Combining these results with earlier findings on gender identity, Meyer-Balhburg, 
Ehrhardt, and their colleagues conclude that, while gender identity did not appear to be 
affected by prenatal androgen exposure, gender role and sexual orientation did.  
Subsequently, many scientists researching the etiology of sexual orientation have 
accepted these conclusions, and use them as a basis for further research.  This will be 
discussed more thoroughly in subsequent chapters.   
 These series of studies on CAH girls (especially the 1981 study that appeared in 
Science) were tremendously influential.  Among other things, many endocrinologists 
interpreted them to “all show that both gender-related behavior and genital morphology 
are subsequently affected by levels of steroid hormones present during prenatal 
development.”269
                                                 
268 Meyer-Bahlburg, H., et. al. (1995). "Prenatal Estrogens and the Development of Homosexual 
Orientation." Developmental Psychology 31(1): 12 - 21. 
 
269 MacCulloch, M., and Waddington, John (1981). "Neuroendocrine Mechanisms and the 
Aetiology of Male and Female Homosexuality." The British Journal of Psychiatry 139(4): 341 - 
345. 
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 The vast majority of endocrinologists (judging by the articles citing Ehrhardt and 
Meyer-Balhburg’s work) uncritically accepted their conclusions.  Bruce McEwen, in an 
article appearing in the same issue of Science as Ehrhardt and Meyer-Balhburg’s 
influential report, describes this study as being able to: 
 
[E]laborate on the extent to which we are able to recognize, in spite of the 
environmental influences of learning, the components of human behavior which 
are influenced by hormones during development and in adulthood.270
 
 
 That is, the work of Ehrhardt and Meyer-Balhburg could provide a means of 
distinguishing hormonal from environmental influences on human behavior. 
 In the same issue, Rubin and his colleagues, reviewing studies of postnatal effects 
of hormones on human behavior, refer to the work of the Johns Hopkins Psychohormone 
Unit to note that: 
 
Prenatal exposure of humans to gonadal steroids, whether of internal or external 
origin, appears to have an appreciable influence on behavioral development.  In 
particular, exposure of the female to androgens or androgen-based progestins 
increases the frequency of tomboyish behavior during childhood.271
 
 
 In other words, the results of CAH studies appear to confirm the 
organization/activation model for human beings.  More specifically, they appear to 
confirm Dörner’s prenatal hormone theory – that sexual orientation, although not 
                                                 
270 McEwen, B. S. (1981). "Neural Gonadal Steroid Actions." Science 211(4488): 1303 - 1311. 
 
271 Rubin, R., et. al. Ibid."Postnatal Gonadal Steroid Effects on Human Behavior." 1318 - 1324. 
 
 155 
necessarily gender identity, is dependent upon the organizing effects of prenatal 
androgens.  However, we should note that this confirms that female homosexuality 
depends upon prenatal organization, not male. 
 One scientist who did not accept this conclusion was Froukje Slijper, a child 
psychiatrist working in the Netherlands.  In his critical 1984 review, he begins by noting 
that: 
 
The explanation for tomboy behaviour [of CAH girls] is sought by Ehrhardt et. al. 
in the prenatal action of the male hormone.  According to these authors, the male 
hormone has an “imprinting effect on the central nervous system,” which gives 
rise to tomboy behaviour.272
 
 
 Slijper is hesitant to adopt this explanation, for two reasons.  First, the tomboy 
behavior displayed by CAH girls could be attributed to the way in which the parents react 
to the child’s masculized genitalia.  Many experiments demonstrate that parents (and 
adults in general) react differently to male and female infants.  For instance, parents often 
exhibit significantly different behavior towards a baby in male clothing and a male name 
than towards that same baby when dressed as a girl and given a female name.273  From 
this, Slijper concludes that the masculinized genitalia of CAH girls can create doubts in 
the minds of the parents about the child’s sex.274
                                                 
272 Slijper, F. (1984). "Androgens and Gender Role Behaviour in Girls with Congenital Adrenal 
Hyperplasia (CAH)." Progress in Brain Research 61: 417 - 422. 
 
 
273 Will, J., et. al. (1976). "Maternal Behavior and Perceived Sex of Infants." American Journal of 
Orthopsychiatry 46: 135 - 140. 
 
274 Slijper, F. (1984). "Androgens and Gender Role Behaviour in Girls with Congenital Adrenal 
Hyperplasia (CAH)." Progress in Brain Research 61: 417 - 422. 
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 Second, CAH is a chronic, and often serious, illness.  CAH girls are often 
hospitalized, as many of them often undergo at least two genital operations, one 
immediately after birth and another in adulthood.  Girls with the more serious version of 
CAH (the salt-loss variety) are frequently and often seriously ill in their first years of life.  
In addition, all CAH females have to take hydrocortisone for the rest of their lives.275
 Slijper notes that chronically ill children often compensate for feelings of 
insufficiency and insecurity with confident and “bustling” behavior.
 
276  In addition, and 
not surprisingly, chronically ill children are often anxious about the future, an anxiety 
that can manifest itself as a lack of interest in marriage, motherhood, and responsibility 
for small children.277
 To test this possibility, Slijper compared the behavior of CAH girls with that of 
other chronically ill girls (suffering from diabetes mellitus), the healthy sisters of CAH 
girls, and controls.  Similarly, Slijper compared the behavior of boys with CAH, their 
unaffected brothers, diabetic boys, and a control group. 
  Because of these behavioral tendencies of chronically ill children, 
Slijper suspects that the potential severity of CAH could act as a confounding factor in 
the results of Ehrhardt and Meyer-Balhburg.  This, plus parental ambiguity about their 
child’s gender identity, could explain the high levels of tomboyism found in CAH girls. 
 To measure, and hence compare, the gender role behavior of these children, 
Slijper used the Sophia test, which is based upon those aspects of gender role behavior as 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
275 Ibid. 
 
276 E.g., Tavormina, J., et. al. (1976). "Chronically Deviant Population?" Journal of Abnormal 
Child Psychology 4: 99-111. 
 
277 Schowwalter, J. (1979). The Chronically Ill Child. Basic Handbook of Child Psychiatry. J. 
Noshpitz. New York, Basic Books. 1: 432-436. 
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distinguished by Ehrhardt et. al.  Values the children attached to indoor and outdoor play, 
playing with girls as opposed to boys, dolls versus cars, as well as marriage and 
parenthood were measured and scored, with higher scores indicating more “girlishness.” 
Slijper initially gave this test to the control group with the purpose of establishing a scale 
on which boys were to be distinguished from girls.278
 When administering the Sophia test to the sick children, Slijper also interviewed 
their parents, “using precoded questions about the children’s psychosexual and 
psychosocial development,”
 
279
 The chronically ill girls (both CAH and diabetes) had significantly more “boyish” 
scores on the Sophia test than did the controls.  From this, Slijper concludes that “the 
effect on gender role behavior is not necessarily explained by hormonal action alone; 
being sick plays a role.”
 in addition to collecting medical data on the degree of 
virilization before genital operations.  The purpose of these additional measures was to 
compare parental perception with the Sophia scores, as well as to determine what, if any, 
effect the degree of virilization has on both.  
280
 
 [Original emphasis] Examining the data on ill girls more 
carefully, Slijper found that CAH girls scored significantly more “boyishly” than did 
diabetic girls.  However:  
Closer examination of the data revealed that the specific CAH effect is fully 
accounted for by the group of girls with the salt-loss variant of CAH; with CAH 
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girls with the non-salt-loss variety about the same as diabetic girls. [Original 
emphasis]281
 
 
 This reinforces Slijper’s claim that chronic illness can have a direct effect on a 
child’s gendered behavior.  More tellingly, the objective degree of virilization at birth did 
not correlate with the gender score, nor was it the case that CAH girls differed from 
control girls in their appreciation of “fighting, romping, wild play and outdoor play.  
However, more parents of a CAH daughter (80%) than of a diabetic daughter (50%) 
consider that their child is extremely fond of romping.”282
 These findings lead Slijper to conclude that: 
 Although Slijper does not state 
so explicitly, the implication is that virilization can influence parents’ perceptions of their 
child’s behavior, even years after the beginning of treatment. 
 
[T]he hypothesis that behaviour is masculinized by exposure to androgen 
hormones during the early stages of development cannot be supported by this 
study.  Psychosocial factors such as the child’s being sick, and the parents’ doubts 
about the sex of the child seem to have more influence on gender role behaviour 
than does androgenic hormone action (i.e. degree of virilization).283
 
 
 In other words, the exclusive focus of previous CAH studies upon hormonal 
factors – a methodological influence of the organization/activation model – resulted in 
other, potentially salient, factors being ignored. 
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VI. Reaction of the Scientific Community 
 
But it appears that Slijper’s objections fell on deaf ears, as the vast majority of 
articles citing Ehrhardt and Meyer-Bahlburg’s work appear to accept it uncritically.  The 
authors of a few studies accept their results as supporting Dörner’s prenatal hormone 
theory and, by extension, the organization/activation model, yet caution readers that the 
studies are hampered by methodological problems.  Specifically, the results “are not fully 
consistent but may be construed to support”284 the results found in lower animals.  Other 
authors point out that the studies were afflicted with “research problems”285 or “design 
weaknesses.”286
 However, the majority of later articles do not mention any sort of methodological 
difficulties.  Instead, the authors of these papers either reference the work of Ehrhardt and 
Meyer-Balhburg uncritically, as part of the general background information of the 
 None of these authors elaborate on the nature of the methodological or 
design problems. 
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field,287
 As a result of the crucial resolution of homosexuality, many, if not most, members 
of the scientific community accepted the notion that androgen alone is the causative 
factor in prenatal organization.  This happened in spite of several prominent researchers 
trying to discourage single-factor models of development, including Charles Phoenix, one 
of the authors of the seminal 1959 paper.  Speaking at a conference sponsored by the 
International Institute for the Study of Human Reproduction, Phoenix: 
 or use the results of their studies as the foundation for further research into the 
etiology of sexual orientation.  
 
[H]oped that the concept of the organizing action of prenatal androgen will not 
give rise to time-worn arguments of heredity versus environment or be conceived 
of as a fatalistic theory that renders useless the need for studying the effects of the 
environment on the development of normal sexual behavior.288
 
 
But give rise it did.  The question of the influence of prenatal hormones on later 
sexual and gendered behavior was, almost from the beginning, debated in terms of nature 
(conceived of as internal factors) versus nuture (external factors). 
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 For instance, psychologist Diane McGuinness, who studies gender differences in 
behavior, claims that many other psychologists disapprove of her research: 
 
Because the conclusion of all this seem to me inescapable, and it rides against the 
whole direction most of science has taken over the past twenty or thirty years [that 
most behavior is the result of socialization].  These things [cognitive differences 
between men and women] are not culturally induced.  They’re biological.  Just as 
the capacity for language is prewired into our brains before birth – as Noam 
Chomsky, among others, has shown – so, in females, is a special skill in it.  So is 
the male’s special visual and spatial skill.  And so, perhaps, are all the other 
abilities and behaviors I’ve talked about.  What comes easy to either sex is likely 
to be biologically programmed, like the hypothalamus: stamped, primed, waiting 
to be developed.289
 
 
 This echoes the metaphor of the developing brain as a photographic plate.  As the 
reader may notice, her comments can be interpreted as having political, not just scientific, 
import. 
 Years later, Money decried the tendency of biologists and psychologists to follow 
a reductionist program in the explanation of sexual behavior.  Theoretically, “they reduce 
the origins and development of human sexuality to a single and usually abstrusely 
defined determinant which typically belongs to one side or the other of the obsolete 
nature/nurture fence.”290
                                                 
289 From an interview with the authors, in Durden-Smith, J., and deSimone, Diane (1983). Sex 
and the Brain. New York, Arbor House. Original emphasis. 
  Money explicitly links the nature/nurture debate to politics, 
claiming that reductionists of either stripe:  
 
290 Money, J. (1991). The Development of Sexuality and Eroticism in Human Kind. Heterotypical 
Behaviour in Man and Animals. B. a. A. Haug. London, Chapman and Hall. 
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Wrongly equate the biological with the fixed and preordained, and the 
sociocultural with the unfixed and optional.  By implication, the preordained is 
unmodifiable, and the arbitrary modifiable.  Herein lurks another implication, a 
covertly political one.  Scientists of the status quo favour a reductionist dogma of 
the biological unmodifiability of anything in men’s and women’s sexuality.  
Scientists of change favour another reductionist dogma, that of the sociocultural 
and environmental modifiability of everything in men’s and women’s sexuality.291
 
 
 Perhaps Money is being uncharitable here; it is not clear that researchers in this 
area are reductionists in this manner.  Nonetheless, Money’s concern about the focus 
upon a single and “abstrusely defined” determining factor is a telling indictment of the 
rigidity of categories of sexual behavior and development that came with the adoption of 
the organization/activation model. 
 
 
VII. Conclusion  
 
 
Once homosexuality came to be seen as a distinct (and largely unitary) 
phenomenon, two elaborated hypotheses concerning the pathological nature of its 
etiology were available: that it was due to environmental factors; and that it was due to 
endocrine imbalance.  As we have seen, neither elaborated hypothesis could explain 
adequately the phenomenon.  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
291 Ibid. 
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The organization/activation model was accepted, in part, because it provided a 
crucial resolution to the problem of homosexuality. The notion of central nervous system 
pseudohermaphroditism, while “solving” the problem of homosexuality, solved it in 
advance of any convincing empirical evidence.  In providing this crucial resolution, it 
served as the deciding factor between two general theories of sexual development.  Even 
though this resolution has the character of a thought experiment, it has shaped the 
development of the entire field. 
The empirical confirmation of Dörner’s prenatal hormone theory through CAH 
studies cemented its general acceptance within the scientific community, in spite of 
methodological problems.  This largely uncritical acceptance reflects the power of crucial 
resolutions in general, and the crucial resolution of homosexuality in particular. 
The organization/activation model also had the advantage of being able to explain 
both typical and atypical development.  This tremendous explanatory promise can viewed 
as an exemplar both of unification and mechanism.    
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
Organization/Activation and Explanation by Unification 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The organization/activation model explains the etiology of a host of phenomena 
through one basic argument pattern:  chromosomal arangement (and certain types of 
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external factors, if present) determine fetal hormone exposure; this hormone exposure 
determines, at least in part, both physiological and neurological development; the 
resulting neural structures determine later behavior and cognitive abilities.  
Because one basic argument pattern explains both physical and behavioral 
developmental outcomes – previously thought to be unrelated – the 
organization/activation model appears to be an exemplar of what Philip Kitcher calls 
“explanation by unification.”  I claim that it is such an exemplar.  However, because 
many endocrinologists explicitly describe their work in terms of mechanisms and the 
search for mechanisms, it is possible to apply the philosophical conception of 
mechanistic explanation to this field.  (This is the topic of the next chapter.)  I claim that 
viewing the model through a Kitcherian lens reveals both the strengths and the limitations 
of the unification approach to scientific explanation.  Specifically, while Kitcher’s ideal 
of explanatory unification, as applied to behavioral endocrinology, reveals several 
weaknesses in that account, there is still an important element of unification to the 
organization/activation model; a unification of mechanism types, not argument patterns. 
 To show this, I begin with a bit of intellectual history, outlining Kitcher’s 
expansion and development of the unificationist account as initially put forth by Michael 
Friedman.  Friedman considers and rejects several models of philosophical explanation, 
proffering the unificationist account in their stead.  Next, to demonstrate the critical role 
explanatory unification played (and plays) in the development of the field of behavioral 
endocrinology, I show how well the organization/activation model satisfies Kitcher’s 
ideal.  However, there are limitations this appeal to unity has in terms of generating 
satisfactory explanations.  Specifically, the same general argument pattern is used to 
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explain both homosexuality and transsexuality.  I explore this problem in the ninth 
chapter.  Finally, I address criticisms of Kitcher’s account. 
 
 
II. Intellectual Background 
 
Advocates of the ideal of explanation by unification argue that we increase our 
scientific understanding of the world by creating and expanding upon a unified picture of 
it.  The unification model of scientific understanding and explanation was first proposed 
by Michael Friedman in 1974 and elaborated upon by Philip Kitcher in the following 
decade.  Friedman’s initial paper was concerned with the connection between explanation 
and understanding – a connection he thought to be missing from theories of scientific 
explanation available at the time.   
Intuitively, explanation confers the epistemic virtue of understanding.  We seek 
explanations in order to understand the world around us.  Friedman discusses and 
dismisses the Standard Model292 and its associated deductive-nomological account, the 
“familiarity” account, and what he calls the “intellectual fashion” view as all inadequate 
to connect explanation to understanding.  As other philosophers, criticizing the Standard 
Model, have pointed out, rational expectability does not confer understanding.293
                                                 
292 As initially put forth by Hempel and Oppenheim in 1948.  Hempel, C. (1965). Studies in the 
Logic of Explanation. Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of 
Science. C. G. Hempel. New York, The Free Press: 245 - 290. 
  
Because the inadequacies of the Standard Model and its associated deductive-
 
293 See, for instance, Scriven, 1959 and Salmon, 1971. 
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nomological account of scientific explanation are well known, I focus on Friedman’s 
criticisms of the remaining two accounts.   
One prominent account of understanding (inspired by the Logical Positivists’ 
program of theory reduction) was that we explain unfamiliar events and phenomena (and 
thus understand them) by explicating them in terms of what we find familiar.  This model 
of explanation, which relies heavily on analogy, is advocated by a wide variety of 
scientists and philosophers, from William Dray to Rom Harre´.  Unfortunately, it is 
plagued with difficulties, the most prominent of which, according to Friedman, is it’s 
failure to connect explanation to understanding. 
Friedman denies that explanations produce understanding by reducing unfamiliar 
phenomena to familiar ones.  On this general account of scientific explanation, science 
allows us to understand the world by relating and/or reducing unfamiliar phenomena to 
familiar ones.  Thus, advocates of the familiarity account claim that the description of 
events or entities as analogous to familiar ones is a form of explanation.  That unfamiliar 
entities can be explained implies (for advocates of the familiarity account) that these 
entities can be understood. 
Analogy is the cornerstone of the familiarity account of explanation: it gives us a 
place to start our investigations, and suggests directions of research.  The relationship 
between unfamiliar and familiar entities is one in which we can make inferences about 
the unfamiliar entities based upon what we know of the familiar ones.  That which is 
explained (for example, sound) is explained by use of analogy to something with which 
we are familiar (for example, waves).  We understand sound as something analogous to 
wave.  
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 But we still need to discern exactly how analogical descriptions can provide 
explanations.  One version of the familiarity account is that of simple reduction: 
 
I believe that examination will show that the essence of explanation consists in 
reducing a situation to elements with which we are so familiar that we accept 
them as a matter of course, so our curiousity rests.294
 
 
 Although explanation, upon this account, involves descriptions, not all 
descriptions are explanations.  I can describe the ice cube in my glass getting smaller the 
longer it is out of the freezer, but this does not explain why the ice cube gets smaller.  
The description does not give us an understanding of the phenomena of shrinking ice 
cubes.  So one of the desiderata of the familiarity account is to distinguish explanatorily 
salient descriptions or comparisons from non-explanatory ones. 
Friedman claims that the familiarity account is unable to fulfill this requirement 
for two reasons: 
 
1. Many scientific theories relate familiar phenomena to unfamiliar ones (e.g. 
explaining water turning to steam when heated in terms of molecular bonds). 
2. Being familiar does not equal being understood.295
 
 
The first objection is an empirical counter-example wherein the explanatory 
relation moves in the opposite direction: from the familiar to the unfamiliar.  The second 
                                                 
294 P. W. Bridgeman, The Logic of Modern Physics, New York, Macmillian, 1968, p. 37, quoted 
in Friedman, M. (1974). "Explanation and Scientific Understanding." The Journal of Philosophy 
71(1). 
 
295 Ibid. 
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objection concerns the issue of distinguishing between explanatory and non-explanatory 
descriptions.  I discuss these objections in order.  
We are familiar with water turning to steam when heated; but the fact that we 
explain this phenomenon using unfamiliar entities such as molecular bonds and kinetic 
energy contradicts the familiarity account (according to Friedman).  This counter-
example is forceful, but its force can be mitigated by further reduction.  Although we 
may be “unfamiliar” with molecules in terms of hands-on experience, we are quite 
familiar with the model of explanation supporting the theory of molecular bonds.  A 
specific model, in this case, the billiard ball model of molecules, often is better 
understood than the system itself.296  We can make predictions about the physical systems 
using the rules of the specific model, then refine the model by taking account of 
previously neglected features.  For example, George G. Stokes developed the elastic 
sphere model of gas molecules from the billiard ball model by recognizing that the actual 
bodies were not rigid, and added equations of elasticity to the rules of the original 
model.297
It is the theoretical objection – that familiarity does not constitute understanding – 
that poses the strongest challenge to the familiarity account of explanation.  Friedman 
claims that the familiarity account does not differentiate between descriptions that are 
  If we conceive of molecules as analogous to particles with forces of attraction 
(e.g., elastic bands), the model of explanation supporting molecular theory appears 
mundane.  So, it is plausible that all explanatory appeals to unfamiliars will turn out to 
rely (at another level) on analogical extensions of the familiar. 
                                                 
296 This example due to Hesse, M. (1953/4). "Models in Physics." The British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science 4. 
 
297 Ibid.  See: Stokes, Mathematical and Physical Papers I, Cambridge, 1875, p. 75. 
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explanatory and those that are not.  He points out that we are all familiar with household 
appliances, but most of us would be hard put to explain why they behave the way they 
do.298
At first, it appears that an advocate of the familiarity account can answer this 
objection by relying upon the maxim that, while all explanations are descriptions, not all 
descriptions are explanations.  Thus, while I can open up and describe the various bits 
and pieces of the DVD player, for example, this description does not tell us why it 
behaves the way it does.  This response, however, does not really answer Friedman’s 
objection; it merely restates it.  For, “being familiar, just like being expected, is not at all 
the same thing as being understood.”
 
299
Friedman also considers and rejects the Standard Model (as initially promulgated 
by Hempel and Oppenheim), as well as the Weltanshauung (or ‘world-picture’) 
conception of scientific theories as put forth by Toulmin (1963) and Hanson (1963).  
According to this conception (which he calls the “intellectual fashion” conception
  Another possible response (not addressed by 
Friedman) is to claim that we can explain unfamiliar phenomena by reducing them to 
phenomena we already understand – phenomena with which we are familiar.  While this 
response provides a means to distinguish explanatory from non-explanatory descriptions, 
it does so at the cost of shedding any light on the elusive notion of understanding. 
300
                                                 
298 Friedman, M. (1974). "Explanation and Scientific Understanding." The Journal of Philosophy 
71(1). 
), 
 
299 Ibid. 
 
300 Although he admits this description is rather uncharitable: 
 
In all fairness, it should be pointed out that most supporters of this account do not believe 
that the choice of such ideals of intelligibility is completely capricious, depending only 
on the whims and prejudices of particular scientists.  On the contrary, most believe that 
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explanations produce understanding of a particular phenomenon by relating it to some 
‘ideal of natural order:’  
 
At any given time certain phenomena are regarded as somehow self-explanatory 
or natural.  Such phenomena need no explanation.  Explanation, within a 
particular historical tradition, consists in relating other phenomena to such ideals 
of intelligibility.301
 
 
 As such, what counts as scientific understanding varies with historical tradition, 
since what counts as an ideal of intelligibility varies as well.  A theory that is explanatory 
– and thus confers understanding – in one tradition may fail to be so in another. 
 Friedman acknowledges that the intellectual fashion view has historical 
support,302
                                                                                                                                                 
these can be good reasons, usually to do with predictive power, for choosing one ideal 
over another. 
 but considers this account of understanding to lack a crucial normative 
component, as the criteria for a phenomenon’s understanding may vary from one 
  
 Ibid. 
 
301 Ibid. 
 
302 One of the most serious challenges to the Standard Model came from the 1962 publication of 
Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions.  According to Kuhn, all scientific 
investigations take place within a paradigm, and, thus, cannot sensibly compared to scientific 
ventures that take place within a different paradigm.  Advocates of this approach to scientific 
explanation hold that theories (and hence the explanations they provide) are relative to the 
overarching conceptual perspectives in which they are formulated.  As a result, philosophers (and 
other interested parties) should view science as an ongoing social enterprise involving a shared 
language, methodology, and general worldview.  On this account, the philosophical investigation 
of science involves an analysis of the development, discovery, acceptance and rejection of 
scientific theories.  As such, it is no longer adequate to analyze theories in terms of their rational 
reconstruction. 
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paradigm to another.  Even though the intellectual fashion account appears to apply to 
certain episodes in intellectual history:  
 
However, it seems to me that it would be desirable, if at all possible, to isolate a 
common, objective sense of explanation which remains constant throughout the 
history of science; a sense of ‘scientific understanding’ on which the theories of 
Newton, Maxwell, Einstein, and Bohr all produce scientific understanding.303
 
 
 Instead, he argues that to derive a fact from any premises whatsoever (be they 
initial conditions and general laws, as is the case with the Standard Model, or the stated 
and unstated premises of a particular tradition) is never sufficient, by itself, to render the 
explanation of a particular phenomenon less mysterious.  From his discussion of the three 
different accounts of scientific explanation, he concludes that a theory of explanation 
should have three characteristics.  First, it should be sufficiently general.  Most, if not all 
scientific theories that we consider to be explanatory should come out as so according to 
our theory.  The theory also needs to be objective, that is, not based on the idiosyncracies 
of a particular time period (which the intellectual fashion account cannot deliver).  
Finally, it needs to connect explanation to understanding (where the Standard Model 
fails).304
 He argues that our understanding of particular phenomema, and hence our 
exlanations of these phenomena, involves placing them within a larger cognitive order.  
He writes: 
 
                                                 
303 Friedman, M. (1974). "Explanation and Scientific Understanding." The Journal of Philosophy 
71(1). 
 
304 Ibid. 
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[T]his is the essence of scientific explanation – science increases our 
understanding of the world by reducing the total number of independent 
phenomena that we have to accept as ultimate or given.  A world with fewer 
independent phenomena is, other things equal, more comprehensive than one with 
more.305
 
 
 But what does it mean to say that a world with fewer independent phenomena is 
more intelligible than one with more?  This question consists of two parts: what it means 
for a phenomenon to be independent; and what it means for one conception of the world 
to be more comprehensible than another. 
 The first part is an issue of ontology, the second epistemology.  It is tempting to 
conceive of the independence of phemonena in terms of causality: if we need not invoke 
causal processes to explain the phenomena – if they just are – than such phenomena are 
brute.  These phenomena would be the basic laws of physics, the number of stars in the 
universe, and, in the case of endocrinology, hormones.  On this understanding of the 
independence of the phenomena, a world with fewer such basic facts is more 
comprehensible than one with more. 
 While it may be a fact of human cognition that a world with fewer independent 
phenomena, in the ontological sense, is more comprehensible, there is no guarantee that 
the ultimate facts of the world are so sparse.  One means of avoiding this potentially 
troublesome ontological commitment is to regard ultimate phenomena as those 
foundational aspects of our knowledge.  One can argue that Kitcher’s defense of the 
unification account of understanding through argument patterns takes this approach. 
                                                 
305 Ibid. 
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III. Kitcher’s Ideal of Explanatory Unification 
 
Kitcher argues that one of the most important features of a scientific theory is its 
ability to provide explanations that unify the phenomena.  Kitcher argues that we expand 
our unified picture (and hence increase understanding) by minimizing the number of 
“brute facts” needed to articulate our scientific theories.  A group of phenomena are 
unified when their explanations can be derived using the same fundamental argument 
pattern: 
 
Science advances our understanding of nature by showing us how to derive 
descriptions of many phenomena, using the same pattern of derivation again and 
again, and in demonstrating this, it teaches us how to reduce the number of facts 
that we have to accept as ultimate (or brute).306
 
 
This, of course, raises the question of what it means for a fact to be “brute.”  For 
Kitcher, facts are “brute” in an espistemological sense.  
He supports this approach by pointing out that the acceptance of some major 
scientific research programs depended upon recognizing promises for unifying, and 
thereby explaining, the phenomena.  For example, Newton’s universal laws of gravitation 
used the same pattern of argument to derive (and thereby describe) the orbit of the 
planets, falling bodies near the surface of the earth, and the tides.  This general argument 
                                                 
306 Kitcher, P. (1989). Explanatory Unification and Causal Structure. Scientific Explanation. P. 
Kitcher, and Wesley Salmon. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press. XIII: 410 - 505. 
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united what had been disparate phenomena under the same general explanation.  From his 
examination of this and other important episodes in the history of science, Kitcher 
concludes that the notion of an argument pattern is central to that of explanation.  To 
grasp the concept of explanation is to see that if one accepts an argument as explanatory, 
one is thereby committed to accepting as explanatory other arguments that instantiate the 
same pattern.307
Kitcher’s account relies upon the concept of a ‘general argument pattern’ 
consisting of: 1) a schematic argument; 2) a set of sets of filling instructions containing 
one set of filling instructions for each term of the schematic argument; 3) a classification 
of the schematic argument.
 The significance of this claim will become apparent in the final chapter.  
In addition, he claims that we can assess theories (including embryonic theories) by their 
ability to provide us with such unifying arguments.  I discuss this in more detail in what 
follows. 
308
A sequence of sentences instantiates the general argument pattern just in case it 
has the same number of terms as the schematic argument of the general argument pattern; 
each sentence in the sequence is obtained from the corresponding schematic sentence in 
accordance with the appropriate set of filling instructions; and it is possible to construct a 
chain of reasoning that assigns to a sentence the status accorded to the corresponding 
schematic sentence by the classification.  
 
                                                 
307 Kitcher claims that “[t]o grasp the concept of explanation is to see that if one accepts an 
argument as explanatory, one is thereby committed to accepting as explanatory other arguments 
which instantiate the same pattern.” Kitcher, P. (1998). Explanatory Unification. Introductory 
Readings in the Philosophy of Science. H. Klemke, and Rudge. Amherst, Prometheus Books: 278 
- 301. 
 
308 Ibid. 
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Scientists ideally aim to ‘systematize’ the set K of accepted sentences in science 
by developing one or more argument patterns that can be used to derive some members 
of K from others.  Kitcher defines a systemization of a set of statements as a:  
 
[C]ollection of derivations, all of whose constituent statements (premises, 
conclusions, intermediate steps) belong to the set.  Each systematization can be 
seen as instantiating a set of schemata, the basis of the systematization.309
 
 
In other words, a systematization of a set of statements is a collection of 
derivations wherein the premises, conclusions, and intermediate steps all belong to the 
same explanatory set.  As such, a systematization is an instantiation of a schema, and 
explicitly deductive.310
Systematizations that are also explanations are those with the smallest available 
set of argument patterns that can be used to infer the largest number of sentences that we 
accept.  This minimal set is the explanatory store E(K).  Kitcher’s general challenge is 
that of specifying E(K), the explanatory store over K, which is the set of arguments 
acceptable as the basis for acts of explanation by those whose beliefs are exactly the 
members of K.  These systematizations need not specify every detail surrounding the 
emergence of a phenomenon, but can be idealizations or even “explanation-sketches.” 
 
The most relevant historical example for my purposes is that of Darwinian 
evolutionary theory as presented in the Origin, which promised to unify a host of 
biological phenomena.  Because he had not worked out the details of his theory, Darwin 
                                                 
309 Kitcher, P. (1993). The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity 
Without Illusions. New York, Oxford University Press. 
 
310 Ibid. 
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could not provide in-depth evolutionary stories.  Instead, he offered sketches of 
selectionist explanations, which Kitcher schematizes as follows: 
 
SIMPLE INDIVIDUAL SELECTION 
Question: Why do (virtually) all members of G have [property] P? 
 
Answer: 
(1) Among the ancestors of G there was a subgroup of contemporaneous organisms, G0, 
such that 
(i) a small number of members of G0 has P; 
(ii) none of the members of the generation ancestral to G0 had P; 
(iii) each of the other members of G0 had one of the variant characteristics P1, . . ., 
Pn; 
(iv) no other variant of P is present in any generation of the G0 – G lineage. 
(2) Analysis of the ecological conditions and the physiological effects on their bearers of 
P, P1, . . , Pn 
Showing 
(3) Organisms with P had higher expected reproductive success than organisms with P1 (1 
≥ i ≥ n) 
(4) P, P1, . . ,Pn are heritable. 
Therefore 
(5) P increased in frequency in each generation of the lineage leading from G0 to G. 
(6) There are sufficiently many generations between G0 and G 
Therefore 
(7) (Virtually) all members of G have P.311
  
 
                                                 
311 Ibid. 
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The filling instructions instructions for this schema are as follows: P is to be 
replaced by the name of a trait; G and G0 by the names of groups of organisms 
(populations, species, taxa, etc.).  According to the classification of this schema, (1) – (4) 
are premises leading to (5) using the principle of reproductive fitness.  In turn, (5) and (6) 
act as premises which, using mathematical induction on lineages, leads to conclusion (7). 
 This schematic sketch of Darwin’s argument can be further abstracted: 
 
Initial conditions C1, . . ,Cn 
Generalities G1, . . . ,Gm  
Therefore 
Present state of affairs. 
 
Where, according to the ideal of explanatory unification, generalities G1, . . ., Gm 
should unify the phenomena.  This highly abstracted version of Kitcherian schemata 
serves as a mere template, with the conditions and laws to be filled in according to the 
particular scientific field. 
 Kitcher, in his early writings on unification, explicitly disavows reliance on laws 
as a part of his attempt to analyze explanation.  He claims that argument patterns, not 
laws, are fundamental to scientific explanations.  Laws are not what gives science its 
generality – this is done by the repeated use of a limited number of argument patterns.  
(This reflects the explicitly deductive nature of Kitcher’s account of explanation and, as 
we shall see later, his hesitation to invoke the notion of causality.)  However, 
Schoonhoven claims that a robust notion of law can be recovered Kitcher’s unification 
account.  Kitcher does not deny that there are laws; he merely assigns them a different 
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provenance and status in his account then that of the earlier deductive-nomological (D-N) 
model.  Kitcher argues that generalizations do not figure in explanations because they are 
laws, rather, they are laws because they figure in explanations.312
 It seems clear that on Kitcher’s account there are some generalizations that 
function in argument patterns in much the same way that laws do in the older D-N 
account.  Schoonhoven claims that these general explanatory patterns “bring laws in their 
wake.”
  
313
 As we have seen, the main logical tool Kitcher uses is that of deductive inference.  
(He has, on occasion, called himself a “deductive chauvinist.”) This has led the ideal of 
explanatory unification, like the standard model before it, to be accused of ignoring 
issues of causality.  Before I explore this, I demonstrate how the organization/activation 
model accords with Kitcher’s explanatory ideal. 
  
 
 
IV. The Organization/Activation Model as an Exemplar of Unification 
 
One of the primary reasons for the rapid acceptance of the organization/activation 
model, besides providing a crucial resolution to the problem of homosexuality, was its 
unifying aspects.  In their gloss on the effects of the organization/activation hypothesis on 
the field of behavioral endocrinology, Breedlove and Hampson write: 
 
                                                 
312 Kitcher, P. (1989). Explanatory Unification and Causal Structure. Scientific Explanation. P. 
Kitcher, and Wesley Salmon. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press. XIII: 410 - 505. 
 
313 Schoonhoven, p. ? 
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The organizational hypothesis had an immediate and profound effect upon the 
field of behavioral endocrinology.  Many researchers tried to see whether other 
sex differences in adult behavior were determined by early androgen exposure.  In 
each case, the prediction was clear – exposure of young animals to androgen 
should make their behavior more masculine in adulthood, while the absence of 
early androgen should result in more feminine (and less masculine) adult behavior 
. . . Although there were some interesting exceptions, these predictions were often 
borne out for many other behaviors.314
 
   
As mentioned earlier, the general acceptance of the organization/activation model 
resulted in less attention paid to environmental and genetic factors.  As a result of this 
lack of consideration, most endocrinologists, after the general acceptance of the 
organization/activation model, were agreed that: 
 
Sex differences in the hypothalamus are thought to be the basis of sex differences 
in (1) reproductive behaviour, that is, the menstrual cycle in women, (2) gender 
identity, that is, the feeling that one is either male or female, and (3) sexual 
orientation, that is, homosexuality and heterosexuality.315
 
 
Sex differences in the hypothalamus (and in the brain in general) are, according to 
the organization/activation model, due to early hormone exposure.  This general 
explanatory model, like Darwin’s theory of descent with selection, can be framed in 
terms of a general explanation sketch: 
 
                                                 
314 Breedlove, S. M., and Hampson, Elizabeth (2002). Sexual Differentiation of the Brain and 
Behavior. Behavioral Endocrinology. B. Becker, Crews and McCarthy. Cambridge, MIT Press. 
 
315 Swaab, D., and Hofman, Michel (1995). "Sexual Differentiation of the Human Hypothalamus 
in Relation to Gender and Sexual Orientation." Trends in Neurosciences 18(6): 264 - 270. 
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Question: 
Why do (virtually) all members of M with G have P? 
 
Answer: 
(1) Among the members of M, when in an embryonic state 
(i) Approximately half of the members possess G1 
(ii) Approximately the other half possess G2 
 
(2) The possession of G (usually) results in the excretion of H 
(i) The possession of G1 (usually) results in the excretion of substance H1 
(ii) The possession of G2 (usually) results in the excretion of substance H2 
 
(3) The presence of substance H results in the development of property P 
(i) The presence of substance H1 leads to the development of property P1 
(ii) The presence of substance H2 leads to the development of property P2  
 
Therefore, 
(4) (Virtually) all members of M with G have P 
 
Filling instructions:      Classification: 
M = mammals (all mammals, or just a specific species) (1) – (3) are premises 
G = gonads       (4) the conclusion 
H = hormones 
P = sex dimorphic properties 
  
Thus, in terms of general structure, the organization/activation model, like 
Darwin’s account of evolution, serves as an exemplar for unification. 
We can schematize the above argument in terms of the second, more abstract, 
argument pattern.  The initial condition (C1) consist of the presence or absence of fetal 
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testes, as well as (C2) the presence or absence of external hormonal manipulation.  The 
biological laws consist of (L1) the production of androgens by the fetal testes; (L2) the 
physiological effects of androgens on the fetus; and (L3) the physiological effects of 
androgen absence.  The argument pattern explaining normal genital development would 
look something like the following: 
 
NORMAL SEXUAL DEVELOPMENT  
(1) Initial conditions: 
C1: Presence or absence of testes 
C2: No external manipulation 
(2) Biological law: 
L1: Production of androgens by fetal testes 
Therefore: 
(3) Hormone production (androgens or lack thereof) 
L2: Physiological effects of androgens 
(Development of Wolffian ducts; disintegration of Müllerian ducts) 
L3: Physiological effects of androgen absence 
(Disintegration of Wolffian ducts; development of Müllerian ducts) 
Therefore: 
(4) Normal male or female genital development. 
 
Importantly for my argument, explanatory models in behavioral endocrinology 
also fulfill Kitcher’s substantive criteria for unifying explanations.  In the two historical 
cases he examines in “Explanatory Unification” – Newtonian mechanics and Darwinian 
evolutionary theory – he finds three important features: 
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(i) Prior to the articulation of a theory with high predictive power, certain 
proposals for theory construction are favored on the grounds of their explanatory 
promise. 
(ii) The explanatory power of embryonic theories is explicitly tied to the notion of 
unification. 
(iii) Particular features of these theories are taken to support their claims to 
unification.316
 
 
We can find each of these three features in the organization/activation model.  
Recall that Phoenix et. al.’s initial reasoning behind their experimental choices was that a 
finding that prenatal exposure to androgens had an “organizing action” that would 
influence adult sexual behavior might mean a whole range of adult behavior could be 
traced (directly or indirectly) to that early exposure.  If they could discover the existence 
of such an organizing action, it:  
 
 [W]ould 1) extend our knowledge of the role of the gonadal hormones in the 
regulation of sexual behavior by providing information bearing on the action of 
these hormones or related substances during the prenatal period, 2) be suggestive 
evidence that the relationship between the neural tissues mediating mating 
behavior and the morphogenic fetal hormones parallels that between the genital 
tissues and the same hormones, and 3) direct attention to a possible origin of 
behavioral differences between the sexes which is ipso facto important for 
psychologic and psychiatric theory.317
 
  
                                                 
316 Kitcher, P. (1998). Explanatory Unification. Introductory Readings in the Philosophy of 
Science. H. Klemke, and Rudge. Amherst, Prometheus Books: 278 - 301. 
   
317 Phoenix, C., et. al. (1959). "Organizing Action of Prenatally Administered Testosterone 
Propionate on the Tissues Mediating Mating Behavior in the Female Guinea Pig." Endocrinology 
65: 369 - 382.  
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Not only did the proposed model promise to extend knowledge about hormone 
action, the possibility that it could explain both physiological and behavioral 
developmental endpoints is specifically cited for its adoption.  One of the authors of the 
1959 paper, William C. Young, is even more specific about the unifying potential of the 
postulated model.  If, as he predicted, prenatal hormones influenced a wide variety of 
behaviors, adopting the organization/activation hypothesis would unite:  
 
[T]he work of experimental embryologists who have concerned themselves so 
completely with all that is involved in the development and differentiation of the 
genital tracts, and the work of psychologists and psychiatrists for whom the 
development and differentiation of neural tissues presents problems of equal 
interest and importance.318
 
   
Thus uniting the fields of physiology and behavioral research under the same 
explanatory model. 
Fulfilling the second feature, the explanatory power of the embryonic 
organization/activation model was indeed explicitly tied to the notion of unification.  In 
his preface to the monograph of a 1963 New England Psychological Association meeting, 
psychologist John Money specifically credits the organization/activation model with 
creating a new direction for the field of sex research: “It is the new concept of critical 
periods in the development, however, that has done most to render archaic the dichotomy 
                                                 
318 Young, W. C. (1961). The Hormones and Mating Behavior. Sex and Internal Secretions. W. 
C. Young. Baltimore, The Williams and Wilkins Company. II. 
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between physical and psychological.”319
When viewed through this endocrinological lens, human behavior, once strictly 
the province of psychology, came under the rubric of behavioral endocrinology.  The 
appeal of unification has been dramatic: one of the over-arching goals of the field of 
endocrinology since the seminal 1959 paper has been to refine our understanding of how 
hormones determine neural organization and how this neural organization determines or 
influences later behavior.  Specifically, physical development (in terms of gross anatomy 
and neurology
 These “critical periods” are specific sorts of 
hormone exposure during development, rather than learning stages.  
320
                                                 
319 Money, J. (1965). Sex Research: New Developments. New York, Holt, Rinehary and Winston, 
Inc. 
) could be explained (primarily) by prenatal hormone exposure, with the 
 
320 In their extensive review of the principles and mechanisms of sexual differentiation in the 
vertebrate brain, Cooke et. al. note: 
 
Perhaps the single most obvious conclusion about sexual differentiation of these neural 
systems in animals is the pivotal role of steroid hormones.  In every case discovered so 
far, one can manipulate the sexual dimorphism in the nervous system by manipulating 
steroid hormones. 
 
Cooke, B., et. al. (1998). "Sexual Differentiation of the Vertebrate Brain: Principles and 
Mechanisms." Frontiers in Neuroendocrinology 19: 323 - 362. 
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consequence that the resulting neural structures determine later behavior321 and cognitive 
abilities.322
Finally, certain features of the model are taken to support its unifying aspects, and 
these features help to explain the tremendous appeal of the model.  In the case of 
behavioral endocrinology, both general and particular features are taken to support its 
unifying aspects, which is one of the reasons I consider the organization/activation model 
to be an exemplar of Kitcherian explanation by unification.  One general feature is its 
ability to explain many aspects of developmental endpoints by appealing to prenatal 
androgen exposure (or lack thereof).  For instance, one textbook author writes: 
 
 
In most mammal studies to date, the brain in either sex is feminine until it is 
converted to a masculine form in males through the action of testosterone.  This 
masculinization, or defeminization, of the brain affects not only sexual behavior 
                                                 
321 Raisman and Field, investigating sex dimorphism in the brain, emphasize the importance of 
early exposure to “organizing” hormones: 
 
The characteristic sexual differences in the control of gonadotropins and certain aspects 
of mating behaviour depend not on the genetic sex of the animal but upon whether the 
brain has been exposed to androgen during a critical perinatal period of development.  
 
Raisman, G., and Field, Pauline (1973). "Sexual Dimorphism in the Neuropil of the Preoptic Area 
of the Rat and its Dependence on Neonatal Androgen." Brain Research 54: 1 - 29. 
 
322 Psychologist Diane Halpern, introducing a chapter on sex-dimorphism in the human brain, 
writes: 
 
Not surprisingly, researchers have considered the possibility that sex differences in 
cognitive abilities may, in part, reflect sex differences in the underlying neural structure 
or organization of the brain. 
 
Halpern, D. F. (1992). Sex Differences in Cognitive Abilities. Hillsdale, Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
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but also a wide range of behaviors relating to aggression, play, and ingestions, as 
well as a number of key physiological processes.323
 
 
Another general feature of the organization/activation model is its ability to 
explain both typical and atypical developmental outcomes.  Specifically, the notion that 
the prenatal brain acquired gender during a critical period in development could not only 
explain the sex-dimorphic cognitive and behavioral differences found in “normal” human 
adults, it also provided a theoretical framework for explaining atypical sex-related 
behaviors.  
One particular feature of the model taken to support its unifying aspects is ability 
to offer an explanation of the development of homosexuality, considered, by those who 
disagreed with Beach, to be not just atypical in terms of frequency, but violating norms of 
sexual development and gendered behavior.  (This is discussed in previous chapters.) 
 
 
V. Criticisms of Unification 
 
Kitcher, in his 1989 work, shies away from invoking causation as a means of 
resolving traditional problems that beset the Standard Model.  More generally, he 
hesitates to invoke the notion of causality as an element of explanation.  He claims that 
there is “no sense” to the notion of causal relevance except as “that of figuring in the 
systematization of belief in the limit of scientific inquiry, as guided by the search for 
                                                 
323 Schulkin, J. (1999). The Neuroendocrine Regulation of Behavior. New York, Cambridge 
University Press. 
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unification.”324  Kitcher thus rejects the possibility that there could be some factor, 
causally relevant to a particular phenomenon Ki, such that no derivation within the 
explanatory store E(K) could produce a description of Ki using premises which refer to 
the causally relevant factor.  Hence, his “version of the unification approach makes it 
constitutive of explanatory relevance that there be no basic explanatory (or causal) 
mechanisms that are not captured in the limits of attempts to systematize our beliefs.”325
However, Kitcher is more amenable to causation in his later work.  In The 
Advancement of Science (1993), he writes: 
 
 
Ever since Hume, philosophers have faced the challenge of explaining how we 
are in a position to gain evidence for statements involving a family of notions – 
statements that identify causal relationships, statements that talk of objective 
explanatory dependence, statements that assert that a particular set of objects is a 
natural kind, statements that talk of natural necessities.  The root problem seems 
to be that we have no semantical account of such statements that will fit into the 
epistemological account.326
 
 
Kitcher proposes “strong realism” as a response to the traditional metaphysical 
and epistemic worries raised by Hume.  Without going into details, he claims that strong 
realists can accept the metaphysical baggage and plausibly claim that the epistemological 
worries are unfounded.   
                                                 
324 Kitcher, P. (1989). Explanatory Unification and Causal Structure. Scientific Explanation. P. 
Kitcher, and Wesley Salmon. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press. XIII: 410 - 505. 
 
325 Ibid. 
 
326 Kitcher, P. (1993). The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity 
Without Illusions. New York, Oxford University Press. 
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Some reviewers of The Advancement of Science were quick to point out that 
Kitcher had not, in fact, resolved the issues surrounding causality.  Richard Miller, for 
instance, while claiming that Kitcher’s ideal of explanatory unification provides a firm 
basis for the strong realism proposed by Kitcher as the solution to Humean problems, 
also claims that it cannot provide a firm enough basis: 
 
To begin with, the general equation of warrant with unifying role does not seem 
to describe well-conducted causal inquiry.  Wise historians and 
psychopathologists are often content with a motely of causal mechanisms even 
when unification could be improved by some grand scheme.327
 
 
Miller notes that, given the diverse roles that the notion of explanatory unification 
can play, one could make the mild claim that it is an important virtue in a field to the 
extent to which it is rational to expect a minimal set of mechanisms to generate the 
phenomena.  Unfortunately for Kitcher, this mild claim does nothing to support the 
strong realism he proposes.  As mechanistic explanations of phenomena often make use 
of unobservables, a strong realist would be inclined to accept such unobservables as 
genuine entities, rather than heuristic devices.  However, as Miller points out: 
 
The mixed record of reliance on literal belief concerning unobservables together 
with the conceivability of alternative standards of theory choice create a need to 
vindicate any commitment to unobservables which is more fervent than Mach’s 
belief that theories provide a unified scheme for deducing observable phenomena.  
An account of causal inquiry is required to fill this need.  Yet Kitcher’s attempt to 
                                                 
327 Miller, R. (1995). "The Advancement of Realism." Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 55(3). 
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ground causal inquiry on explanatory unification seems ultimately to support 
Machian anti-realism, rather than overcoming it.328
 
 
 Kitcher’s response to this criticism is that he did account for causality in an 
adequate fashion.  In his “Author’s Response,” Kitcher claims that Miller’s worries are 
misplaced:  
 
After arguing that one component of progress consists in identifying correct 
causal dependencies in nature, I remain officially agnostic between the invocation 
of mind-independent non-Humean causation in nature, and a Kantian alternative, 
in which the causal structure of the world is that projected by our explanatory 
schemata in the limit of our attempts to unify the phenomena.329
 
   
While Kitcher now includes causal arguments as a part of explanatory unification, 
he refuses to speculate about the metaphysics of causation.  Specifically, he refuses to 
choose between a strongly realist non-Humean conception of causation and a more 
moderately realist Kantian one.  So it would seem that the later Kitcher has no problem 
with linking explanatory laws with causal dependencies, even if only for heuristic 
reasons.   
This later, cautious acceptance of causation seems to strengthen the applicability 
of Kitcher’s model to endocrinology.  It would allow us to take the intuitively appealing 
step of talking about how androgen secretions cause certain physiological changes.  This 
makes much more sense than strict inferential deduction.  
                                                 
328 Ibid. 
 
329 Kitcher, P. Ibid."Author's Response." 653 - 673. 
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But I do not think that Kitcher’s incorporation of causality into his ideal of 
explanatory unification solves all the problems.  Take, for example, a further instantiation 
of the argument pattern: the claim that human males are better than females at visuo-
spatial tasks because of greater cerebral lateralization.  Recall the original schematic 
argument pattern: 
 
Question: 
Why do (virtually) all members of M with G have P? 
 
Answer: 
(1) Among the members of M, when in an embryonic state 
(i) Approximately half of the members possess G1 
(ii) Approximately the other half possess G2 
 
(2) The possession of G (usually) results in the excretion of H 
(i) The possession of G1 (usually) results in the excretion of substance H1 
(ii) The possession of G2 (usually) results in the excretion of substance H2 
 
(3) The presence of substance H results in the development of property P 
(i) The presence of substance H1 leads to the development of property P1 
(ii) The presence of substance H2 leads to the development of property P2  
 
Therefore, 
(4) (Virtually) all members of M with G have P 
 
Filling this out to instantiate the particular argument about visuo-spatial skills, we get: 
 
Question: 
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Why do (most) humans who are males possess superior visuo-spatial skills? 
 
Answer: 
(1) Among the members of humanity, when in an embryonic state, approximately half 
possess fetal testes. 
 
(2) The possession of fetal testes (usually) results in the excretion of androgens. 
 
(3) The presence of androgens results in the development of cerebral lateralization 
 
(3’) The presence of cerebral lateralization leads to the possession of superior visuo-
spatial skills. 
 
Therefore 
(4) (Most) humans who are males possess superior visuo-spatial skills. 
 
Even if this is to read as telling a causal story, I find it problematic as an 
explanation.  My main worry is with (3’).  While many endocrinologists (and even more 
psychologists) accept this statement (in Kitcherian terms, it belongs to the set K), the 
claim that cerebral lateralization causes superior visuo-spatial skills is meaningless unless 
one can explain how the presumed cause actually causes the development of such 
abilities.   
To echo remarks I’ve made earlier, there are two possible ways of responding to 
this.  One is to point out Kitcher’s emphasis upon explanatory promise: although 
scientists do not yet know the exact details of how cerebral lateralization leads to superior 
visuo-spatial ability (specifically, why the neural function supporting spatial ability need 
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to be more lateralized, but functions supporting verbal ability need to be less lateralized), 
this is merely something that needs to be worked out.  
The second response is to point out that explaining a phenomenon by postulating 
a cause, when one does not know how the cause causes, is no explanation at all.  One can 
argue that this is a case of unification without explanation.  
In either case, even if Kitcher is willing to admit causes into his explanatory 
schemata, he needs to be able to explain how the causes cause, in order to be able to 1) 
support his notion of explanatory promise and 2) avoid “just so” stories. 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
 Because of the Humean problems involved in re-introducing causation into 
philosophical accounts of scientific explanation, some thinkers – most notably Kitcher – 
attempt to resolve the problems of causation by excluding it from their account.  Instead, 
scientific explanation confers understanding by unifying the phenomena.  The ideal of 
unification appeals to deeply intuitive desires concerning our overall understanding of the 
world, intuitive desires fulfilled by the organization/activation model.   
In particular, the model was adopted prior to unambiguous empirical support 
because of its tremendous explanatory promise.  This promise – namely, the ability to 
explain both typical and atypical development – is explicitly one of unification.  Like the 
general Darwinian schema, the organization/activation model can be instantiated to 
explain a host of phenomena. 
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While the organization/activation model fulfills all of Kitcher’s criteria for 
explanatory unification, the unificationist ideal cannot account for all aspects of the 
model’s explanatory power.  In particular, the model, once accepted, set the stage for 
investigations into underlying causal pathways.  This is the topic of the following 
chapter.   
  
 
 
 
Chapter 7 
Organization/Activation as an Exemplar of Mechanism 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 In response to the problems of unification, some writers propose to explain 
explanation in terms of mechanism.  Like unification, mechanism displays the same three 
virtues that Friedman requires for unification: it is sufficiently general, objective, and 
connects explanation to understanding.  It is general in that the explanatory mechanisms 
do not need to be limited to the familiar, objective in that what counts as a mechanism 
does not depend upon the prevailing ideal of natural order, and it connects explanation to 
understanding in that we understand something when we can explain how it works.   
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This second, mechanistic, type of understanding involves deducing how things 
work, and takes a broadly realist approach towards causation.330
In the previous chapter, I claim that, initially, the organization/activation model of 
psychosexual development appears to be a case of explanation by unification.  However, 
a closer examination reveals that the goal of scientists is (and has been) to cash out the 
initial predictions and explanations of the model in terms of mechanisms.  In what 
follows, I give a brief definition of mechanism and list criteria that distinguish 
explanatory from non-explanatory models, drawing primarily upon the work of Carl 
Craver.  I then demonstrate how the organization/activation model fulfills these criteria in 
terms of both the overarching, general methodology, and, more specifically, in terms of 
investigations into the neurological substrates underlying homosexuality and 
transsexuality.  However, while the model is an exemplar of mechanism in terms of the 
research program it inspired, the initial appeal and subsequent adoption of the model is 
due to its explanatory unification. 
  A mechanism is a 
system of parts that operate or interact like those of a machine, transmitting forces, 
motion or energy from one part to another.  Mechanical systems are organized 
hierarchically, in that mechanisms at lower levels can produce changes at higher levels. 
  
                                                 
330 E.g., Wilson and Keil, in “The Shadows and Shallows of Explanation” write: 
 
We take the notion of causation itself to be a primitive notion, one that has its own 
shadows in both reductive accounts of causation (e.g. Humean accounts) and 
nonreductive accounts that consider causation to be richer but still analyzable in terms of 
prior notions (e.g. time, powers, properties).  
 
Wilson, R., and Keil, Frank (2000). The Shadows and Shallows of Explanation. Explanation and 
Cognition. K. a. Wilson. Cambridge, MIT Press.  
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II. Definition and Criteria 
 
As is the case in other areas of science, many endocrinologists explicitly describe 
their work as the search for underlying causal mechanisms.331
Most generally, a mechanism is a system of parts that operate or interact like 
those of a machine, transmitting forces, motion or energy from one part to another.  In 
this sense, a mechanistic description of a phenomenon explains it when that description 
includes a story about the causes relevant to the phenomenon. 
 In response to the 
challenges facing the ideal of explanatory unification, some philosophers of science 
propose to explain explanation in terms of mechanism, wherein we understand something 
when we can explain the mechanisms that bring that thing about.  (Because I am 
interested in endocrinological explanations of etiologies, I focus on mechanisms that 
produce phenomena, rather than mechanisms that underlie the present functioning of 
phenomena.)   
However, the philosophical conception of mechanism and mechanistic 
explanation incorporates a number of different epistemological and ontological notions – 
notions that vary over the course of history as well as between particular scientific 
                                                 
331 For instance, Morris et. al. begin their review of sexual differentiation by claiming: 
 
Understanding the mechanisms that give rise to sex differences in the behavior of 
nonhuman animals may contribute to the understanding of sex differences in humans.  In 
vertebrate model systems, a single factor – the steroid hormone testosterone – accounts 
for most, and perhaps all, of the known sex differences in neural structure and behavior. 
 
Morris, J., et. al. (2004). "Sexual Differentiation of the Vertebrate Nervous System." Nature 
Neuroscience 7(10): 1034 - 1039. 
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fields.332
To demonstrate the applicability of the mechanistic account to behavioral 
endocrinology, I demonstrate how the explanations proffered by endocrinologists satisfy 
criteria the five requirements listed by Craver in his most recent book on the subject.  In 
addition, these explanations satisfy the criteria required not just for mechanistic models, 
but also for genuinely explanatory models.
  As medical professionals, endocrinologists investigating the causal pathways 
behind psychosexual developmental endpoints are more concerned with mechanistic 
explanations of the relevant phenomena, as opposed to delineating the underlying 
ontological categories.  
333
First, mechanistic explanations, in order to fully account for the phenomena they 
are meant to explain, must begin with an accurate and complete account of those 
phenomena.  For instance, in order to develop an etiological explanation of the 
development of secondary sex characteristics, endocrinologists must start with an 
adequate taxonomy of the phenotypes underlying those characteristics.
   
334
                                                 
332 In their introduction to the special issue of Studies in the History and Philosophy of Biology 
and Biomedical Sciences, Craver and Darden stress that, historically, the concept of mechanism 
and mechanistic explanation has varied from time to time and from thinker to thinker: 
 It took many 
 
For some, the mechanical philosophy is associated primarily with atomism or other 
varieties of materialism.  For some, its central feature is the rejection of teleology and the 
rejection of explanation via Aristotelian forms.  For some, it is associated with 
mathematical description.  For others, it is characterized in terms of a few basic kinds of 
machines. 
 
Craver, C., and Lindley Darden (2005). "Introduction." Studies in the History and Philosophy of 
Biology and Biomedical Sciences 36: 233-244.  
 
333 Craver, C. (2007). Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience. 
New York, Oxford University Press. 
 
334 My most up-to-date endocrinology textbook catalogues more than a dozen variations of the 
XX “versus” XY genotypes. 
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years for scientists to disambiguate the categories of homosexual, transsexual, and 
hermaphrodite.  As scientists investigated the etiologies, these categories became 
sharpened, which in turn aided the discovery of mechanisms.  More generally, it makes 
common sense that, if one is to explain how a phenomenon comes about, one must start 
with some sort of definition of that phenomenon. 
Second, a complete characterization of the phenomena requires knowing the 
conditions under which they fail to occur, not just standard precipitating conditions.  
Building endocrine theories of the etiology of sex-dimorphic phenomena requires 
explaining atypical outcomes, not just typical outcomes.  For instance, researchers, after 
the implementation of tests to determine XX or XY configuration, were surprised to find 
some individuals who were XY but phenotypically female.335  The question was to 
determine under what conditions the presence of a Y chromosome does not result in a 
male phenotype.  Later research discovered two conditions under which the development 
of a male phenotype failed to occur: a mutation of the SRY region (sex determining 
region of the Y chromosome) that renders it inactive thus abrogating the process of 
phenotypic masculinization, and complete androgen insensitivity syndrome (CAIS), 
wherein the fetal testes produce testosterone, but the body’s tissues fail to respond to it.336
                                                 
335 There also exist individuals who possess the XX genotype yet are phenotypically male.  The 
sex determining region of the Y chromosome (that which encodes for the production of Sertoli 
cells, causing a chain reaction that usually results in the male phenotype) is located on the very 
top part of the short arm of the Y chromosome.  As such, it is quite susceptible to the genetic 
phenomenon of “cross-over” – whereby chromosomes exchange genetic information by crossing 
over (and hence substituting) their arms.  (This phenomenon was illuminated by feminist icon 
Barbara McClintock.) 
  
 
336 See, for instance, Bancroft, J., and Niels Skakkebeak (1978). Androgens and Human Sexual 
Behavior. Symposium on Sex, Hormones and Behaviour, London, Excepta Medica.; Carter, C. S. 
(2002). Hormonal Influences on Human Sexual Behavior. Behavioral Endocrinology. B. Becker, 
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Discovering under which conditions phenomena fail to occur helps to fulfill the 
third requirement.  Not only do researchers need to know the conditions under which 
phenomena fail to occur, they also need to know their modulating conditions.  In other 
words, they must be able to explain know how variations in the background conditions 
alter the phenomena.  The most famous example of this in the history of endocrinology is 
the long-term research program dedicated to examining the behavioral consequences of 
prenatal androgen exposure in human genetic females due to a condition known as 
congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH).  While the precise background hormonal 
modulations could be neither controlled nor modulated for ethical reasons, individuals 
with this condition were considered to be medical models of the modulating effects of 
androgens.  
Because there are only two typical psychosexual developmental outcomes within 
the field of behavioral endocrinology (as informed by the organization/activation model), 
any manipulation and/or investigation of modulating conditions involves the creation of 
non-standard conditions.  In contrast with human models, scientists can deliberately 
create non-standard precipitating conditions in laboratory animals.  
Finally: 
 
The variety of by-products or side-effects of the phenomena can be crucial for 
distinguishing “how-possibly” from “how-actually” models; for distinguishing 
explanatory sketches from complete mechanistic models.337
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Crews and McCarthy. Cambridge, MIT Press.; and Wilson, J. D. (2001). "Androgens, Androgen 
Receptors, and Male Gender Role Behavior." Hormones and Behavior 40: 358 - 366. 
337 Craver, unpublished manuscript 
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 Determining “how-possibly” from “how-actually” explanations has been a 
hallmark of endocrinological research.  While endocrinologists have discovered a 
remarkable number of “how-actually” models,338
 
 hypotheses about the etiology of 
homosexuality and transsexuality remain firmly in the realm of the possible.  As such, the 
endocrine model of these phenomena fails to be genuinely explanatory on mechanistic 
grounds.  However, obtaining an explanatory model on this account is clear, if far from 
simple: discover the mechanisms. 
 
III. Mechanistic Investigations into Neurological Substrates 
 
 In the late 1960s, researchers began to discover sex differences in the neural 
structure of rats.  One neural structure in particular, the medial preoptic area, received 
special attention.  Before these discoveries, the belief that early hormone exposure could 
permanently alter the structure of the brain (and hence behavior) rested on indirect 
evidence – specifically, behavioral evidence from lab animals.  Indirect as this evidence 
may have been, many scientists viewed it as confirming the organization/activation 
model, since “the nervous system controls behavior, (barring the existence of spirits or 
demons), sex differences in behavior imply that there are sex differences in neural 
structure.”339
                                                 
338 For instance, the testes determination pathway or the positive gonadotropic feedback loop that 
supports ovulation. 
 
 
339 Breedlove, S. M., and Hampson, Elizabeth (2002). Sexual Differentiation of the Brain and 
Behavior. Behavioral Endocrinology. B. Becker, Crews and McCarthy. Cambridge, MIT Press.  
As Craver and Darden point out, historically, one prominent idea associated with the term 
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 The organization/activation model provided the impetus to search for the 
neurological basis of sexually dimorphic behavior.  In their extensive 1998 review of the 
principles and mechanisms of sexual differentiation of the brain, Cooke et. al. point out 
that sex differences observed in the behavior of lab animals foreshadowed the discovery 
of sex dimorphism in brain structure: 
 
In the wake of Alfred Jost’s pioneering work explicating the role of testicular 
hormones in organizing internal and external genitalia of mammals, Phoenix, 
Goy, Gerall and Young [1959] suggested an extension of these ideas to the brain.  
Based on inferences from the behavior of guinea pigs, they proposed that 
testicular steroids could permanently alter the developing nervous system to make 
it more likely to display masculine behaviors, and less likely to display feminine 
behaviors, in adulthood.340
 
 
This proposal, it may be recalled, contrasted the well-understood short-term 
effects of hormones with their long-lasting organizational effects.  Besides introducing 
this distinction, Cooke et. al. claim that: 
 
Perhaps the most important contribution of the organizational hypothesis was to 
draw attention to the question of why males and females behave differently.  After 
this landmark paper [1959] the question was refined to, “what is different about 
males and females that causes them to behave differently?”  Once this question 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘mechanism’ is that they are naturalized: “[O]ne need not appeal to occult objects or properties to 
explain their working.” Craver, C., and Lindley Darden (2005). "Introduction." Studies in the 
History and Philosophy of Biology and Biomedical Sciences 36: 233-244. 
 
340 Cooke, B., et. al. (1998). "Sexual Differentiation of the Vertebrate Brain: Principles and 
Mechanisms." Frontiers in Neuroendocrinology 19: 323 - 362. 
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was posed, the most obvious potential answer was that the brains of males and 
females were structurally different.341
 
 
 As a result of this shift in emphasis from external factors (learning) to internal 
ones, scientists promptly began to investigate the possibility of structural differences 
between male and female brains responsible for sex-dimorphic behavior.  The most 
obvious difference – the presence or absence of the feedback loop responsible for 
ovulation – had been known for some time, although scientists had not yet determined the 
exact mechanisms.  But because it was not obvious how this related to sex-dimorphic 
behavior, scientists interested in pinpointing the loci of masculine and feminine behavior 
did not pursue this.    
 Instead, they looked for other structural differences, with the hope of correlating 
these structures with specific aspects of sex-dimorphic behavior.  They found three 
general categories of anatomical sexual dimorphism.  The first category involves 
ultrastructural differences in cellular or synaptic organelles.  Here, ‘ultrastructure’ refers 
to those elements in the brain too small to be observed, even with technological aids.  As 
such, discussions of the ultrastructure invoke the overall functional structure of neurons. 
The second category involves differences in synaptic or dendritic organization.  A 
synapse defines the contact region between two nerve cells, where nerve impulses are 
transmitted from one cell to another, while a dendrite is the branching process of a neuron 
that conducts impulses towards the cell.   
                                                 
341 Ibid. 
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The final category involves differences in the gross volume of defined cell 
groups, i.e., size and shape differences in anatomical structures. This is sometimes 
referred to as ‘cytoarchitecture,’ and, because it does not invoke “unobservables” (in 
contrast to studies of ultrastructure), nor suffered the same technological limitations of 
investigations of synapses and dendrites (at the time), was much more amenable as a 
method of investgation.  As a result, it has been the primary focus of research into the 
neurological substrates correlated with homosexuality342 and, as I discuss later, 
transsexuality.343
                                                 
342 In discussing the resurgence of research on sex differences in the 1970s, Geert de Vries and 
Patricia Boyle note that: 
 
 
Sex differences in structures involved in reproduction were typically associated with sex 
differences in the functions regulated by those structures.  Consequently, such sex 
differences were believed to help solve the question of how brain structure contributes to 
brain function.  For example, sex differences in the medial preoptic area (MPOA), e.g. in 
the size of certain cell clusters, or in the distribution of certain transmitters, have often 
been linked to sex differences in male sexual behavior . . . These associations perpetuate 
the idea that sex differences in the brain generate sex differences in functions regulated 
by the brain. 
 
De Vries, G. J., and Boyle, Patricia (1998). "Double Duty for Sex Differences in the Brain." 
Behavioural Brain Research 92: 205 - 213.  
 
343 Louis Gooren, in his 1990 review of endocrinological investigations into transsexualism, 
writes: 
 
The main regions of the brain involved with the sexual differentiation process are the 
hypothalamus, the preoptic area and the amygdala.  The brain systems underlying 
sexually dimorphic behavior are in close proximity to those involved in gonadotropin 
regulation.  The organization of the latter in animals also depends upon androgens.  
Thereofre, in lower animals, differentiation of gonadotropin as cyclic (normal in females) 
and tonic (normal in males) usually parallels the differentiation of sexually dimorphic 
behavior.  This close association between male/female dichotomy in brain differentiation 
and tonic/cyclic gonadotropic secretion has become the corner stone on investigations in 
humans with regard to the functional difference of their “sexual brains.” 
 
Gooren, L. (1990). "The Endocrinology of Transsexualism: A Review and Commentary." 
Psychoneuroendocrinology 15(1): 3 - 14. 
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 One of the first areas of sexual differentiation to be discovered was in the medial 
preoptic area, which is just anterior to the hypothalamus in rats (although many 
researchers consider it to be a part of the hypothalamus).  Researchers in the mid to late 
1950s discovered, through a combination of lesion and electrical stimulation studies, that 
the medial preoptic area was involved in regulating the sexual behavior of rats.344
In what follows, I review the scientific attempts to find the neurological basis for 
sex-dimorphic behavior.  Specifically, I discuss the three categories of neurological 
sexual dimorphism as they were discovered in the medial preoptic area of the rat.  The 
following subsection details the attempts to apply these discoveries to the human brain. 
 
Beginning in the early 1960’s lesion and electrical-stimulation studies of various parts of 
the continuum between the hypothalamus and the medial preoptic area either reduced or 
eliminated male mating behavior, but did not induce gonadal atrophy.  Some scientists 
interpreted these results as confirming Phoenix et. al.’s hypothesis that neural structures 
regulated sexual behavior, not gonadal hormones, and proceeded to study the medial 
preoptic area. 
 Two scientists inspired by the above-mentioned lesion and stimulation studies 
were Lennart Heimer and Knut Larsson, collaborating members of the University of 
Göteborg’s departments of anatomy and psychology, respectively.  As a result of the 
lesion studies in particular, they hypothesized that “the medial preoptic and anterior 
                                                 
344 Fisher (using electrical stimulation) concludes: “initial findings tentatively implicate the 
medial preoptic area in maternal behavior, and the lateral preoptic area in sexual behavior.” 
Fisher, A. (1956). ""Maternal and Sexual Behavior Induced by Intracranial Chemical 
Stimulation." Science 124(3214): 228 - 229. 
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hypothalamic regions . . . would seem to be a center for impulses influencing mating 
behavior.”345
To test this hypothesis, they induced lesions in every part of the hypothalamus 
(except the tuberal area, where lesions can impair circulation and the gonadotrophin 
feedback mechanism) in male rats.  They categorized the placement of these lesions as 
either within the medial preoptic – anterior hypothalamic continuum or outside of it.  
Within both of these areas, they created two kinds of lesions: small and large, thus 
creating four test groups.  The rats from all of these groups were then placed with 
receptive females, and their mating behavior observed.  Finally, they performed 
histological examinations of the rats’ brains in an attempt to correlate behavioral 
impairment with the specific size and placement of the lesions. 
 
Heimer and Larrson discovered that large lesions in the medial preoptic area 
permanently abolished sexual behavior.  Even when the rats were injected with 
testosterone, they failed to mount any females.346 In contrast, small lesions in this area 
impaired, but did not permanently eliminate, mating behavior.  Of the 42 rats in this 
group, 19 of them displayed sexual impairment. Injections of testosterone propionate 
could restore the mating behavior of these sexually impaired rats.347
However, within the group of rats that received small lesions in the continuum, 
Heimer and Larrson found that: 
 
                                                 
345 Heimer, L., and Larrson, Knut (1966). "Impairment of Mating Behavior in Male Rats 
Following Lesions in the Preoptic-Anterior Hypothalmic Continuum." Brain Research 3(2): 248 - 
263. 
 
346 Ibid. 
 
347 Ibid. 
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There was not any relationship neither between the location of the lesion within 
this area and the occurrence of an impairment of sexual behavior, nor between the 
size of the lesion and the behavior deficit.  These results suggest that there is no 
specific area of the [medial preoptic – anterior hypothalamic] continuum 
controlling sexual behavior.348
 
 
However, other results mitigated this seemingly negative finding.  Because both 
large and small lesions in the hypothalamic regions outside of the medial preoptic –  
anterior hypothalamic continuum did not appear to affect mating behavior, Heimer and 
Larsson conclude: 
 
It would seem that there exists, within the hypothalamus, besides a mechanism 
controlling the release of gonadotrophic hormones and thus via the hormonal 
system indirectly influencing the mating behavior, another neural mechanism 
which acts with relative independence of the pituitary function.349
 
 
That is to say, there appeared to be a neural mechanism other than that governing 
the positive or negative feedback loops that influenced sexual behavior.  While Heimer 
and Larsson are not so bold as to claim that this hypothesized mechanism directly 
influences mating behavior, their study established the possibility of another structural 
dimorphism besides that of the positive or negative feedback loop. 
                                                 
348 Ibid. 
 
349 Ibid. 
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This example of the first category of structural dimorphism was suggestive, but it 
did not reveal the specific area within the continuum responsible for regulating male 
mating behavior, nor did it shed any light on the mechanisms involved in female mating 
behavior.  However, this finding inspired endocrinologists to investigate this area of the 
brain more closely. 
The next major discovery of sex-dimorphism within the medial preoptic area 
involved differences of synaptic and dendritic organization.  The discoverers, Geoffrey 
Raisman and Pauline Field, were explicit about locating the cause of sex dimorphic 
behavior within the neural substrate: 
 
By investigating the structural organization of those parts of the central nervous 
system thought to be concerned in reproductive functions we have attempted to 
establish an anatomical basis for such functional dimorphism.350
 
 
Because previous studies had shown lesions of the medial preoptic area led to 
alterations in sexual behavior, Raisman and Field were intrigued by the possibility of 
sexual differences in the neural organization of this area.  They wanted to obtain a finer-
grained anatomical knowledge of the medial preoptic area with the hope that it could 
shed light on the functional dimorphism.  To this end, Raisman and Field looked for the 
possibility of sex dimorphism in the synaptic organization of the preoptic area.  The 
previous studies gave them a place to start: 
 
                                                 
350 Raisman, G., and Field, Pauline (1973). "Sexual Dimorphism in the Neuropil of the Preoptic 
Area of the Rat and its Dependence on Neonatal Androgen." Ibid. 54: 1 - 29. 
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The characteristic sexual differences in the control of gonadotropins and certain 
aspects of mating behaviour depend not on the genetic sex of the animal but upon 
whether the brain has been exposed to androgen during a critical perinatal period 
of development.  This has led to the view that the preoptic area is a specific site 
for the action of androgen in sexual differentiation.351
 
 
A preliminary series of experiments focused upon the neuropil of the preoptic 
area.  (A neuropil is a dense feltwork of interwoven cytoplasmic processes of nerve cells 
– dendrites and axons – and of neuroglial cells – which provide structural and functional 
support –  in the gray matter of the central nervous system).  Raisman and Field found 
that the neuropil in this area has more non-strial (that is, non-amygdaloid) synaptic 
contacts on dendritic spines in the female than in the male.352
 
 Combining this information 
from these previous studies with the view that the preoptic area is a specific site for 
androgen action in sexual differentiation, Raisman and Field hypothesized that: 
                                                 
351 Ibid. 
 
352 Ibid.  They describe their findings as follows: 
 
In normal females the number of non-amygdaloid synapses on dendritic spines in the 
preoptic area is higher than in the male.  The suggestion that this difference could be 
related to the ability of the female to maintain a cyclic pattern of gonadotrophin release 
and/or behavioral oestrus is supported by published work implicating the preoptic area in 
the control of ovulation and mating behaviour.  
 
Raisman, G., and Field, Pauline (1973). "Sexual Dimorphism in the Neuropil of the Preoptic Area 
of the Rat and its Dependence on Neonatal Androgen." Brain Research 54: 1 - 29. 
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If such a structural difference is indeed correlated with sexually dimorphic 
functions such as ovulation, then it too should be determined by the presence or 
absence of androgens during the first few days after birth in the rat.353
 
 
To test this hypothesis, Raisman and Field cut the axons projecting from the stria 
terminalis, a tract of fibers projecting from the amygdala to the preoptic area and the 
ventromedial nuclei of the tuberal hypothalamus.354
They used six groups of rats: (1) untreated adult females; (2) adult females treated 
with testosterone propionate on the 16th day of life (well after the critical period for neural 
sexual differentiation); (3) adult males castrated at birth; (4) adult females treated with 
testosterone propionate on the 4th day of life; (5) intact adult males; and (6) males 
castrated on the 7th day of life.  The castrated males were treated (as adults) with estrogen 
followed by progesterone in order to induce female behavior. 
 Their goal was to determine what 
synapses would survive in the medial preoptic area in the presence (or absence) of 
androgens.  
For convenience, Raisman and Field referred to the first three groups as ‘cyclic 
(describing their presumed pattern of gonadotrophin release) and the remaining three 
groups as ‘non-cyclic.’355
                                                 
353 Raisman, G., and Field, Pauline (1973). "Sexual Dimorphism in the Neuropil of the Preoptic 
Area of the Rat and its Dependence on Neonatal Androgen." Brain Research 54: 1 - 29. 
 After the test animals had reached adulthood, and their sexual 
 
354 Anatomically, therefore: 
 
[T]he stria terminalis links the amygdala with the preoptic area and the tuberal 
hypothalamus, all areas that have been implicated in the control of gonadotrophin release. 
 
Raisman, G., and Field, Pauline (1971). "Sexual Dimorphism in the Preoptic Area of the Rat." 
Science 173(3998): pp. 731 - 733. 
355 Raisman, G., and Field, Pauline (1973). "Sexual Dimorphism in the Neuropil of the Preoptic 
Area of the Rat and its Dependence on Neonatal Androgen." Brain Research 54: 1 - 29. 
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responses tested, they took ultrathin sections from both the preoptic area and the 
ventromedial nucleus of the animals. 
Raisman and Field found sexual dimorphism in a specific part of the preoptic 
area, the part of the preoptic area traversed by the stria terminalis (a tract of fibers that 
links the amygdala to the preoptic area), which they named the “strial part of the preoptic 
area.”356
They classified and counted synapses in this area, finding that normal females had 
more synapses on dendritic spines and fewer synapses on dendritic shafts than males.  (In 
other words, females had more synapses of a non-strial origin and fewer synapses of 
strial origin in this area than males.)  In contrast, normal males had more synapses on 
dendritic shafts and fewer synapses on dendritic spines than females (i.e., more synapses 
of strial origin).
 It is a small, mid-dorsal part of the preoptic area, lying just beneath the anterior 
commissure, and contains prominent bundles of myelinated axons. When sectioned, it is 
vaguely triangular in shape. Synapses originating from the strial area are located on 
dendritic shafts, while synapses originating from other areas of the brain are located on 
dendritic spines.  
357
                                                                                                                                                 
 
   
356 Ibid. 
 
357 Raisman and Field created “maps” to correlate the ultrastructural observations with the 
information gleaned from light microscopy.  These maps were based on a classification of axon 
terminals and other structures.  The axon terminals were divided according to their mode of 
termination on cell bodies, dendritic shafts or spines, and further subdivided into three groups 
according to the number of dense core vesicles present.  Combining the information, they 
reconstructed two maps, one for the normal male and the other for the normal female.  These 
maps illustrate several features, one of which is a sex-dimorphic region (defined as the area 
containing more than ten percent of synapses on dendritic spines).  This region was significantly 
larger in females than in males.  Ibid. 
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In addition, and crucially for the organization/activation hypothesis, early 
androgen manipulation could reverse the sex difference normally seen in adulthood.  In 
normal females, females treated late in life with androgens, and in males castrated at birth 
and later treated with estrogens and progestins (all of which Raisman and Field labeled 
‘cyclic’), the number of non-strial spine synapses found in the preoptic area was 
significantly higher than the non-cyclic groups.  Likewise, normal males, castrated 
females treated early in life with androgens, and males castrated later in life (after the 
critical period) all displayed a “masculine” synaptic development.358
Before Raisman and Field’s report, while many scientists accepted Phoenix et. 
al.’s hypothesis that differences in sexual behavior reflected sex differences in brain 
structure, it was entirely plausible to argue that the differences in behavior were (merely) 
the result of functional brain differences.  That is to say, the behavioral changes seen 
following early hormone treatments need not imply any specific structural brain changes 
whatsoever.  But, as Gorski makes plain, Raisman and Field’s report confirmed that the 
sex difference in function resulted from a sex difference in neural structure. 
 
In the case at hand, it appeared that the structural sexual dimorphism found by 
Raisman and Field was correlated with the functional sexual dimorphism of positive or 
negative gonadotropic feedback response.  While these researchers were not rash enough 
to suggest that correlation implies causation, this discovery lent credence to the 
hypothesis that cyclicity or acyclicity (that is, a positive or negative feedback response) 
could serve as a functional marker for masculine or feminine neural structures.  (Later 
research included handedness, certain cognitive skills such as visuo-spatial ability, and a 
                                                 
358 Ibid. 
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variety of other traits as such markers.)  In addition, this functional marker of “cyclicity” 
was to play an important role in theories about human neural sexual differentiation, 
specifically, in terms of distinguishing male from female brains, and hence heterosexual 
from homosexual brains.359
Raisman and Field’s report was tremendously influential, in part because it 
confirmed the prediction of the organization/activation model that early androgen 
exposure could permanently organize neural structure, not just function. Cooke et. al., for 
instance, claim that:  
 
 
The widely accepted view that the brains of males and females must be 
structurally different was confirmed by Raisman and Field’s [1973] seminal 
report that female rats had a greater proportion of certain synaptic types in the 
preoptic area (POA) than did males.360
 
 
In addition to confirming Phoenix et. al.’s initial hypothesis, Raisman and Field’s 
work opened up exciting new venues in neuroendocrinology. Endocrinologist Melissa 
Hines writes: 
 
                                                 
359 In his book, The Sexual Brain, Simon LeVay states: 
 
The discovery of this anatomical dimorphism [in the medial preoptic area] has been an 
important element in the elucidation of the mechanisms by which the sexual 
differentiation of the brain comes about. 
 
 LeVay, S. (1993). The Sexual Brain. Cambridge, The MIT Press. 
 
360 Cooke, B., et. al. (1998). "Sexual Differentiation of the Vertebrate Brain: Principles and 
Mechanisms." Frontiers in Neuroendocrinology 19: 323 - 362. 
 
 212 
This discovery [by Raisman and Field] revolutionized thought regarding the 
neural mechanisms involved in sexual differentiation of the brain.  There was now 
growing confidence that the parts of the brain that determined sexual behavior 
could be identified, that at least some of the neural sex differences underlying 
behavioral sex differences were structural, and that the neural sex differences and 
the mechanisms involved in their development could be studied directly.361
 
 
As such, sex differences in behavior potentially could be correlated sex 
differences in brain structure.  Specifically, Raisman and Field’s study opened up the 
possibility for scientists to trace the causal path from gonadal hormones to brain 
structure, from brain structure to function, and from brain function to behavior. 
This report by Raisman and Field inspired a flurry of other studies into sexual 
dimorphism in the brain, as it provided a starting point for linking function to structure.  
In addition, it set up the medial pre-optic area as the anatomical model for sexual 
dimorphism in the brain.  For instance, Randy Nelson, author of the 2005 Introduction to 
Behavioral Endocrinology, writes: 
 
Since this early [1973] report, more obvious structural sex differences have been 
reported.  Because of its prominent role in the mediation of mating behavior in 
several species, the preoptic area (POA) of the hypothalamus has received special 
attention.362
 
 
                                                 
361 Hines, M. (2004). Brain Gender. New York, Oxford University Press. 
 
362 Nelson, R. J. (2005). An Introduction to Behavioral Endocrinology. Sunderland, Sinauer 
Associates. 
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Much of neuroendocrinology since has been (and continues to be) concerned with 
connecting functional neurological differences between the sexes to differences in 
anatomical structure.  In addition, the field of behavioral endocrinology aims to connect 
behavioral to structural differences. 
Of the studies inspired by Raisman and Field’s findings, the most dramatic results 
came from a 1978 study by Roger Gorski and his colleagues.363
 
  By that time, Gorski and 
his colleagues agreed that: 
The concept of the sexual differentiation of brain function is now well 
established, particularly with regard to the regulation of gonadotropin secretion, 
male and female sexual behavior, the regulation of food intake and body weight, 
and aggressive behavior.364
 
 
 As mentioned earlier, one of the goals of endocrinology at this time was to link 
function to structure – that is, to find the neural substrates responsible for the sexually 
dimorphic behavior mentioned above.  This general research goal is akin to Robert 
                                                 
363 More than a decade later, Gorski writes that, in 1973: 
 
Raisman and Field published a study of great importance.  They reported that at the 
ultrastructural level there was a significant sex difference in terms of the number of 
dendritic spine synapses of non-strial origin in the MPOA; females have significantly 
more of such synapses.  Importantly, they demonstrated that the number of synapses 
followed the “rules of sexual differentiation.” That is, males castrated at birth, or females 
exposed to androgen after the period of sexual differentiation had a large (female-like) 
number of synapses, whereas androgenized females or males castrated after the period of 
sexual differentiation had fewer (i.e., the masculine pattern) of synapses of this type. 
 
Gorski, R. A. (1984). "Critical Role for the Medial Preoptic Area in the Sexual Differentiation of 
the Brain." Progress in Brain Research 61: Sex Differences in the Brain: 129 - 146. 
 
364 Gorski, R. A., et. al. (1978). "Evidence for a Morphological Sex Difference Within the Medial 
Preoptic Area of the Rat Brain." Brain Research 148(2): 333 - 346. 
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Cummins’ philosophical account of the role of “function-ascribing” statements in 
science.  In his now-classic 1975 article, he provides a schematic reconstruction of 
function-ascribing statements: 
 
X functions as a φ in S (or the function of X in S is to φ) relative to an analytic 
account A of S’s capacity to ψ just in case X is capable of φ-ing in S and A 
appropriately and adequately accounts for S’s capacity to ψ by, in part, appealing 
to the capacity of X to φ in S.365
 
  
 In this account of mechanistic explanation, S is a system with the capacity to ψ, 
while X is a component of system S that has the capacity to φ.  As such, analytical 
account A is an explanation of how a system is able to ψ, given its ability to φ.  In the 
case of endocrinology, system S is the mammalian organism, X is a hormone, φ is the 
physiological action of the hormone, and ψ is a developmental endpoint.   
Notably, Gorski et. al. claim that the concept of the sexual differentiation of brain 
function assumes that: 
 
Those functions recognized as ‘masculine’ in the adult are at least partially the 
result of the action of testicular hormones on the developing brain, which is 
undifferentiated and/or inherently female.  Although this concept of a permanent 
or organizing action of the hormonal environment on neuronal differentiation and 
development is of considerable importance to both neuroendocrinology and 
neuroscience in general, the mechanism of this effect is poorly understood.366
                                                 
365 Cummins, R. (1975). "Functional Analysis." Journal of Philosophy 72: 741-765. 
 
366 Gorski, R. A., et. al. (1978). "Evidence for a Morphological Sex Difference Within the Medial 
Preoptic Area of the Rat Brain." Brain Research 148(2): 333 - 346. 
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 In order to shed some light on this mechanism, Gorski and colleagues carried out 
an analysis of the possible effects of the prenatal hormone environment on the brain of 
the adult rat.  Describing the preoptic area as “an extensively studied model of sexual 
differentiation,”367
 Gorski et. al. conducted two experiments.  In the first, adult rats were 
gonadectomized, than treated with either a combination of estradiol benzoate and 
progesterone, testosterone, or nothing.  The first combination was meant to induce a 
positive feedback response (cyclicity), testosterone meant to induce a negative feedback 
response, with the final group acting as a control.  The rats were “sacrificed” either two 
or five to six weeks later, and their brains examined.  Gorski et. al. found that: 
 they focused on the gross volume of various substructures in the 
medial preoptic nucleus.  (This is the third category of sexual dimorphism mentioned 
earlier.) 
 
These treatments did not affect the sexual dimorphism in the MPON [medial 
preoptic nucleus] and, in all groups, nuclear volume in the male animals was 
significantly greater than that of females whether nuclear volume was expressed 
in absolute terms or relative brain weight.368
 
 
 Thus implying that sexual dimorphism within the medial preoptic area did not 
depend upon adult hormone levels – reinforcing the importance of critical periods in 
development.  Gorski and his colleagues found the (absolute) volume of the medial 
                                                 
367 Ibid. 
 
368 Ibid. 
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preoptic area in males to be up to eight times greater than in females.369
 The second experiment used 23 rats of both sexes.  The females were injected 
with either large or small amounts of testosterone propionate, or used as controls.  The 
males were either castrated neonatally or used as controls.  After they grew to aduldhood, 
the rats were sacrificed and subjected to histological examination.
  (When 
calculated relative to brain size, it is up to five times greater.)  
370
 The neonatally castrated male rats in this second group displayed a significant 
reduction in medial preoptic area volume compared to male rats castrated later in life, 
after the period of sexual differentiation of the brain.  In addition, both the neonatally 
castrated males and the females injected with the large doses of testosterone propionate 
displayed medial preoptic areas larger than those of control females.  Further 
investigation showed that late-castrated males had a preoptic area larger than any other of 
the groups in the experiment.
 
371
 Pulling all of these results together, they concluded: 
 
                                                 
369 Ibid.  
  
370 Ibid. 
 
371 Ibid.  In his discussion of mechanisms and role functions, Craver claims that the active 
organization of mechanisms depends upon the spatial and temporal organization of their 
components: 
 
The same entities and activities, strung together in different spatial and temporal relations 
to one another, can yield very different mechanisms.  One understands a mechanism by 
discovering its component entities and activities, and by learning how their activities are 
spatially and temporally organized. 
 
Craver, C. (2001). "Role Functions, Mechanisms, and Hierarchy." Philosophy of Science 68(1): 
53 - 74. While the organization/activation model is founded upon temporal organization, the 
activities of the secretions of the ductless glands do not depend upon their physical location 
within the body. 
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The major findings of this present study are that there is a gross morphological 
sexual dimorphism in the MPON [medial preoptic nucleus] of the rat, a sexual 
dimorphism which is independent of the hormone environment of the adult, but 
one that is at least partially determined by the prenatal environment.  The fact that 
volume of the MPON of the neonatally castrated male is not equivalent to that of 
the female, or that this volume in the androgenized female fails to reach that of 
the male castrated at weaning, suggests that partial differentiation may occur 
prenatally, and/or that the volume of the MPON is influenced by the neuronal 
genome.372
 
 
Because the density of neurons per unit within this region is greater than that of 
the surrounding tissue, Gorski and his colleagues considered this to be a nucleus, which 
they named the ‘sexually-dimorphic nucleus of the POA’ (SDN-POA).373
 This sex-dimorphism of the POA “conforms beautifully to both the organizational 
and the aromatization hypothesis.”
 
374
                                                 
372 Gorski, R. A., et. al. (1978). "Evidence for a Morphological Sex Difference Within the Medial 
Preoptic Area of the Rat Brain." Brain Research 148(2): 333 - 346. 
 Not only did castration of males on the day of birth 
cause their SDN-POAs to be smaller (i.e., less masculine) in adulthood, androgen 
treatment of newborn females caused their SDN-POAs to be larger in adulthood.  Adult 
hormone manipulations do not alter the volume in either sex.  Further investigation 
showed that the greater the early androgen exposure, the larger the SDN-POA.  In 
addition, prenatal treatment with estradiol produced the same type of masculinizing effect 
 
373 Gorski, R. A. (1979). "The Neuroendocrinology of Reproduction: An Overview." Biology of 
Reproduction 20(1): 111 - 127. 
 
374 Cooke, B., et. al. (1998). "Sexual Differentiation of the Vertebrate Brain: Principles and 
Mechanisms." Frontiers in Neuroendocrinology 19: 323 - 362. 
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as did testosterone.  For Gorski and his colleagues, this suggested that the sex-
dimorphism of the POA was due to prenatal androgens and their metabolites, rather than 
a “neuronal genome.”  
It was thought that the sexually-dimorphic nucleus of the preoptic area (SDN-
POA) might provide an anatomical signature of androgen’s influence upon the rat 
nervous system, and thus serve as a model for neural sexual differentiation in general.  A 
year after the publication of his 1978375 report, Gorski, noting that “it would be very 
helpful if one could identify a clear signature of sexual differentiation upon which 
appropriate studies could be focused,” claims that he and his colleagues “presently 
believe that we have discovered such a clear signature,”376
 But positing sexual dimorphism in the medial preoptic area as the neural substrate 
for sexually dimorphic behavior is not so easy, as the function of the SDN-POA remains 
a mystery.  To use Craver’s terminology, while the SDN-POA served as a how-actually 
model of androgen’s influence upon a specific neural structure, it remained a how-
 namely, the SDN-POA.  
Specifically, Gorski and his colleagues found that, in rats, the medial preoptic area was 
significantly larger in males than in females.  
                                                 
375 Gorski, R. A., et. al. (1978). "Evidence for a Morphological Sex Difference Within the Medial 
Preoptic Area of the Rat Brain." Brain Research 148(2): 333 - 346. 
 
376 Gorski, R. A. (1979). "The Neuroendocrinology of Reproduction: An Overview." Biology of 
Reproduction 20(1): 111 - 127.  Reflecting upon the decade of studies performed by his research 
group, Gorski writes: 
 
We thus submit that the SDN-POA is a morphological signature of the organizational 
effects of gonadal hormones on the developing brain.  Because the magnitude of the sex 
difference in SDN-POA, we believe this nucleus can serve as a model system to 
investigate possible mechanisms by which gonadal hormones act to differentiate the brain 
sexually. 
 
Gorski, R. A. (1984). "Critical Role for the Medial Preoptic Area in the Sexual Differentiation of 
the Brain." Progress in Brain Research 61: Sex Differences in the Brain: 129 - 146. 
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possibly model for sexually dimorphic behavior.  In their initial 1978 report, Gorski et. al. 
caution: 
 
Although it is tempting to consider that the morphological differences in the 
MPON may be a reflection of a fundamentally sexually dimorphic function that 
may be served by these cells, it must be pointed out that the identity of these cells 
as neurons is not firmly established.377
 
  
Later research shed no light on the functional significance of the sexually 
dimorphic area of this region.  Researchers following up on Heimer and Larson’s work 
found that destroying the sexually dimorphic area of the hypothalamus in rats of either 
sex (while sparing the non-dimorphic parts of the medial preoptic area) does not affect 
their sexual behavior.  Specifically, lesions of only this sex-dimorphic area of the POA in 
females have no effect on their mating cycles or behavior.378 Likewise, if only the SDN-
POA is lesioned in males, they continue to display normal mating patterns, but, in some 
cases, exhibit temporary or mild impairment.379
                                                 
377 Gorski, R. A., et. al. (1978). "Evidence for a Morphological Sex Difference Within the Medial 
Preoptic Area of the Rat Brain." Brain Research 148(2): 333 - 346. 
   
 
378 Arendash, G., and Roger Gorski (1983). "Effects of Discrete Lesions of the Sexually 
Dimorphic Nucleus of the Preoptic Area or Other Medial Preoptic Regions on the Sexual 
Behavior of Male Rats." Brain Research Bulletin 10(1): 147 - 154. 
 
379 De Jonge, F., et. al. (1989). "Lesions of the SDN-POA Inhibit Sexual Behavior of Male Wistar 
Rats." Ibid. 23(6): 483 - 492.  More than a decade later, Cooke et. al. note that: 
 
The function of the SDN-POA in rats remains disappointingly uncertain.  Lesions limited 
to the SDN portion of the POA have either no discernible effect on behavior, or only a 
subtle and transient effect on male mating behaviors. 
 
Cooke, B., et. al. (1998). "Sexual Differentiation of the Vertebrate Brain: Principles and 
Mechanisms." Frontiers in Neuroendocrinology 19: 323 - 362. 
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IV. Reaction of the Scientific Community 
 
 Except for two not very interesting exceptions (the avian song control system in 
the zebra finch and androgen-dependent penile spinal reflexes in the male rat) none of the 
three kinds of neuroanatomic differences (ultrastructural, synaptic, and cytoarchitectural) 
can be correlated with specific sexually differentiated nervous system functions.380
 In spite of this lack of correlation between the functional and the structural:  
  
 
A general hypothesis has been formulated for the mechanism of CNS [central 
nervous system] sexual differentiation which has much in common with the 
model for differentiation of the peripheral reproductive tract . . . in mammals, the 
intrinsic pattern is female, with differentiation towards masculine patterns of 
gonadotropin secretion and behavior occurring in the male as a result of exposure 
to testicular hormones during development.381
 
   
The scientific community, as a whole, quickly accepted this general hypothesis.  
For instance, just three years aft Gorski et. al. published their 1978 paper, Robert Rubin 
et. al., in their review of studies attempting to extend the work on lab animals to humans, 
begin by noting that: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
380 MacLusky, N. J., and Naftolin, Frederick (1981). "Sexual Differentiation of the Central 
Nervous System." Science 211(4488): 1294 - 1303. 
 
381 Ibid. 
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For many sexually dimorphic behaviors (those differing in males and females), it 
seems necessary that the male CNS be exposed to increased levels of gonadal 
steroids during early development and that the female not experience this early 
hormonal stimulation.  For some behaviors, this early hormonal exposure is all 
that appears to be of consequence.382
 
 
As a result of the aforementioned research, the medial preoptic area became the 
model for central nervous system masculinization.  It was hoped that this model could 
shed light on the causal, and hence mechanistic, path from the secretion of gonadal 
hormones to later (particularly adult) behavior. 
Roger Gorski, in his 1984 introduction to a special issue of Progress in Brain 
Research dedicated to the relation between structure and function of sex differences in 
the brain, writes: 
 
Recent studies of structural sex differences reinforce the importance of the MPOA 
in the sexual differentiation of the rat brain.  This statement does not imply that 
the MPOA is the only, the principle, or even the most critical site of sexual 
differentiation.  However, the MPOA, or, more precisely, a smaller component of 
this area [the SDN-POA], does represent a major site of hormone action 
(presumably direct, although this is yet to be established) and offers a model 
system for mechanistic studies which heretofore have been impossible.383
 
 
 To this day, endocrinologists (as well as others) consider the sexual dimorphism 
found in the preoptic area of the rat brain to be the classic model for the influence of 
                                                 
382 Rubin, R., et. al. Ibid."Postnatal Gonadal Steroid Effects on Human Behavior." 1318 - 1324. 
 
383 Gorski, R. A. (1984). "Critical Role for the Medial Preoptic Area in the Sexual Differentiation 
of the Brain." Progress in Brain Research 61: Sex Differences in the Brain: 129 - 146. 
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gonadal hormones on brain structure.  Specifically, most scientists now use the medial 
preoptic area as the general model for sexual dimorphism in the brain.  Twenty years 
after Gorski published the above-quoted article, Cooke et. al. write: 
 
Perhaps the most widely known animal model for neural sexual dimorphism is 
found in the rat medial preoptic area (mPOA).  The mPOA appears to be a crucial 
element in reproductive behavior and endocrine status in rats.384
 
 
 Furthermore, the authors of a recent review in the journal Endocrinology point out 
that the work of endocrinologists on animals demonstrates that: 
 
In mammalian models, a testicular hormonal signal – androgen – masculinizes the 
developing genitalia and also masculinizes the developing brain.  For a wide 
variety of behaviors, we can arrange for an animal to display either typically 
male-like or typically female-like behaviors, or something in between, just by 
manipulating androgen levels at the right time in development.  For most 
behaviors, a single exposure of androgen early in life will masculinize the 
animal’s brain and behavior forever.  The rat SDN-POA conformed to this notion 
beautifully: males deprived of androgen early in life display a small SDN-POA in 
                                                 
384 Cooke, B., et. al. (1998). "Sexual Differentiation of the Vertebrate Brain: Principles and 
Mechanisms." Frontiers in Neuroendocrinology 19: 323 - 362. In their tremendously influential 
extension of this model to human beings, Swaab and Hofman note that: 
 
The sexually dimorphic nucleus of the preoptic area (SDN-POA) of the hypothalamus, as 
first described in the rat by Gorski and colleagues, is still the most conspicuous 
morphological sex difference in the mammalian brain. 
 
Swaab, D., and Hofman, Michel (1995). "Sexual Differentiation of the Human Hypothalamus in 
Relation to Gender and Sexual Orientation." Trends in Neurosciences 18(6): 264 - 270. 
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adulthood, whereas females exposed to androgen during the perinatal period will 
display a large SDN-POA.385
 
 
 In addition to considering the SDN-POA to be an exemplar of androgen’s effects 
on development, and hence an exemplar for the organization/activation model, many 
scientists use the notion of the preoptic area as the anatomical signature of the 
organizational effects of androgens as the basis for further hypotheses.  These include 
hypotheses of cerebral lateralization, sex differences in cognitive abilities, and the 
etiology of homosexuality and transsexuality.   
The widespread acceptance of the organization/activation model of neurological 
development brought with it three foundational assumptions.  First, there is a notion of 
masculine or feminine exemplars: typical brains are either masculine or feminine, and 
this depends upon early hormone exposure.  Second, this neural organization is 
permanent, and, finally the nature of this organization can be determined by certain 
aspects of behavior. 
 
 
V. Application of Neurological Rat Studies to Humans 
 
 In spite of the mystery surrounding the function of the SDN-POA, 
endocrinologists quickly extended this model to humans.  The most obvious extension 
was to the ability or inability to support the positive gonadotropic response that can 
induce ovulation.  While this was used as a functional marker for feminine or masculine 
                                                 
385 Morris, J., et. al. (2006). "Brain Aromatase: Dyed-in-the-Wool Homosexuality." 
Endocrinology 145(2): 475 - 477. 
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neural development, it was not correlated with sex dimorphic behavior, and so was not 
extensively studied in and of itself.  Instead, researchers used a “two-pronged” approach: 
finding anatomical correlates to rodent neural structures; and examining the behavior of 
presumed human correlates to animal models of central nervous system masculinization.  
As the second prong is discussed in the fourth chapter, the following explores the first 
prong. 
 Taking their cue from the work initially done by Phoenix et. al. in 1959, and 
extending the SDN-POA model to human beings, Dutch endocrinologists Dick Swaab 
and Michel Hofman claim that: 
 
In analogy with observations in many mammalian species, the human brain might 
well undergo sexual differentiation during its development as a result of an 
organizing effect of sex hormones, and such a structural organization might be the 
basis for functional sex differences.386
 
 
 Inspired by Raisman and Field’s 1973 work on synaptic and dendritic 
organization, as well as by Gorski et. al.’s discovery of cytoarchitectural sex differences 
in rats,387
                                                 
386 Swaab, D., and Hofman, Michel (1995). "Sexual Differentiation of the Human Hypothalamus 
in Relation to Gender and Sexual Orientation." Trends in Neurosciences 18(6): 264 - 270. 
 Swaab and his colleague Fliers looked for a sex difference in the human 
 
387 While noting that they knew of no reports of sex difference in cell number for any part of the 
human brain, Swaab and Fliers point out that: 
 
Since Raisman and Field reported sex differences in the synaptic organization of the 
preoptic area of the rat, reports pertaining to gender-linked differences in many brain 
components throughout the animal kingdom have increased.  The most conspicuous of 
these sex differences was described by Gorski et. al. within the rat brain, in the preoptic 
area (POA). 
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analogue of the rat SDN-POA.  To this end, they examined the hypothamali of cadavers, 
with an eye towards high cell density and sexual dimorphism that marks the SDN-POA 
of rats. 
 After fixing the brains of thirteen men and eighteen women (between the ages of 
ten and ninety-three) in formalin for approximately a month, they took serial coronal 
sections from the hypothalamus and stained them.  Swaab and Fliers found a sexually 
dimorphic nucleus in the human POA that, as in the case of rats: 
 
[W]as characterized by its more intense staining, larger cell bodies, and higher 
cell density than the rest of the POA.  The SDN-POA was located in the medial 
POA, between the dorsolateral supraoptic nucleus and the rostral pole of the 
paraventricular nucleus.388
 
 
 Swaab and Fliers measured the shape, volume and cell density of this sexually 
dimorphic nucleus.  Dividing their human subjects into three age groups (10 – 40; 41 – 
70; 71 – 100), they found the SDN-POA volumes to be 2.2, 2.0, and 3.3 times larger in 
men than women, respectively.  When the SDN-POA volume was expressed as ratio to 
brain weight, the values were significantly larger in men than women for all age groups.  
The total cell number was 1.74, 1.96, and 2.75 times larger in men than women.  In 
addition, the maximum cross-sectional area was 2.1 times as large in men than in 
women.389
                                                                                                                                                 
Swaab, D., and Fliers, E. (1985). "A Sexually Dimorphic Nucleus in the Human Brain." Science 
228(4703): 1112 - 1115. 
   
 
388 Ibid. 
 
389 Ibid. 
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 Interestingly, Swaab and Fliers found that in both sexes the volume, cell number 
and maximal cross-sectional area of the SDN-POA decreased with age.  While this result 
had not been observed in animal tests, Swaab and Fliers did not assume that the decrease 
is due to the changing hormonal milieu of adulthood.  They did not make this assumption 
because of one of their test subjects, a forty-six year old woman who had been virilized 
by a tumor of the adrenal cortex.  Her SDN-POA measurements were similar to the other 
female values, “which is in agreement with Gorski’s (1978) data on the rat,” namely, that 
prenatal gonadal hormone exposure determined the size of the POA.390
 Noting that the function of the SDN-POA “is unknown in both the rat and 
humans,” Swaab and Fliers expressed hope that immunocytochemistry could be a potent 
technique for continuing study of this area.  (Immunocytochemistry is the technique by 
which an antibody is used to link a cellular antigen to a specific strain of cultured cells, so 
that the cells can be seen more easily with a microscope.) 
 
 In 1989, Laura Allen, along with Melissa Hines, James Shryne and Roger Gorski, 
inspired by recent technological advances (including immunocytochemistry), continued 
the project of correlating structural with functional sexual dimorphism.  They reported a 
second discovery of sexual dimorphism in the human brain.  Noting that, besides Swaab 
and Fliers’ report, earlier animal studies demonstated various sexual dimorphisms, they 
concluded that:  “Because the POA shows the greatest number of reported gender-related 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
390 Ibid.  On the face of it, it is odd that they could be so certain in this assumption on the basis of 
one test subject. 
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dimorphisms in other mammalian species, it is a likely site for similar differences in 
humans.”391
 
  However:  
Since there are no clear boundaries in the human brain between the POA and the 
anterior hypothalamus, and, in fact, some anatomists consider the POA to be the 
anterior region of the anterior hypothalamus, we selected the preoptic-anterior 
hypothalamic area (PO-AHA) for quantitative analysis of possible sexually 
dimorphic nuclei in the human brain.392
 
 
 To see if this possibility was an actuality, Allen and her colleagues examined the 
brains of twenty-two human subjects – eleven males and eleven females, all age matched.  
After fixing the brains in gelatin, taking coronal sections and staining them, Allen et. al. 
obtained the following results: 
 
Since we were unable to identify any cell group clearly homologous to a sexually 
dimorphic nucleus of another species, 4 relatively discrete cell groups within the 
PO-AHA that stained darkly with thionin were selected for analysis.393
 
 
Because these discrete groups had not been identified previously, they elected to 
name them the “Interstitial Nuclei of the Anterior Hypothalamus” (INAH) and number 
them one to four in a lateral to medial direction.  In addition, they analyzed the size of the 
supraoptic nucleus.  
                                                 
391 Allen, L., et. al. (1989). "Two Sexually Dimorphic Cell Groups in the Human Brain." The 
Journal of Neuroscience 9(2): 497 - 506. 
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Upon a quantitative analysis, Allen et. al. found that the INAH-2 and INAH-3 
exhibited a significant sexual dimorphism, while the other two nuclei, as well as the 
supraoptic nucleus, did not.  Specifically, they found the INAH-3 to be 2.8 times larger in 
the male brain than in the female brain, regardless of the age of the subject.394  Even 
though the other striking sexual dimorphism, that of the INAH-2, was found to be twice 
as large in males than in females, it appeared that the varying size of this nucleus was 
due, at least in part, to the particular age-related hormonal milieu of the subject.  
Specifically, Allen and colleagues found that the “INAH-2 was 3.7-fold larger in women 
of child-bearing age than in prepubescent and post-menopausal females.”395
Thus while the dimorphism in INAH-2 was equivocal and possibly linked to 
certain age groups, the dimorphism of INAH-3 was dramatic – about three times as large 
in males than in females – and independent of age.  Because the dimorphism of INAH-3 
did not appear to be a function of adult, “activational” hormones, the INAH-3 promised 
to be a human homolog of the rat SDN-POA. 
   
However, Allen and her collegues were careful to note that: 
 
It is unclear which, if either, of the 2 nuclei we found to be sexually dimorphic in 
the human brain corresponds to the SDN-POA of the rat.  INAH-3 exhibits 
similarities to the SDN-POA of the rat by virtue of its location between the optic 
chiasm and the anterior commissure.  However, without knowledge of 
connectivity or neurochemical characteristics of these nuclei, it is difficult to 
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assign any as a homolog to a sexually dimorphic nucleus of another mammalian 
species.396
 
 
 To use Craver’s terminology, the sexually dimorphic nuclei discovered by Allen 
et. al. could act as “how-possibly” models of neurological substrates underlying human 
sexual and gendered behavior; but they lack the knowledge required to designate either of 
the nuclei as “how-actually” models.  From this evidence (or, more accurately, lack 
thereof), as well as the evidence that INAH-2 dimorphism is age-dependent, they 
conclude: 
 
Since there appears to be more than one sexually dimorphic nucleus in this region 
[the POA], and there is presently no indication that INAH-1 is homologous to the 
SDN-POA of the rat, we do not believe that it is appropriate for INAH-1 to be 
called the SDN-POA, regardless of its potential sexual dimorphism.397
 
 
 Citing the earlier work connecting prenatal gonadal hormones to sex differences 
in human behavior, Allen et. al. note that, even though they do not know the genomic 
determinants, environmental factors, and/or hormone levels responsible for the sex 
differences in INAH-2 and INAH-3, “there is evidence that some facets of human 
behavior may be influenced by hormone levels during the prenatal period.”398
                                                 
396 Ibid. 
 
 
397 Ibid. 
 
398 Ibid.  In support of this contention, Allen et. al. cite the work of Hines, M. (1982). "Prenatal 
Gonadal Hormones and Sex Differences in Human Behavior." Psychological Bulletin 92(1): 56-
80.  Hines’ claims rely exclusively upon the work of Money and his colleagues at the 
psychohormone unit.  
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 But what about the previous findings by Swaab and Fliers in humans?  During the 
course of Allen et. al.’s study, Swaab and Fliers: 
 
[R]eported a sexually dimorphic nucleus in the human POA that resembles the 
INAH-1 in location, size, shape and cell types, and its dramatic decrease in 
volume with advancing age . . . Although we firmly believe that the nucleus 
studies by Swaab and Fliers is the same as INAH-1, we can only speculate as to 
why they determined this nucleus to be 2.5 times larger in the male brain, whereas 
we found that INAH-1 was only 1.2-fold larger in males than in females, prior to 
weight adjustment.  Most likely, some discrepancy is due to the fact that our 
subjects were age-matched.399
 
   
 Specifically, because the dimorphism of the INAH-2 appeared to be due to age 
and post-natal, activational hormones, it was possible that the volume of the INAH-1 is 
affected in a similar fashion, albeit only be age.  Thus, the results of Swaab and Fliers are 
an artifact of their methodology,400
                                                 
399 Allen, L., et. al. (1989). "Two Sexually Dimorphic Cell Groups in the Human Brain." The 
Journal of Neuroscience 9(2): 497 - 506. 
 and the human homolog of the rat SDN-POA is the 
INAH-3, not, as suggested by Swaab and Fliers, the INAH-1. 
 
400 Although not all endocrinologists are convinced.  Morris et. al. note that: 
 
Unfortunately, neither Gorski’s group [i.e., Allen et. al., 1989] nor [Simon] Levay found 
a sexual dimorphism in INAH-1, failing to replicate Swaab and Fliers’ findings, which 
may represent a matter of statistical power, because the Dutch group have [sic] much 
larger sample sizes. 
 
Morris, J., et. al. (2006). "Brain Aromatase: Dyed-in-the-Wool Homosexuality." Endocrinology 
145(2): 475 - 477. 
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 In conclusion, Allen et. al note that, while it is difficult to extrapolate from 
laboratory animals to humans regarding structural, behavioral, or physiological sex 
differences: 
 
It is interesting to speculate that factors such as prenatal stress that both feminize 
and demasculinize sexual behavior, and decrease the volume of the SDN-POA in 
male rats may, similarly, contribute in human males to homosexuality and a 
decrease in the volume of the sexually dimorphic INAH; moreover, the INAH are 
located in a region of the brain influencing sex differences in gonadotrophin 
secretion which may be altered in some homosexual men.401
 
  
 Allen et. al. specifically refer to Dörner’s hypothesis that male homosexuality 
results from a feminized brain.  As a further research program to follow up on the above 
possibility – that the INAH may serve as an anatomical marker for male homosexuality – 
Allen et. al. suggest: 
 
[M]orphological analysis of the brains from humans with different sexual 
orientations and identities, during different stages of development, and from 
individuals exposed perinatally to atypical steroid hormones . . . may lead to 
further deductions concerning the possible influence of sex hormones on the 
structure and function of the human brain.402
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 Later scientists took up this task.  Following Barraclough and Gorski’s 1961 
investigations in rats, and Dörner’s extension of this study, most (explicitly) claim that it 
is the hypothalamus that becomes either male or female.  Specifically, the hypothalamus 
either can support the positive gonadotropin feedback loop responsible for ovulation, or it 
cannot. 
But it is clear that endocrinologists want to extend the “maleness” or 
“femaleness” of brains beyond the hypothalamus, for a number of reasons.  First, as we 
have seen in previous chapters, it is not at all clear how structures that support a positive 
or negative feedback loop are related to sex dimorphic behavior.  Second, a number of 
other areas of the brain, outside of the hypothalamus, have been found to be sexually 
dimorphic.  Finally, the observed sex dimorphism in cognitive abilities, especially verbal 
and visuo-spatial abilities, suggests to many researchers that the masculinity or femininity 
of the brain extends beyond the hypothalamus.  
One of the most prominent researchers of “global” brain masculinization or 
femininization interpretation is Simon LeVay.403
 
 Under this interpretation, the 
explanatory sketches for the etiology of particular conditions are quite simple, if 
somewhat sparse. A genetic male, if exposed to the proper level of androgens in utero, 
develops a masculine brain, and, ultimately, masculine cognitive and behavioral traits: 
good visuo-spatial ability, poor verbal ability, self-identification as male, sexual 
attraction to females.  The inspiration for LeVay’s global model comes from Dörner: 
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Although Dörner’s specific theories have not held up well, his basic idea – that 
homosexuality, like heterosexuality, results at least in part from specific 
interactions between androgenic sex hormones and the brain during development 
– is one that I share.404
 
 
As a result, failure to manifest any of the above mentioned cognitive or behavioral 
traits can be explained as the result of low levels of androgens in utero.  Likewise, if a 
genetic female were to manifest any of these cognitive traits, this can be explained as due 
to abnormally high levels of androgens in utero.  
A number of problems arise within this area.  The most serious is that the global 
conceptualization of the model, though widely accepted, has proved incapable of 
“specification,” i.e., detailed mechanisms of sexual differentiation in accordance with the 
model have not been found.  As we have seen, Dörner considered all sex-atypical 
behavior to be a manifestation of neurological “pseudo-hermaphroditism.” As a result, 
the global conceptualization of the organization/activation model can provide an 
explanatory sketch for both typical and atypical development, but cannot explain the 
development of different versions of atypical phenomena.405
                                                 
404 LeVay, S. (1993). The Sexual Brain. Cambridge, The MIT Press. 
  
 
405 For instance, Heino Meyer-Bahlberg, when asked to justify his practice of grouping 
homosexuals and transsexuals together in his studies, replies:  
 
In terms of psychological development, there seems to be a wide overlap between 
homosexual and transsexual individuals, involving largely identical aspects of sex-
dimorphic behavior.  Since there is only one broad endocrine theory of sex dimorphic 
behavior, we assume that it would underly [sic] both homosexual and transsexual 
development, if at all valid for the human case. 
 
Meyer-Bahlburg, H. (1984). "Psychoendocrine Research on Sexual Orientation: Current Status 
and Future Options." Progress in Brain Research 61: 375 - 398. 
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We have, therefore, a case in which a mode of explanation (at a certain level of 
generality) is accepted in part because it unifies certain phenomena, and yet is not 
adequate to handling all the cases; it is therefore not explanatory, which is contrary to 
what Kitcher’s account would lead us to expect. 
Some researchers take that to imply that the model is mistaken, others that it 
merely requires more work in order to be applied to cases.  Those endocrinologists who 
think that the organization/activation model requires more work subscribe to the second 
conceptualization – a ‘local’ one wherein masculinization (and feminization) can occur in 
some parts of the brain but not others.  The main support of the local interpretation comes 
from recent anatomical findings, which are explored in detail in the following chapter. 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
 On the face of it, the research program inspired by the organization/activation 
model fulfills the general criteria for mechanism.  Scientists began with functional 
definitions of the ultrastructure and anatomical descriptions of synaptic and dendrite 
connections, and built upon them to distinguish defined cell groups.  Besides determining 
conditions of failure for developmental endpoints, researchers investigated the 
modulating conditions of early androgen exposure.  Finally, certain nuclei (the SDN-
POA in particular) were and are considered how-actually models of structural hormonal 
influence, as well as how-possibly functional models underlying sexual and gendered 
behavior.  
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However, the research program inspired by the organization/activation model 
displays several significant deviations from the standard mechanistic account.  First, and 
foremost, the crucial resolution of the “problem” of homosexuality – a resolution that 
launched approximately a thousand experiments – was (generally) accepted in advance of 
any convincing empirical evidence.  As it stands, current mechanistic accounts of 
scientific practice and explanation cannot account for this phenomenon.  Second, the 
tradition of research programs attempting to link outward function to physical 
mechanisms – a hallmark of mechanistic explanations – is curiously reversed in the 
recent history of behavioral endocrinology.  The discovery of physical sexual 
dimorphisms in the brain led to an inquiry about the function of those dimorphisms.  
Even though scientists were unable to uncover the functional significance of said 
dimorphisms, they were upheld as a model of sexual dimorphism in general.  
 Finally, this general research program is founded upon ill-defined notions of 
“masculinity” and “femininity.” As will become apparent in the following chapter, these 
vague, yet foundational, notions have confounded not just the research on homosexuality, 
but also on transsexuality.     
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 8  
The Etiology of Transsexuality 
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I. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapters, I claimed that the crucial resolution of the “problem” of 
homosexuality was a primary reason for the acceptance of the organization/activation 
model.  Besides solving the puzzle of homosexuality, the model had potentially 
widespread application. The notion that the prenatal brain acquired gender during a 
critical period in development promised to explain both normal and pathological 
development.  Not only could the organization/activation model explain the etiology of 
homosexuality, it promised to explain a host of sexual and sex-related phenomena.  
One such phenomenon was transsexuality. Transsexuality, even more than 
homosexuality, is a phenomenon fraught with vagueness, ambiguity, and categorical, 
definitional, and professional controversy.  The scientific literature approaches both 
homosexuality and transsexuality in one of three ways: in terms of behavior, in terms of a 
pseudo-natural kind, and in terms of neurological structures. These categories easily 
overlap: the category of “persons” can explain, if in a limited fashion, some types and 
aspects of behavior; neurological structures can play the role of “symptoms” for various 
kinds of people.  All three categorizations appear in the literature, often without explicit 
disambiguation.   
Importantly for my argument, the organization/activation model, once it was 
accepted as an explanation for homosexuality, was immediately and uncritically extended 
to other phenomena, including transsexuality.  Not only was the model to provide 
foundation for research into transsexuality, it does so to this day.   
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The extension of the model to transsexuality took it that the very same general 
mechanism is thought to be responsible: an unusual hormonal milieu in utero causes the 
development of a gendered brain at odds with the genetic sex.  Transsexuality, like 
homosexuality, thus results from a central nervous system pseudohermaphroditism. 
The apparently uncritical extension of the model to the phenomenon of 
transsexuality raises several issues.  On the face of it, this extension appears incongruous.  
The organization/activation model resolved a problem about sexual orientation, namely, 
explaining the apparent incompatibility of typical physical development and atypical 
gender preference.  Transsexuality is characterized by typical physical development and 
atypical gender identity.  While both these classifications involve sexuality, gender 
identity and sexual orientation are usually considered orthogonal categories.  It is 
therefore not immediately obvious why the resolution of the problem of homosexuality 
should also resolve the problem of transsexuality.         
Transfer of the organization/activation model to transsexuality was tempting, but 
doing so created a new issue urgently in need of resolution:  once it was argued that 
transsexuality and homosexuality are two separate phenomena, the same model was 
being invoked to explain two different developmental outcomes.  If no distinct paths from 
initial conditions to the distinct outcomes could be exhibited, then not only would 
transsexuality not be explained, but also the organization/activation model itself might 
cause to be doubted, even in its original domain of application.  
In the case of transsexuality, the elucidation of the mechanisms is not just 
desirable, but urgent, because the same general model is used to explain two different 
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developmental outcomes.  In particular, the model was supposed to explain both typical 
and atypical outcomes. 
Complicating the search for precise mechanisms was the fact that, at the time 
when researchers began to look at transsexuality per se, there were two competing 
conceptualizations of the phenomenon.  One view considered transsexuality to be a 
version of homosexuality – in the words of one researcher, transsexuality is an “extreme 
version of central nervous system pseudohermaphroditism.”  This conception, drawing 
upon the organization/activation model, “explains” both typical and atypical 
(homosexual) development, with transsexuality being a sub-version of homosexuality.  
The other view considered transsexuality to be a phenomenon distinct from 
homosexuality, but also due to some form of central nervous system 
pseudohermaphroditism.  On this other conception of transsexuality, the model explains 
“typical” (i.e., a gender identity and sexual orientation “congruent” with physiology, in 
addition to identity-incongruent and orientation-incongruent outsomes.  Importantly for 
my argument, both conceptions of transsexuality were (and are) based upon the 
organization/activation model.  One reason for this is because there is only one general 
model of psychosexual development.  If transsexuality is to be considered a biological 
phenomenon, then any etiological explanation will be structured by the 
organization/activation model. 
Both conceptions face explanatory problems.  With the first conception, the 
problem is most immediate and glaringly incomplete: how to explain how a particular 
variation of homosexuality comes about?  However, the second conception brings to the 
fore a more general explanatory conundrum: if both homosexuality and transsexuality are 
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due to central nervous system pseudohermaphroditism, how can this general explanation 
give insight into the specifics of two developmental endpoints?  If scientists are unable to 
delineate these pathways, this creates serious doubts about the organization/activation 
model as an explanatory schema.  The widespread applicability of the model, initially 
seen as a strength, could become its greatest weakness. 
In spite of these explanatory problems, the organization/activation model was 
assumed to explain the etiology of transsexuality.  There are several reasons for this, 
some resulting from the history of the field itself, others more broadly cultural.  In 
exploring these reasons, I want to demonstrate several points.   
1) Most generally, cultural and scientific confusion about the classification of 
transsexuality resulted in divergent presuppositions informing different research projects.   
2) It is not immediately obvious why the organization/activation model should be 
applied to transsexuality in the first place. 
3) That the organization/activation model was applied uncritically to the 
phenomenon of transsexuality demonstrates the rhetorical power of crucial resolutions.   
Unfortunately, the history of research into transsexuality has a complicated time 
line.  Because of the early categorical confusions surrounding homosexuality and 
transsexuality, I first give a brief overview of the field before the general acceptance of 
the organization/activation model.   
After an initial historical introduction, I present a history of investigations into 
and theories about the etiology of transsexuality.  The key concept behind this research is 
that of gender identity – was it is, and how it develops.  Like homosexuality, many 
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behavioral endocrinologists came to believe transsexualism to have a neuroendocrine 
correlate. 
As mentioned above, there were two general conceptions of transsexuality: that it 
is a variation of homosexuality, and that it is a distinct (and possibly related) 
phenomenon. These two different conceptions have different implications for the etiology 
of gender identity.  Historically, each of these conceptions map onto one of two 
elaborated hypotheses about the etiology of gender identity. Like homosexuality before 
it, there were two elaborated hypotheses concerning the development of gender identity: 
that it was learned, and that it had a biological basis.  
 
The first hypothesis postulated external factors as the primary cause behind the 
etiology of gender identity, while the second postulated causes internal to the individual.  
In the third and fourth sections, I discuss these etiological hypotheses and their 
implications for the explanatory power of the organization/activation model.  I conclude 
with a more in-depth discussion of classification issues surrounding transsexualism and 
gender identity. 
As many endocrinologists believe the etiology of transsexuality to be similar or 
identical to that of homosexuality, the same general investigative techniques are used to 
determine that etiology: studies of hormonal levels and feedback responses, 
pseudohermaphrodites and sex-dimorphic cognitive abilities and brain structures.  But the 
most celebrated investigation of the etiology of gender identity is a long-term research 
project focusing on one individual.  I discuss this in the final section of this chapter. 
 241 
The application of the organization/activation model to transsexuality brings with 
it, by default, the assumption of an important biological factor.  However, because of the 
supremacy of the organization/activation model, that biological factor is conceived of in 
terms of prenatal hormonal influence.  This results in the explanatory problems 
mentioned earlier.  Besides the problems concerning causal pathways, there is a more 
general problem: it is not clear that the organization/activation model should be applied 
to transsexuality in the first place.   
 
 
II. Historical Background 
 
 
Early researchers did not distinguish sharply between homosexuality, 
transsexuality, and hermaphroditism.  The initial studies of “pseudohermaphrodites,” for 
instance, did not make a distinction between these three categories.  It is due primarily to 
the work of Jost that the mechanisms behind such forms of pseudohermaphroditism 
became known.  While this distinguished pseudohermaphroditism as a separate 
phenomenon, both homosexuality and transsexuality initially were thought to arise from 
adult hormone imbalances. Eventually the definitions of these phenomena were 
sharpened, and the adult hormone imbalance hypothesis invalidated, to be superceded by 
the organization/activation model.  
Before the widespread acceptance of the organization/activation model, Freudian-
inspired theories dominated scientific thinking about homosexuality.  In this line of 
thought, transsexuality, like homosexuality, is a learned behavior.  After the acceptance 
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of the organization/activation model, most scientists accepted that sexual orientation has 
a biological basis.  Along the lines of the organization/activation model, it was tempting 
to suppose that gender identity also has a biological basis.  Nonetheless, some scientists 
(most notably John Money) argued that gender identity – unlike orientation – is learned.  
However, this hypothesis was not fully articulated until the mid 1960s.  
The other elaborated hypothesis – that the development of gender identity has a 
biological basis – relies upon the conception of transsexuality as a phenomenon distinct 
from homosexuality.  Historically, this conception was articulated before Money’s 
learning theory, although it took some time for the scientific community to accept it.  
Central to this discussion is the work of Harry Benjamin, an endocrinologist and 
sexologist working in New York.  Unlike many of his peers, Benjamin considered 
transsexuality to be a phenomenon distinct from homosexuality – a classification that not 
all scientists accept, even to this day. 
There was no research program dedicated to uncovering the etiology of 
transsexuality until after the crucial resolution of homosexuality.  In light of the 
methodological precept established by Lillie – that one should investigate the atypical in 
order to understand the typical – this delay is inexplicable. Because transsexuality is more 
atypical than homosexuality (in terms of numbers as well as cultural intuitions), it would 
seem that scientists should prioritize the investigation of transsexuality over that of 
homosexuality.  In terms of actual practice, this delay is due in part to the fact that there 
were (and are) fewer transsexuals than homosexuals, and thus fewer research subjects, 
and in part to the conceptual confusions mentioned above. 
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In the mid-1950s, scientists outside of the field of psychoanalysis began to 
speculate about the origins of gender identity.  Because of the categorical confusions and 
explanatory problems previously mentioned, uncovering the etiology of gender identity 
would:  
1) help resolve the categorical confusion and, in doing so, 
2) shed light on the relative contributions of internal versus external influences on 
sexual and gendered behavior. 
 
All of this presupposes clear notions of masculine and feminine behavior.  After 
all, one must have a conception of what constitutes gendered behavior in order to 
investigate the causal factors behind said behavior.  As discussed in the fourth chapter, 
Frank Beach was responsible for categorizing and classifying masculine and feminine 
behavior in laboratory animals.  Unfortunately, said categories were (and are) not so 
clearly defined in human beings.  I discuss this issue further on in this chapter.  In spite, 
or perhaps because of, these cultural presuppositions about what constitutes “proper” or 
“congruent” gendered/sexual behavior, research into transsexuality brings to the fore in 
an even stronger way their categorical shortcomings than it does (and did) for 
investigations into the etiology of homosexuality.    
While psychologists and psychiatrists for sometime had been aware of individuals 
who desired to live as a member of the opposite sex, the publicity surrounding the 1952 
Christine Jorensen case first brought this phenomenon to the public eye.  Prior to this 
case (in which a former G.I named Georges Jorgensen requested a sex change) the 
thinking of most physicians in regards to transsexuality was dominated by 
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psychotherapists heavily influenced by the thought of Sigmund Freud.  These 
psychotherapists considered Freud’s theories to be key for understanding any kind of 
sexual dysphoria.406
The history of research into the etiology of transsexuality provides strong support 
for my main thesis: that the explanatory power of the organization/activation model lies 
in its ability to explain a host of developmental endpoints.  Both classifications of 
transsexuality – as a version of homosexuality or as a distinct phenomenon – explain it as 
the result of atypical sexual brain development.  As such, both appeal to a Kitcherian 
sense of unification in their attempt to explain the etiology of transsexualism.  
  
 
 
III. Harry Benjamin  
 
 
While the term “transsexual” has been in use since the early 1920s, it was not 
until the mid-1950s’ that transsexuality as a category distinct from transvestism, 
hermaphroditism, and homosexuality emerged.407
                                                 
406 Bullough, V. (2000). "Transgenderism and the Concept of Gender." The International Journal 
of Transgenderism 4(3): 1 - 10.  As late as 1970, some medical doctors subscribed to this view.  
For example, Margolese writes: “Currently, most authorities consider that altered gender role and 
sexual preference are largely the result of social and psychological factors.” Margolese, S. (1970). 
"Homosexuality: A New Endocrine Correlate." Hormones and Behavior 1(2): 151-155. 
  The man primarily responsible for 
 
407 For an instance of the conflation of these categories, see Witschi, E., and Mengert, William 
(1942). "Endocrine Studies on Human Hermaphrodites and Their Bearing on the Interpretation of 
Homosexuality." Journal of Clinical Endocrinology 2(5): 279-286. In contrast to Chapman, A., et. 
al. (1951). "Pseudohermaphroditism: A Medical, Social and Psychiatric Case Study." 
Psychosomatic Medicine: Experimental and Clinical Studies 13(4): 212 - 219. 
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creating transsexualism as its own diagnostic category was Harry Benjamin, whose initial 
diagnostic criteria and etiological speculations are discussed in the first section. 
Even though psychologists and psychiatrists had been aware of individuals who 
desired to live as a member of the opposite sex since before the turn of the last century, 
the actual number of physicians who professionally addressed the topic was vanishingly 
small.  One of the few who did was Harry Benjamin, who had met with patients in his 
clinic expressing dissatisfaction with their biological sex for several years before the 
publicity surrounding the Jorgensen case.408   In the wake of this publicity, Harry 
Benjamin was asked to write an article on the subject to be presented at the 1953 meeting 
of the Association for Advancement of Psychotherapy (and published that same year).409
In this article, he used the term ‘transsexualism’ to describe the subjective 
conviction of belonging to the opposite sex.  The subjective notion of belonging, rather 
   
                                                 
408 Benjamin, H. (1953). "Transvestism and Transsexualism." International Journal of Sexology 
7. In his article on Harry Benjamin, Richard Ekins describes Benjamin as “the founding father of 
contemporary western transsexualism.” Ekins, R. (2005). "Science, Politics and Clinical 
Intervention: Harry Benjamin, Transsexualism and the Problem of Heteronormativity." 
Sexualities 8(3): 306 - 328.  
 
409 In his extensive review of the etiology of transsexuality, Mormont notes: 
 
The first surgical case (consisting of a complete sex change: operation, hormone 
administration and post-operative follow-up), performed by a Danish team, received 
major media attention from the tabloid press.  This case involved Georges Jorgensen, a 
photographer and ex-GI, who went to Denmark for the operation.  At the same time, 
albeit in New York, Benjamin, an endocrinologist and sexologist, published one of the 
first scientific articles on the subject.  In December 1953, during a symposium held by 
the Association for Advancement of Psychotherapy, Benjamin and Gutheil coined the 
term ‘transsexualism.’ 
 
Mormont, M., and Legros, J. (2001). "A Psycho-Endocrinological Overview of Transsexualism." 
European Journal of Endocrinology 145: 365 - 376.  
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than attraction to, the opposite sex is crucial.  Although he was not the first researcher to 
use this term, he was the first to use it in an unambiguous fashion.410
As mentioned, early researchers did not distinguish sharply between 
homosexuality, transsexuality, and hermaphroditism.  The studies of 
“pseudohermaphrodites,” for instance, did not distinguish between these three categories. 
Benjamin was concerned to disambiguate these phenomena.  In a later book devoted to 
the subject, Benjamin writes: 
 
 
The transsexual (TS) male or female is deeply unhappy as a member of the sex 
(or gender) to which he or she was assigned by the anatomical structure of the 
body, particularly the genitals.  To avoid misunderstanding: this has nothing to do 
with hermaphroditism.411
 
 
In other words, the mis-match of gendered elements is a mis-match between 
subject identity and anatomical features, not an ambiguity of the anatomical features 
themselves.  It is due primarily to the work of Jost that the mechanisms behind 
pseudohermaphroditism became known.  
                                                 
410 Ekins points out that, contrary to popular opinion, 
 
Benjamin did not coin the term ‘transsexual’, as is sometimes said.  Magnus Hirschfeld 
had done that way back in 1923.  Moreover, David Cauldwell had written quite 
extensively about transsexuals in the late 1940s and early 1950s.  However, Hirschfeld 
had not developed a distinguishable clinical entity of transsexuality and Cauldwell was 
largely opposed to transsexual [gender reassignment] surgery, which impeded the 
development of his thought on the topic. 
 
Ekins, R. (2005). "Science, Politics and Clinical Intervention: Harry Benjamin, Transsexualism 
and the Problem of Heteronormativity." Sexualities 8(3): 306 - 328. 
 
411 Benjamin, H. (1999). The Transsexual Phenomenon. Düsseldorf, Symposium Publishing. 
Originally published by the Julian Press, Inc., New York, 1966. 
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As a result of Jost’s (and Benjamin’s) work, the absence of hormonal or gonadal 
irregularities is part of the present-day definitions of both homosexuality (as discussed in 
the sixth chapter) and transsexuality.412
In addition to distinguishing personal gender confusion from biological 
ambiguity, Benjamin insisted upon separating transsexualism from homosexuality.  
Claiming that transsexuals, transvestites and homosexuals should be distinguished based 
upon both their gender identity (an internal factor) as well as choice of sex partners (an 
external factor), Benjamin points out: 
  Even after this sharpening of categories, 
transsexuals were often included in the same studies as homosexuals. The reasons for this 
will be discussed in the following section. 
 
The transsexual feels himself to be a woman (“trapped in a man’s body”) and is 
attracted to men.  This makes him a homosexual provided his sex is diagnosed 
from the state of his body.  But he, diagnosing himself in accordance with his 
female psychological sex, considers his sexual desire for a man to be 
heterosexual, that is, normal.413
 
 
This definition of transsexuality – in terms of the feelings of the subject – paints it 
as a pseudo-natural kind, a category defined in terms of intentions rather than behavior 
                                                 
412 In a much later review of the endocrinology of transsexualism, Louis Gooren points out that: 
 
Most biological investigations of transsexuals have found that there are no abnormalities 
in chromosomal pattern, in the gonads or genitals, or in circulating, peripheral sex steroid 
levels that could account for the condition.  The very absence of the above-mentioned 
abnormalities now constitutes an element in the definition of transsexualism.  
 
 Gooren, L. (1990). "The Endocrinology of Transsexualism: A Review and Commentary." 
Psychoneuroendocrinology 15(1): 3 - 14. 
  
413 Benjamin, H. (1999). The Transsexual Phenomenon. Düsseldorf, Symposium Publishing. 
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per se.  While this is a radical change from earlier definitions, it should be noted that 
Benjamin is still relying upon a very old cultural trope: failure to be a paradigm of one’s 
sex is the result of mix of gendered elements.   
In spite of this, Benjamin suspected that transsexuality was due to a biological 
force.  Like many during the early-1960s, he was inspired by the organization/activation 
model of sexual development, even though he rejected the rigid sex and gender categories 
many thought it implied.  Throughout his career, he consistently presents the view that 
some hidden biological factor could explain the phenomenon of transsexuality. 
In his early writings, Benjamin thinks the two possible biological sources for 
transsexuality are genetic and endocrinological, although at the time of his 1966 book, 
“no genetic cause has as yet been proved for any transsexual manifestation.”414 Although 
genetic research had not been promising, “a possible endocrine cause of transsexualism 
has been investigated in a few cases with great thoroughness.  Beyond a few suspicious 
findings, no definite proof has as yet been found.”415
                                                 
414 Ibid.  Benjamin cites doctors Melicow and Uson’s hypothesis of the etiology of transsexuality: 
a “sex identification gene” breaks off the Y chromosome and attaches to the X.  In spite of its 
weaknesses, Benjamin comments:  
 (This reflects the explanatory 
promise of hormones.) 
 
A theory such as that would indeed explain much better than psychological 
“conditioning” the astonishing depth and the intensity with which a transsexual identifies 
with the opposite sex.  Incidentally, it would also explain the resistance to treatment. 
 
Benjamin, H. (1999). The Transsexual Phenomenon. Düsseldorf, Symposium Publishing. 
 
415 Benjamin, H. (1999). The Transsexual Phenomenon. Düsseldorf, Symposium Publishing. 
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Benjamin does not say so explicitly, but he hints that Gorski’s work with rats 
suggests that male-to-female transsexuals have a “feminine hypothalamus.”416
 
 A year 
later, in a 1967 article, Benjamin summarized his hypothetical thinking as follows: 
Most satisfying to me is a working hypothesis based on the experiments of brain 
physiologists and psychobiologists . . . Their possible explanation for the 
transsexual phenomenon would be neuroendocrine in nature . . If something 
interferes, perhaps an abundance of the mother’s estrogen or lack of the neural 
target organ, this particular center (a hypothalamic brain center) remains female, 
determining the later sexual behavior and possibly causing gender role 
disorientation.417
 
 
 While Benjamin’s working hypothesis is more subtle than those who consider 
transsexuality to be a version of homosexuality – it acknowledges different forms of 
femininity – it assumes the organization/activation hypothesis as the underlying structure. 
As such, the brains of transsexuals fail to become properly masculinized, but they fail in 
a different way than the brains of homosexuals. 
As pointed out in the fourth chapter, the adoption of the organization/activation 
model led to sexual classifications becoming more rigid.  While Benjamin did accept 
aspects of the organization/activation model, his embrace of diversity harks back to the 
tolerance of some of the early pioneers of sexology.  Richard Ekins writes: 
 
                                                 
416 Ibid. 
 
417 Benjamin, H. (1967). "The Transsexual Phenomenon." Transactions of the New York 
Academy of Sciences 29: 428 - 430. 
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He [Benjamin] is best placed, perhaps, in the sexological tradition of such 
important figures as August Forel, Havelock Ellis and Magnus Hirschfeld.  He is 
part of what might be called the liberal wing of sexology which was tolerant of 
sexual variation and diversity.418
  
  
Although Benjamin, in his articles as well as in his personal practice, 
distinguished orientation from identity, few of his colleagues did so.  This conglobation 
of categories may explain the divided response to the Christine Jorgensen case by both 
the public and the scientific community.  Even after the publication of Benjamin’s article, 
many physicians considered transsexualism to be a version of homosexuality, and as such 
a mental pathology.  While the Journal of the American Medical Association published 
the medical history (including treatment and surgery) of the case: 
 
Many physicians were critical of the use of any treatment other than 
psychotherapy in a condition apparently of a psychopathological nature.  This was 
especially true of psychoanalysts.  Other physicians, not too well versed in sex 
problems, confused transsexualism with homosexuality.  “Oh, just another fairy,” 
one commented to me when speaking of the Jorgensen case.419
 
 
Benjamin’s initial (and subsequent) discussions of the diagnosis, etiology, and 
treatment of transsexuality provoked hostile reactions from a number of psychoanalysts 
who argued that removing healthy organs at the request of “emotionally disturbed” 
                                                 
418 Ekins, R. (2005). "Science, Politics and Clinical Intervention: Harry Benjamin, 
Transsexualism and the Problem of Heteronormativity." Sexualities 8(3): 306 - 328. 
 
419 Benjamin, H. (1999). The Transsexual Phenomenon. Düsseldorf, Symposium Publishing. 
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patients was unethical and bad medical practice.420
 
  In addition, an influential report in 
the Journal of the American Medical Association, released the year after Benjamin’s 
initial publication, rejected the distinctions drawn between transsexualism, transvestism 
and homosexuality.  As a consequence of this definitional rejection, the authors argue 
against sex-change (re-assignment) surgery: 
Although our subjects share certain needs, wishes, and personality characteristics, 
it would be completely erroneous to conclude from these similarities that they 
represent a homogenous group.  The need for surgery that these persons share 
does not in itself represent a disease entity but rather a symptomatic expression of 
many complex and diverse factors.421
   
 
For these doctors, it is not the case that transsexuality is a version of 
homosexuality, but rather that it is not a category (a “disease entity”) at all.  Instead, it is 
a pathological syndrome with multiple (as yet unknown) causal agents.    
But not only did Benjamin separate transsexualism and homosexuality as two 
different phenomena, he associated “biological normality” with both.  While Benjamin’s 
profession as a medical doctor made it almost inevitable that he would frame his 
discussions in terms of the medical model of disease, he considered neither 
homosexuality nor transsexualism to be pathologies – of either body or mind.  
                                                 
420 See, e.g., Ostow, M. (1953). "Transvestitism." Journal of the American Medical Association 
152: 1553. Gutheil, E. (1954). "The Psychologic Background of Transsexualism and 
Transvestitism." American Journal of Psychiatry 8: 231-235.  Lukianowicz, D. (1959). "Survey 
of Various Aspects of Transvestitism." Journal of Nervous and Mental Disorders 128(1).  
Northrup, G. (1959). "Transsexualism: Report of a Case." Archives of General Psychiatry 1: 332-
337.  Greenberg, N. (1960). "A Study of Transsexualism." Psychiatric Quarterly 34: 203-235. 
 
421 Worden, F., and Marsh, James (1955). "Factors in Man Seeking Sex Transformation: A 
Preliminary Report." Journal of the American Medical Association 157: 1291-1298. 
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Specifically, he did not consider transsexualism to be the result of physiological 
developmental disorders (thus distinguishing it from hermaphroditism) nor from adult 
endocrine disorders.422  In addition, he did not view requests for sex-change surgery to be 
a symptom of mental illness.423
Benjamin held this view, in part, as a result of his adoption of Beach’s model of 
sexual behavior (specifically, Beach’s emphasis on the diversity of behavior) and 
Kinsey’s model of a continuum of sexual orientation.  If sexual behavior and sexual 
orientation were to be classified along a continuum, Benjamin saw no reason why sexual 
or gender identity should not also be so classified: 
 
 
                                                 
422 Mormont writes: 
 
The first definition of transsexualism dates from 1953, coined by Benjamin who 
associated biological normality with the conviction of belonging to the opposite sex and 
the sex reassignment request. 
 
Mormont, M., and Legros, J. (2001). "A Psycho-Endocrinological Overview of Transsexualism." 
European Journal of Endocrinology 145: 365 - 376. As noted earlier, this attribution is, 
technically, incorrect. 
 
423 In Billings and Urban’s critical review of the treatment of transsexualism, they write:  
 
The first reported sex-change operation took place in Germany in 1931 (Pauley, 1968) 
but the procedure was not widely known until Christine (George) Jorgensen’s much-
publicized surgery in Denmark in 1952.  The desire to be a member of the opposite sex 
had previously been viewed in psychoanalytic literature as an undifferentiated perversion.  
In 1954, however, U.S. endocrinologist Harry Benjamin asserted that Jorgensen’s claim 
that he was a woman trapped within a man’s body was indicative of a unique illness 
distinct from transvestism and homosexuality, perhaps conditioned by endocrine factors, 
and not amenable to psychotherapy.  He named this non-psychopathic sexual disorder 
“transsexualism.” 
 
Billings, D., and Urban, Thomas (1982). "The Socio-Medical Construction of Transsexualism: 
An Interpretation and Critique." Social Problems 29(3): 266-282. 
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Again, the thought clearly emerges that what we call “sex” is of a very dubious 
nature and has no accurate scientific meaning.  Between “male” and “female,” 
“sex” is a continuum with many “in betweens.”424
 
 
 This focus on the ambiguities of sexual classifications reflects the influences of 
Beach and Kinsey, with their emphasis upon the overall diversity of behavior, rather than 
the overall “stability” of patterns (as emphasized by Phoenix and his students).  Benjamin 
took this emphasis to liberal, perhaps even radical, conclusions.  In the preface to his 
book, Benjamin claims: 
 
The more sex is studied in its nature and implications, the more it loses an exact 
scientific meaning.  The anatomical structures, so sacred to many, come nearer 
and nearer to being dethroned.  Only the social and legal significances of sex 
emerge and remain.425
 
 
In other words, Benjamin is suspicious of the tendency to “essentialize” various 
(if not all) aspects of sexuality, in spite of his description of (male-to-female) transsexuals 
as women trapped in male bodies.  As the reactions to the Jorgensen case mentioned 
earlier suggest, Benjamin, as a member of the liberal wing of sexology, was in the 
minority.  
The tension between the almost post-modern aspects of Benjamin’s broad 
thoughts on sexuality and his classification of transsexuals as a pseudo-natural kind is 
due, perhaps, to the fact that, no matter how broad-minded he was, he was trained as a 
                                                 
424 Benjamin, H. (1999). The Transsexual Phenomenon. Düsseldorf, Symposium Publishing. 
  
425 Ibid. 
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medical doctor, and thus inclined to categorize his patients using the medical model of 
disease.  
Benjamin, as a medical doctor, was more interested in treating transsexuals than 
determining etiology.  But this did not mean that he was uninterested in its etiology.  
Ekins writes: 
 
However, while Benjamin left it to others and future research to determine what 
the genetic or endocrine components might be, he was particularly and repeatedly 
critical of those who argued that transsexualism was entirely a matter of ‘nurture’ 
over ‘nature.’  Institutionalized American psychoanalysis, from the 1940’s 
onwards, increasingly came to emphasize nurture over nature and some American 
psychoanalysts were in the vanguard of those critical of the Christine Jorgensen 
reassignment in the early 1950s.426
 
 
Many endocrinologists who rejected the tenets of psychoanalysis accepted that the 
etiology of transsexualism might involve biological factors – although very few accepted 
Benjamin’s opinion that the phenomenon was non-pathological.  Something must go 
awry during development.  The search for a mechanism was on – although it was not 
clear whether the mechanism was one of neurological substrates or socialized learning.  
Historically, Benjamin’s belief that transsexuality is a “constitutional” mismatch between 
gendered elements of the body, and distinct from homosexuality, was superseded by the 
etiological theory of gender proposed by John Money. 
 
 
                                                 
426 Ekins, R. (2005). "Science, Politics and Clinical Intervention: Harry Benjamin, 
Transsexualism and the Problem of Heteronormativity." Sexualities 8(3): 306 - 328. 
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IV. John Money and the Learning Theory 
 
In the mid-1950s, scientists outside of the field of psychoanalysis began to 
speculate about the origins of gender identity – in part because of the Jorgensen case.  At 
this time, the primary hypothesis concerning the etiology of gender identity was that it 
was learned through socialization. Those scientists who adopted the learning theory 
looked to the work of John Money.  
Money was the most vocal and prominent proponent of the learning theory. His 
research on pseudohermaphrodites demonstrated (he thought) that, while homosexuality 
may have a biological component, gender identity did not.   As mentioned previously, the 
most important results in support of this claim came from his studies of CAH girls and 
women, as they acted as the human equivalent of androgenized female laboratory animal 
models.  Specifically, while a larger than average percentage of CAH girls become 
lesbians as adults, all self-identified as girls and women.427  His studies on patients with 
other forms of pseudohermaphroditism – i.e. with ambiguous genitalia – further 
convinced him that, with early surgery and sufficient parental and social reinforcement, 
such individuals who adopt a (usually female) gender identity without problem.428
                                                 
427 Three years after the publication of Money’s first book, he and his colleagues write: “A salient 
finding concerning sex and eroticism in the present sample of late-treated women with the 
adrenogenital syndrome is the relatively high incidence of homosexual inclinations.” Ehrhardt, A. 
A., et. al. (1968). "Influence of Androgen and Some Aspects of Sexually Dimorphic Behavior in 
Women with the Late-Treated Adrenogenital Syndrome." The Johns Hopkins Medical Journal 
123(3): 115 - 122.  
   
 
428 Jean Wilson writes: 
 
[O]n the basis of studies of subjects with a variety of forms of human intersex and/or 
endocrine abnormalities, it has been the predominant view that human behavior is more 
complex than that of other species and that human gender identity and gender role 
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However, his most celebrated case involved a set of identical genetic male twins, 
one of whose penis was severed during a botched circumcision.  Money and the parents 
decided to raise the twin in question as a girl, and “Joan’s” successful adoption of a 
female identity was cited as proof of the idea that gender identity is due to the sex of 
rearing.429
If gender identity is learned, then the phenomenon of transsexualism is an enigma, 
as it is difficult to explain how males and females, raised as boys and girls respectively, 
should develop a gender identity at odds with their socialization.  For Money, adults 
whose gender identity does not match their genital identity simply had an extreme 
version of what Dörner called “central nervous system pseudohermaphroditism.” In other 
words, transsexualism is a version of homosexuality – and thus biologically rooted.  
Although he nowhere explicitly states that transsexualism is a version of homosexuality, 
his writings throughout his professional career implicitly equate transsexuality with 
homosexuality.
  (This case will be discussed in the final section.) 
430
                                                                                                                                                 
behavior are determine primarily, if not exclusively, by psychological and social forces.  
According to this anthropocentric view, the human species has been emancipated from 
biological controls so that the hormones that mediate this aspect of sexual behavior in 
animals do not play a significant role in controlling human behavior. 
  (Some of his students do make this equation explicitly, as will be 
 
Wilson, J. D. (1999). "The Role of Androgens in Male Gender Role Behavior." Endocrine 
Reviews 20(5). 
 
429 Money, J. (1975). "Ablatio Penis: Normal Male Infant Sex Reassignment as a Girl." Archives 
of Sexual Behavior 4(1): 65-71. 
  
430 Contrary to Benjamin’s exhortations, Money not only conflates transsexuality with 
homosexuality, he includes transvestitism in the mix: 
 
Transvestitism, in the majority of its manifestations, cannot be attributed to postpubertal 
hormonal dysfunction, nor can homosexuality.  The majority of such patients cannot be 
distinguished from normal members of theirs phenotypic sex, according to present-day 
techniques and standards.  On the other side of the coin, hormonal therapy for 
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discussed shortly.)  This neatly explained the phenomenon while preserving the learning 
theory of gender identity.  
But perhaps not so neatly.  While classifying transsexuality as a version of 
homosexuality, on the face of it, appears to resolve the challenge to Money’s learning 
theory, there remains the underlying implication that central nervous system 
pseudohermaphroditism can influence the development of gender identity.  If 
transsexuality is an extreme version of central nervous system pseudohermaphroditism, 
then the (subjective) conviction of gender identity is, presumably, the result of that 
pseudohermaphroditism.  In the case of transsexuality, it appears that gender identity 
does have a biological component.  Within the classification scheme and general etiology 
as put forth by Money, the transsexual is akin to the platypus: an entitiy that defies 
satisfactory classification; one whose etiology is described as due to either learning or 
prenatal hormonal influences, but not both. 
Money identified male transsexualism, the primary focus of research on 
transsexuality, as a point on the same continuum as effeminate homosexuality and other 
“feminine” behavior, including non-effeminate homosexuality and transvestism. 431
                                                                                                                                                 
transvestites, including transsexuals, and for homosexuals, does not change their 
psychosexual identity and desire. 
 (As a 
 
Money, J. (1965). "Influence of Hormones on Sexual Behavior." Annual Review of Medicine 16: 
67-82. 
 
431 As I have argued, this conflation of (male) homosexuality with femininity in general reflects a 
long-standing cultural trope.  In his study of maternal birth order and the incidence of epilepsy, 
homosexuality and mongols [upon first reading this study, I was surprised at the cross-cultural 
and cross-racial approach to methodology; upon second reading, I was bitterly disappointed] Eliot 
Slater points out that, given his findings: 
 
The clinician would expect male homosexuals to be aetiologically a heterogeneous group, 
including persons of notably feminized constitution with others of more normal make-up 
who had become homosexual in sexual attitude from social and psychological causes. 
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side note, many studies, until fairly recently, have distinguished between “effeminate” 
and “non-effeminate” homosexuals, without out bothering to define the terms.)432
In his 1984 commentary on transsexualism, Gooren claims Money’s practice of 
classifying transsexuals as homosexual is a direct result of Dörner’s influence: 
 
 
Another point of endless confusion in observational studies is the femininity 
found in male transsexuals and in some male homosexuals on the one hand and 
the masculinity in female transsexuals and some lesbians on the other hand.  This 
high degree of similarity to an observer without an attempt to investigate their 
motivation or intention has led researchers (Dörner, 1980) to believe that there 
exists a continuum from the male transsexual to the very effeminate male 
homosexual and on the other end of the scale from the masculine lesbian to the 
female transsexual.433
 
  
 Gooren considers this lack of emphasis on – or even consideration of – intention 
to be a mistake.  Paraphrasing Benjamin, he points out that, while homosexuals enjoy 
having sex with members of their own sex, transsexuals (before reassignment surgery) do 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Slater, E. (1962). "Birth Order and Maternal Age of Homosexuals." Lancet 1(7220): 69 - 71. 
 
432 See, for instance, Raboch, J., and Sipova, I (1974). "Intelligence in Homosexuals, 
Transsexuals and Hypogonadotropic Eunuchoids." Journal of Sex Research 10(2): 156 - 161. 
Some researchers were hesitant to equate uncritically homosexuality with femininity.  Acosta, for 
instance, points out that 
 
Although a small percentage of male homosexuals do fit the stereotype of an effeminate, 
high-voiced, and swishing individual, and do in fact see themselves as more feminine 
than masculine, they seem to be a minority. 
 
Acosta, F. (1975). "Etiology and Treatment of Homosexuality: A Review." Archives of Sexual 
Behavior 4(1): 9 - 29. 
 
433 Gooren, L. (1984). "Sexual Dimorphism and Transsexuality: Clinical Observations." Progress 
in Brain Research 61: 399 - 406. 
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not take pleasure from their genitals, as they are not the organs they desire to have.  This, 
in his view: 
 
[C]onstitutes the core difference between homosexuality and transsexuality.  It is 
therefore misleading to rely on observation alone, without an in-depth interview 
regarding the subjective meaning and the intention of the observed behavior.434
 
  
In other words, investigations into the etiology of transsexuality should focus on 
the subjective experiences of people, not on their behavior. 
In spite of objections like those above, many of Money’s students and colleagues 
followed (and continue to follow)435 this practice.  For instance, Heino Meyer-Balhburg 
regularly grouped homosexuals and transsexuals together in his studies.  When 
questioned about this practice, he gave three reasons.  First, compared to their genital and 
gonadal sex (before surgical treatment), almost all transsexuals have a homosexual 
orientation.436  (Homosexuality here is defined in terms of genetic sex.)  Second, 
retrospective surveys show “significant cross-gender behavior” during childhood in 
approximately two thirds of adult homosexuals of either gender. Finally, a number of 
“markedly effeminate” homosexual males become transsexuals in adulthood.437
                                                 
434 Ibid. 
  
 
435 See, for instance, Zucker, K., et. al. (1997). "Sibling Sex Ratio of Boys with Gender Identity 
Disorder." Journal of Child Psychiatry 38(5): 543-551. 
 
436 That is to say, most (60%) of male-to-female transsexuals are attracted to men, while the vast 
majority (95%) of female-to-male transsexuals are attracted to women.  
 
437 See, for instance, Zucker, K., and Green, Richard (1992). "Psychosexual Disorders in Children 
and Adolescents." Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 33(1): 107 - 151.; and Zucker, K., 
et. al. (1997). "Sibling Sex Ratio of Boys with Gender Identity Disorder." Journal of Child 
Psychiatry 38(5): 543-551. 
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In his justification for combining the categories of transsexual and homosexual, 
Meyer-Bahlburg exemplifies the fundamental ambiguity the notion of a gendered 
mismatch.  The implications of his reasons are worth noting.  First, describing the 
majority of pre-operative transsexuals as “homosexual” implies that gender classification 
is determined primarily by genetic sex.  There is an element of essentialism here: while 
male-to-female transsexuals may consider themselves to be women, they are 
“biologically” male.  If, for the sake of argument, Money’s learning theory were right, 
Meyer-Balhburg’s reasoning could be construed in a less essentialist light: children who 
(from the researcher’s perspective) become transsexuals as adults are, for the most part, 
properly socialized with a gender identity in accordance with their genetic sex, but, in 
terms of sexual orientation, are homosexual.   
Importantly, Meyer-Balhburg focuses upon behavior, rather than subjective 
feelings (in contrast to Benjamin).  By focusing on behavior, rather than subjective 
identification, the category of transsexuality, as a distinct phenomenon rather than a 
variation on homosexuality, disappears. 
Second, while Money strongly denied that the formation of gender identity had 
hormones as its (proximal and distal) cause, he (and Meyer-Balhburg) firmly believed 
that many other aspects of sexual behavior did.  As such, any manifestation of cross 
gender behavior could be the result of central nervous system pseudohermaphroditism.  
However, accepting this statement as true and as an indicator of future homosexuality 
carries with it the assumption that (male) homosexuality is defined by certain types of 
“feminine” behavior – not just attraction to men. 
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Finally, the claim that a number of “effeminate” homosexuals become 
transsexuals in adulthood is ambiguous.  It could imply that their sexual orientation was 
formed (and known) before adulthood.  On the face of it, this is untenable, as it makes no 
sense to talk about sexual attraction before the onset of puberty.  If, instead, Meyer-
Balhburg interprets early cross-gendered behavior as an indication of (future) 
homosexuality, this is also untenable, as it assumes that cross-gendered behavior is an 
indication of homosexuality per se, and not transsexuality in particular.  On a more 
charitable interpretation, Meyer-Bahlburg could mean to that some effeminate (adult) 
homosexuals later became transsexual.  However, this is also problematic, as it assumes 
that these effeminate (male) adults are, in fact, homosexuals. 
In spite of the ambiguities in his reasons, he concludes that: 
 
In terms of psychological development, there seems to be a wide overlap between 
homosexual and transsexual individuals, involving largely identical aspects of 
sex-dimorphic behavior.  Since there is only one broad endocrine theory of sex 
dimorphic behavior, we assume that it would underly [sic] both homosexual and 
transsexual development, if at all valid for the human case.438
 
  
There are two points of interest in this quote.  First, all of these arguments are 
based upon the notion of sex-dimorphic behavior.  This, in turn, relies upon the notions of 
masculine and feminine behavior, notions that are vague, to say the least.  While mating 
behaviors in laboratory animals are classified as either masculine or feminine, such 
                                                 
438 Meyer-Bahlburg, H. (1984). "Psychoendocrine Research on Sexual Orientation: Current Status 
and Future Options." Progress in Brain Research 61: 375 - 398. 
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classifications become more difficult when applied to a broader (human) behavioral 
repetoir.439
Second, that there is only one general theory of sex-dimorphic behavior – the 
organization/activation model – entails that this theory should be able to explain all sex-
dimorphic behavior, typical and atypical.  In short, the same general explanatory scheme 
explains, amongst other things, the etiology of both transsexuality and homosexuality. As 
such, developmental endpoints exhibit congruence between gender and sexual elements, 
or they do not – either typical or atypical. 
  
In response to this, Meyer-Bahlburg notes that there needs to be some additional 
explanation as to why some individuals become homosexual and others become 
“homosexual-plus-transsexual.”440
Other students of Money’s also adopted this “continuum” classification of 
transsexuality when making clinical diagnoses.  While some critics charged that 
 In other words, the general explanatory model is 
incomplete.  However, even if the phenomena are considered to be two distinct 
developmental endpoints, the explanatory model is still incomplete, as it cannot explain 
the precise mechanisms behind the specific mismatches of gendered elements. 
                                                 
439 For instance, an early work of two of Money’s students, Ehrhardt and Meyer-Balhburg, 
describe masculine behavior as characterized by preference for outdoor activities, preference for 
male over female playmates, greater interest in a career than in housewifery, and less interest in 
“parenting rehearsal such as doll play and baby care.” Ehrhardt, A., and Meyer-Bahlburg, Heino 
(1981). "Effects of Prenatal Sex Hormones on Gender-Related Behavior." Science 211(20): 1312 
- 1318. Interestingly, the criterion of “housewifery” is not included in later works – reflecting 
changing conceptions of femininity. 
 
440 Meyer-Bahlburg, H. (1984). "Psychoendocrine Research on Sexual Orientation: Current Status 
and Future Options." Progress in Brain Research 61: 375 - 398. 
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“transsexualism represents a wish, not a diagnosis,”441
 
 and as such should not even be its 
own diagnostic category, much less related to homosexuality, others argued that it should 
be a distinct diagnosis, albeit related to homosexuality.  Howard Baker and Richard 
Green, for instance, assert that: 
Transsexualism is a behavioral phenomenon unique unto itself.  We believe that 
although it is related to other anomalies of sexual orientation and shares features 
in common with them, it can, nevertheless, be differentiated.442
 
 
A fundamental assumption behind this line of thought (and, as we have seen, that 
of Benjamin) is that transsexuality and homosexuality (and any sort of “atypical” psycho-
sexual developmental endpoint) are instances of a mis-match between gendered elements.  
This general notion informed (and informs) the approach to investigating both 
homosexuality and transsexuality.  For instance, quoting a 1862 letter from German 
lawyer and homosexual rights activist Ulrichs, Meyer-Bahlburg claims that Ulrichs’ 
notion of “anima muliebris virili corpori innata (the soul of a woman innate in a male 
body) has been the concept guiding biological explanations of homosexuality since 
then.”443
                                                 
441 Socarides, C. (1970). "Study of the Desire for Sexual Transformation ('Transsexualism"): The 
Plaster of Paris Man." International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 51: 341 - 349.  
  Of course, Meyer-Bahlburg is speaking metaphorically: when it comes to 
biological research, the “soul” or essence of a woman is a physical, rather than a spiritual, 
 
442 Baker, H., and Green, Richard (1970). "Treatment of Transsexualism." Current Psychiatric 
Theory 10.) 
 
443 Meyer-Bahlburg, H. (1984). "Psychoendocrine Research on Sexual Orientation: Current Status 
and Future Options." Progress in Brain Research 61: 375 - 398. 
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entity.  For endocrinologists, naturally, this “essence” is hormones.  For instance, in 
arguing against the hypothesis that the nervous system alone is responsible for individual 
variation, Louis Berman points out that: 
 
It had long been accepted in the inorganic world that differences between 
substances are due to the differences in the chemistry of them.  If they were 
mixtures of more or less similar substances, the differences between them were 
ascribable to differences in the relative amounts of the components of the mixture.  
When it was seen that great differences in the physical and mental make-up and 
reactions could result from a variation in the amount of an internal secretion 
acting in an organism, the analogy was complete.  One could imagine that 
individuals, like all other combinations in the universe, were mixtures of similar 
substances; that individuals were different because of the difference in the amount 
of the substances entering into their composition; and that the most important of 
these substances were the internal secretions, because they, fundamentally, 
controlled the production, distribution and consumption of energy.444
 
   
As we have seen, some of these substances – gonadal hormones – were gendered 
from the beginning.  As such, maleness and femaleness could be explained by male and 
female hormones, respectively.  The vague hypothesis that both homosexuality and 
                                                 
444 Berman, L. (1925). "Anthropology and the Endocrine Glands." Scientific Monthly 21(2): 157 - 
165.  Berman is not the first person to voice this hypothesis.  Sandor Rado describes Krafft-
Ebing’s 1896 theory of homosexuality: 
 
Since the peripheral part of the sexual apparatus [the gonads] is of bisexual disposition, 
this must be true of the central part as well.  Thus one must assume that the cerebrum 
contains male and female centers whose antagonistic action and relative strength 
determine the individual’s sex behavior.  Homosexuality results from the victory of the 
wrong center. 
 
Rado, S. (1940). "A Critical Examination of the Concept of Bisexuality." Psychosomatic 
Medicine 11(4): 459 - 467.  
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transsexuality are the result of mismatched gendered elements acts as a foundational 
assumption for the current hypothesis that both phenomena are the result of central 
nervous system pseudohermaphroditism.445
This practice (of Money’s) was contentious from the start.  One commentator, 
Frank Acosta, notes that, while some researchers regard transsexualism to be at “the 
extreme end of the homosexual spectrum”: 
 
 
The overwhelming findings from current research on homosexuality indicate that 
neither the majority of male homosexuals nor the majority of female homosexuals 
identify themselves with the opposite sex.446
 
 
Thus, despite the “femininity” of male-to-female transsexuals (as Meyer-
Bahlburg conceives it), it is a specific aspect of femininity – sexual attraction to males – 
that is the defining criterion of male homosexuality.447
                                                 
445 See, for instance, Herbert, J. (2008). "Who Do We Think We Are: The Brain and Gender 
Identity." Brain 131(12): 3115 - 3117. 
 This modular approach to the 
 
446 Acosta, F. (1975). "Etiology and Treatment of Homosexuality: A Review." Archives of Sexual 
Behavior 4(1): 9 - 29. 
 
447 Eleanor Maccoby, in her discussion of the multiple meanings attached to the notions of 
masculinity and femininity, embodies this type of thinking.  Her third meaning of masculinity and 
femininity deals with attraction between the sexes: 
 
Probably the most essential ingredient in this definition of masculinity and femininity is 
that the person should not be, or seem to be, homosexual.  Men known to be homosexual 
may be seen as effeminate even if they do not use feminine gestures, dress, or speech 
factors. 
 
Maccoby, E. (1987). The Varied Meanings of "Masculine" and "Feminine". 
Masculinity/Femininity: BAsic Perspectives. J. Reinisch, et. al. New York, Oxford University 
Press. I: 227-239. 
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gendered brain supports the competing elaborated hypothesis about the etiology of 
gender identity, to be discussed in the following section.  
Not all researchers think that this emphasis upon femininity provides insight into 
the etiology of either homosexuality or transsexualism.  In his critical review of Meyer-
Bahlburg’s psychohormonal surveys, John De Cecco argues that Money and his students 
tacitly use the folk wisdom that equates male homosexuality with femininity as the basis 
for their biological theories.448
 
  Even though it is apparent that not all male homosexuals 
are feminine in either appearance or behavior, there must be some hidden femininity to 
account for the orientation towards men.  Following Dörner, the hidden femininity lies in 
the hypothalamus (discussed in the previous chapter).  De Cecco, critical of both this 
underlying assumption and the conceptual vagueness it entails, writes: 
The equation of femininity with male homosexuality is most graphically 
portrayed in the conceptualization of homosexuality in relation to bisexuality and 
                                                 
448 Vern Bullough also notes that folk wisdom has long linked feminine behavior in boys with 
latent homosexuality, although, unlike De Cecco, he does not consider this to be a conceptual 
mistake.  
Bullough, V. (2000). "Transgenderism and the Concept of Gender." The International Journal of 
Transgenderism 4(3): 1 - 10. Several studies confirmed this link, one of the more important being 
a longitudinal one by Richard Green (1987): 
 
Green studied fifty feminine boys over a fifteen year time span.  The boys were decidedly 
feminine as toddlers, so much so that their parents sought professional help at the UCLA 
Center for Gender studies.  The boy children consistently cross dressed very early (94 
percent by age six), played with dolls, preferred girl playmates, and indicated they wished 
they have been girls.  Approximately 75 percent of the feminine boys became 
homosexual as adults compared with only one homosexual man in the fifty member 
control group.  Note, however, that not all the effeminate boys became homosexual, 
which again indicates that there are many variables involved.  None them were 
transvestites or transsexuals although one had flirted with the idea of surgical change. 
 
Bullough, V. (2000). "Transgenderism and the Concept of Gender." The International Journal of 
Transgenderism 4(3): 1 - 10. 
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transsexuality.  My interpretation of this position is that biological femaleness in 
males is not unlike Krafft-Ebing’s (1886/1906) taint: If you have just a little of it, 
you are a bisexual; if you have a lot (i.e., more femininity than masculinity), 
you’re a homosexual; and if you’re drowning in it, you are a transsexual.449
  
 
In spite of such objections, the concept of central nervous system pseudo-
hermaphroditism serves as the foundation for explanations of deviations of psychosexual 
development, regardless of how one conceptualizes transsexuality.  To put it in normative 
terms, male homosexuals and male-to-female transsexuals, in light of this pseudo-
hermaphroditism, fail to be biological exemplars of masculinity.  Under both 
conceptualizations, the goal of scientists researching the etiology of transsexualism is to 
determine which aspect of normal development goes awry.450
Because of this, Acosta, like Gooren after him, cautions researchers to sharply 
distinguish between the two phenomena: 
    
 
Critical differences between homosexuals and transsexuals lie in the repeated 
findings that, unlike homosexuals, transsexuals (1) have a conviction that they 
                                                 
449 De Cecco, J. (1987). "Homosexuality's Brief Recovery: From Sickness to Health and Back 
Again." The Journal of Sex Research 23(1): 106-129. 
 
450 Mormont claims that: 
 
The aetiology of transsexualism remains uncertain in spite of the hypotheses that, for 40 
years, have attempted to mark out the factors that interfering with biological, 
psychological and social processes of the construction of gender will explain the 
appearance of transsexualism. 
 
Mormont, M., and Legros, J. (2001). "A Psycho-Endocrinological Overview of Transsexualism." 
European Journal of Endocrinology 145: 365 - 376. 
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belong to the opposite sex and (2) have a strong compulsion to behave like and to 
have the body of the opposite sex, and to be accepted as one of its members.451
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
For those who do not consider transsexuality to be a version of homosexuality, the 
same broad endocrine theory explains two different phenomena, not just two versions of 
the same phenomenon.  The distinguishing factor between these two appeals to the 
organization/activation model is the generality versus modularity of the brain’s gender 
acquisition.  This is discussed in the final section of this chapter.  
The main blow to the learning theory of gender identity came not from 
definitional issues, but from the discovery of genetic males who, as a result of an enzyme 
deficiency, did not develop the (external) male phenotype until puberty, and consequently 
were raised as girls.  At the time of puberty, however, most of these individuals adopted a 
male gender identity.  This finding, and others that lead scientists to question the learning 
theory, will be discussed in the following section. 
 
 
V. Demise of the Learning Theory 
                                                 
451 Acosta, F. (1975). "Etiology and Treatment of Homosexuality: A Review." Archives of Sexual 
Behavior 4(1): 9 - 29.   
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In 1974, a team of researchers working in the Dominican Republic reported a 
form of pseudohermaphroditism previously unknown to the scientific community.452
In order for external male genitalia to develop in utero, testosterone must be 
converted by the enzyme 5-alpha-reductase to form dihydrotestosterone.
  In 
an isolated community, some girls, upon reaching puberty, developed (external) male 
genitalia and secondary sex features.  The team of scientists (lead by Julianne Imperato-
McGinley) called in to investigate hypothesized that this phenomenon was the result of 
improper testosterone metabolism during embryonic development. 
453
                                                 
452 It should be noted that Witschi, in 1942, briefly describes cases that could be incidences of 5-
alpha-reductase deficiency, although the mechanisms were completely unknown.  Witschi, E., 
and Mengert, William (1942). "Endocrine Studies on Human Hermaphrodites and Their Bearing 
on the Interpretation of Homosexuality." Journal of Clinical Endocrinology 2(5): 279-286.  
  The 
researchers speculated that individuals who experienced this “sex-change” were deficient 
in this enzyme.  However, because the internal genitalia (including the undescended 
testes) were masculine, androgens secreted by the pituitary gland at puberty caused 
masculine differentiation.  Subsequent testing proved that these individuals were indeed 
deficient in the reductase enzyme. 
453 Imperato-McGinley et. al. note: 
 
Within the last 10 years, investigators have shown that testosterone may act as a 
prehormone, that is, in specific androgen-dependent target areas, it is converted by the 
microsomal enzyme ∆4-steroid 5-alpha-reductase to form 5-alpha-dihydrotestosterone, a 
more potent androgen.  It has been demonstrated in human fetuses that, at the time of 
sexual differentiation in utero, dihydrotestosterone formation occurs in the urogenital 
sinus, urogenital tubercle, and urogenital swellings, but dihydrotestosterone formation 
does not occur in the Wolffian anlage until after differentiation has occurred. 
 
Imperato-McGinley, J., et. al. (1974). "Steroid 5-alpha-Reductase Deficiency in Man: An 
Inherited Form of Male Pseudohermaphroditism." Science 186(4170): 1213-1215.  As discussed 
in Chapter 3, the primary brain “masculinizing” hormone is estradiol, often converted from 
testosterone by aromatase. 
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For many behavioral endocrinologists, the most significant finding was not the 
new form of pseudohermaphroditism, but the fact that affected individuals adopted a 
male gender identity upon puberty, in some cases marrying women.  Imperato-McGinley 
and her colleagues also found this to be remarkable: 
 
Psychosexual orientation (postpubertally) is male, and this is of considerable 
interest, since the sex of rearing in 18 of the affected males was female.  Despite 
the sex of rearing, the affected were able to change gender identity at the time of 
puberty.  They consider themselves as males and have a libido directed towards 
the opposite sex.  Thus, male sex drive appears to be testosterone related and not 
dihydrotestosterone related, and the sex of rearing as female appears to have a 
lesser role in the presence of two masculinizing events – testosterone exposure in 
utero and again at puberty with the development of a male phenotype.454
 
 
This initial interpretation, focusing on orientation and sex drive, threatened, but 
did not necessarily invalidate, Money’s learning theory.  However, Imperato-McGinley 
and colleagues subsequently changed the focus of their reports to emphasize the 
development of gender identity over that of sexual orientation, claiming, for instance: 
 
In a laissez-faire environment, when the sex of rearing is contrary to the 
testosterone-mediated biological sex, the biological sex prevails if the normal 
testosterone-induced activation of puberty is permitted to occur.  Thus, it appears 
that the extent of androgen (i.e., testosterone) exposure of the brain in utero, 
                                                 
454 Ibid. 
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during the early postnatal period and at puberty has more effect in determining 
male gender identity than does sex of rearing.455
 
 
The finding that gender identity appeared to have a neurological substrate 
threatened the learning theory.  If the roots of gender identity per se are biological, and, 
consequently, transsexualism is not a version of (biologically determined) homosexuality, 
then, presumably, a structural neural difference underlies this functional outcome.  In 
other words, a biological substrate for gender identity, distinct from that for sexual 
orientation, must be present in the mind.456
The effect of this study was electric.  Although the initial report conflated gender 
identity (in Benjamin’s sense) with sexual orientation, the very fact that some individuals 
“switched” genders upon reaching puberty was seen as a serious blow to Money’s 
learning theory,
 This conjecture – that gender identity, like 
sexual orientation – is organized in the womb serves as the foundation for contemporary 
research into its etiology.  
457
                                                 
455 Imperato-McGinley, J., et. al. (1979). "Male Pseudohermaphroditism Secondary to 17-beta-
Hydroxysteroid Dehydrogenase Deficiency: Gender Role Change with Puberty." Journal of 
Clinical Endocrinology and Metabolism 49(3): 391 - 395. 
 and provided further support for the organization/activation model. 
  
456 Citing Gooren, van Goozen et. al. (1995) state: 
 
Thus far, no abnormalities have been found in the sexual differentiation of the transsexual 
as manifested by the chromosomal patterns, the gonads, secondary sex characteristics and 
hormone levels.  Nevertheless, their persistent and compelling feeling of belonging to the 
opposite sex might have a brain substrate. 
 
van Goozen, S., et. al. (1995). "Gender Differences in Behaviour: Activating Effects of Cross-Sex 
Hormones." Psychoneuroendocrinology 20(4): 343 - 363. 
 
457  Rubin et. al. (1981) report that: 
 
Imperato-McGinley et. al. [1977 and 1979] described pubertal shifts from female to male 
gender identity in an interrelated group of male pseudohermaphrodites from two rural 
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The use of 5-alpha-reductase deficiency to support the biological theory of gender 
identity etiology has come under attack in recent years for three reasons: many 
individuals with this deficiency are identified at birth as “guevedoches” (literally, “eggs 
at twelve”) and so are not raised unambiguously as girls; not all affected individuals 
adopt an unambiguous male identity; and being male in these communities confers a 
distinct advantage.  In other words, the social environment was not laisse faire. 
The very fact that there existed (and exist in one of the two other communities 
discovered to contain 5-alpha-reductase deficient individuals) a local, ontological, 
category for said individuals indicates that 5-alpha reductase individuals are not raised 
unambiguously as either male or female.  Such individuals have what contemporary 
endocrinologists would term “ambiguous” genitalia.  The fact that these village 
communities could label individuals with 5-alpha reductase deficiency from birth as 
failing to be exemplars of either masculinity or femininity indicates that the purely 
                                                                                                                                                 
communities in the Dominican Republic and inferred that testosterone exposure during 
the prenatal, perinatal and, especially, pubertal stages of development is the most 
significant factor in the normal differentiation of male gender identity.  In contrast to this 
hormonal theory, the more widely held contemporary view is that the sex of rearing, as 
established by early parental and social influences, is the primary determinant of gender 
identity. [Citing Money 1972 and 1977] 
 
Rubin, R., et. al. (1981). "Postnatal Gonadal Steroid Effects on Human Behavior." Science 
211(4488): 1318 - 1324. In his report on 5-alpha-reductase deficient individuals in Papau-New 
Guinea, anthropologist Gilbert Herdt notes: 
 
The Dominican Republic hermaphrodites posed a major challenge to the break-through 
theory of Money and the Hampsons (1955).  They argued that gender identity 
development is determined by sex assignment and rearing, not by the gonads, a 
conclusion which Ellis (1945) had exhaustively presaged in the literature on 
hermaphroditism. 
 
Herdt, G. (1990). "Mistaken Gender: 5-Alpha Reductase Hermaphroditism and Biological 
Reductionism in Sexual Identity Reconsidered." American Anthropologist 92(2): 433-446. 
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dichotomous categories of male versus female are not sufficient to analyze the local 
ethnological response.458
In addition to questions about the clarity of assigned gender, follow-up studies on 
the original subjects indicate that not all adopted an uncomplicated male gender identity.  
Later, more in-depth investigations revealed problematic assumptions and 
methodological errors: 
 
 
Imperator-McGinley et. al. stated that adequate post-pubertal psychosexual data 
were obtained from 18 of the 19 subjects unambiguously raised as girls, and of 
these 18 subjects, 17 had successfully changed to a male gender identity and 16 to 
a male gender role.  However, two of the 18 subjects were dead at the time of the 
reports, and, of the 16 living subjects, one maintained a female gender identity 
and role despite a masculinized phenotype . . . a second continued to dress as a 
woman although the investigators regarded his gender identity as unambiguously 
male; a third lived alone in the hills, even though he was reported to have 
assumed an unambiguous male role.459
 
 
Because the ethnography and interview data supplied by Imperato-McGinley et. 
al. are sketchy at best, the claim that males with 5-alpha-reductase deficiency were raised 
as “normal” girls but then became “normal” men lacks merit.460
                                                 
458 For an in-depth analysis of this issues, see Herdt, G. (1990). "Mistaken Gender: 5-Alpha 
Reductase Hermaphroditism and Biological Reductionism in Sexual Identity Reconsidered." 
American Anthropologist 92(2): 433-446. in which the author analyzes 5-alpha reductase 
deficiency in both two-sex and three-sex cultural systems. 
 In other words, genetic 
 
459 Rubin, R., et. al. (1981). "Postnatal Gonadal Steroid Effects on Human Behavior." Science 
211(4488): 1318 - 1324. 
 
460 In spite of their strong conclusions, Imperato-McGinley and colleagues (1979) inform the 
reader that: 
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males with 5-alpha-reductase deficiency fail to be exemplars of gender – either male or 
female. 
In addition to the deficiencies of the empirical claims, one can argue that social 
forces can influence significantly the adoption of a gender identity.  Dominican society 
(and all of the other societies in which 5-alpha-reductase deficiency are found) is highly 
patriarchal; an intersex or pseudohermaphroditic individual has much to gain and little to 
lose by adopting a male gender identity.461
In spite of these objections, the fact that most of these individuals change gender 
at the time of puberty is still cited as evidence for the biological theory – of both sexual 
orientation and gender identity, although more frequently for the latter.   This shows (1) 
the rhetorical power of the organization/activation model and (2) the related assumption 
that transsexuality is related to homosexuality. 
 
Arguing against Money’s learning theory of gender identity, Jean Wilson writes: 
                                                                                                                                                 
[V]illagers are aware of the existence of the hermaphroditic condition in local villages, 
even though the ontology of the guevedoche is never described.  We are also told that the 
prepubertal subjects “showed self-concern over their true gender”; between the ages of 7 
and 12 anatomical abnormality made them aware that they were “different.” 
 
From Herdt, G. (1990). "Mistaken Gender: 5-Alpha Reductase Hermaphroditism and Biological 
Reductionism in Sexual Identity Reconsidered." American Anthropologist 92(2): 433-446. 
  
461 John Money, highly critical of the Dominican Republic study and the threat it posed to his 
learning theory, points out: 
 
Male and female role stereotypes are rigidly dichotomous in a rural Latin-American 
culture.  To be a mannish-appearing woman without breasts, without menses, and without 
fertility is to be unmarriageable in a society where the unmarried daughter is a family and 
community liability.  The common-sense conclusion for all concerned, the priest and 
other village authorities included, is to endorse and legally accept a change of gender 
status, provided the individual concerned does not repudiate it. 
 
Money, J. (1981). "The Development of Sexuality and Eroticism in Humankind." The Quarterly 
Review of Biology 56(4): 379-404. 
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This belief that hormones do not play a role in controlling human gender role 
behavior persists despite a large body of evidence to the contrary, indicating that 
androgens play an important role in human male gender identity/behavior.  This 
evidence stems largely from the work of Imperato-McGinley and her colleagues, 
who documented that genetic males . . . may change gender role behavior to male 
at or after the time of expected puberty.462
  
 
If Money’s learning theory was to be salvaged, he would have to demonstrate an 
example of an individual adopting a gender identity at odds with his or her genetic sex – 
without any complicating factors such as pseudohermaphroditism.  Just such a case is 
discussed in the next section.  
 
 
 VI. The “John/Joan” Case  
 
Not all researchers were convinced by Money’s learning theory of gender 
identity, even before the publication of the Dominican study.  One such person was 
Milton Diamond who, as an upstart graduate student in 1965, published a paper arguing 
that gender identity results from prenatal hormonal exposure, not post-natal rearing.  
Because Diamond’s paper drew upon widely accepted endocrinology research, and not 
just a limited set of human “accidents of nature,” it provided a challenge to – even if not a 
definitive argument against – Money’s learning theory. 
                                                 
462 Wilson, J. D. (1999). "The Role of Androgens in Male Gender Role Behavior." Endocrine 
Reviews 20(5). 
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Diamond argued that pseudo-hermaphroditic children could be, in light of their 
condition, truly “bi-potential” in terms of psycho-sexual development, but this did not 
imply that hormonally average children were so.  In order to provide evidence for the 
latter (i.e., Money’s learning theory) there would have to exist at least one case of an 
unambiguously male infant raised to become unambiguously female in terms of gender 
identity.463
In spite of the difference in their professional stature, Diamond’s last point stung.  
The truth of that matter was that none of Money’s “successful” gender acquisitions had 
occurred in non-hermaphroditic or pseudohermaphroditic individuals.  Money, in order to 
conclusively prove his theory, needed a genetically and hormonally normal infant upon 
which to experiment.  The next year, a couple came to Money’s Psychohormonal 
Research Unit at Johns Hopkins University who presented Money with the golden 
opportunity to conduct just such an experiment.  Linda and Frank Reimer, the parents of 
16 month-old identical twin boys, faced a predicament.  One of their children, at the age 
of 8 months, had undergone a botched circumcision that completely destroyed his penis.   
   
 Money suggested that the child be raised as a girl.  After an initial surgery to 
remove the testes, Money and his colleagues encouraged the parents to dress and treat 
“Joan” as a girl, with further surgeries and estrogen to follow at the time of puberty.464
                                                 
463 Diamond, M. (1965). "A Critical Evaluation of the Ontogeny of Human Sexual Behavior." 
The Quarterly Review of Biology 40(2): 147-175. 
  
464 In a description of the initial interview with the parents written over ten years later, Money 
writes:  
 
If the parents stood by their decision to reassign the child as a girl, surgeons could 
remove the testicles and construct feminine external genitals immediately.  When she was 
11 or 12 years old, she could be given the female hormones. 
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Both twins traveled to Johns Hopkins at least once a year for the next 12 years for 
observation and study. 
By the time of Imperato-McGinley et. al.’s initial report, Money was able to 
counter this threat to the learning theory by pointing to Joan’s successful adoption of a 
female gender role, while her brother “John” was a typical little boy.465
 
  In an interview 
with Rolling Stone (the only journal – academic or otherwise – to give a full report of the 
John/Joan case) Dr. William Reiner, a child psychologist at Johns Hopkins, says: 
It was the hallmark case.  It was the hallmark case because it was followed and 
written up a number of times by Money and then essentially was the source of his 
statements – and subsequent statements in any of the pediatric textbooks in 
endocrinology, urology, surgery and psychology – that you can reassign the sex of 
a child because it’s the social situation that is the most important.466
 
  
Even after Money lost track of the twins, the John/Joan case was cited in the 
literature as support for the learning theory.  In philosophical terms, it acted as a “crucial 
experiment.” Scientists and researchers took Money’s word for it that Joan’s transition to 
a little girl was smooth and uncomplicated.  Decades later, a team of researchers reported 
on another case of ablatio penis, beginning with a discussion of Money’s guidelines for 
sex-reassignment: 
                                                                                                                                                 
Money, J., and Tucker, Patricia (1975). Sexual Signatures: On Being a Man or a Woman. Boston, 
Little and Brown.  
 
465 See, for instance, Money, J. (1972). Man & Woman, Boy & Girl: The Differentiation and 
Dimorphism of Gender Identity from Conception to Maturity. New York, New American 
Library.  
 
466 Colapinto, J. (1997). "The True Story of John/Joan." Rolling Stone Magazine 775: 54 - 97. 
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J. Money used these guidelines in a case of a biologically normal male infant (one 
of a pair of monozygotic twins) whose penis was accidentally ablated during a 
circumcision at the age of 7 months.  The decision to reassign the infant boy to 
the female sex was made at 17 months, with surgical castration and initial genital 
reconstruction occurring at 21 months.  Money reported follow-up data on this 
child through the age of 9 years.  [John/Joan and family did not stop attending the 
Johns Hopkins clinic until the twins were over 12 years old.  Conflicting dates 
and timelines are one of the factors bedeviling discussions of the John/Joan case.]  
Although the girl was described as having many “tomboyish” behavioral traits, a 
female gender identity had apparently differentiated.  Thus, it was concluded that 
gender identity is sufficiently incompletely differentiated at birth as to permit 
successful assignment of a genetic male as a girl, in keeping with the experiences 
of rearing.467
 
 
The John/Joan case served not only as a counterexample to the findings of 
Imperato-McGinley et. al., it reinforced Money’s initial recommendations concerning the 
treatment of individuals with ambiguous genitalia – until 1997. 
Diamond, eager to follow up on the case, finally tracked down Joan.  As it turns 
out, Joan’s gender transition was far from smooth.  In contrast to Money’s glowing 
reports, Joan was a tomboy, refused to wear dresses or play with dolls, and repeatedly 
stated that she wanted to be a boy.  As a final blow, Joan, at the age of fourteen, adopted 
a male gender identity and later underwent operations to remove breast tissue acquired 
                                                 
467 Bradley, S., et. al. (1998). "Experiment of Nurture: Ablatio Penis at 2 Months, Sex 
Reassignment at 7 Months, and a Psychosexual Follow-up in Young Adulthood." Pediatrics 
102(1). 
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through estrogen treatment and a phalloplasty.  Now a he, he eventually married.468
Proponents of the biological theory cite this development as an unambiguous 
triumph of nature over nurture.  A year after Diamond’s electrifying report, an editorial in 
a nursing journal claims: 
 The 
crucial experiment was a failure. 
 
[T]he story [of John/Joan] reverses two beliefs widely held by clinicians: (a) that 
children are psychosexually neutral at birth and (b) that healthy psychosexual 
development depends upon the appearance of the genitals.469
 
 
 In contrast to both scientific narratives – Money’s and Diamond’s – the reality 
was much more cloudy.  It can be argued that Joan was not raised unambiguously as a 
girl, so the gender “switch” was not an either/or case.  In addition, the family’s history of 
mental illness (the father was an alcoholic, the mother a life-long depressive, and both 
twins eventually committed suicide) makes the twins less-than-ideal test subjects.470  
Finally, it is precipitous to base theories of psychosexual development on a single case – 
an observation which almost every article about the case from scientific journals fails to 
make.471
                                                 
468 Diamond, M., and Sigmundson, Keith (1997). "Sex Reassignment at Birth: Long-term Review 
and Clinical Implications." Archives of Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine 151(3). 
 
 
469 Haller, K. (1998). "When John Became Joan." Journal of Obstetric, Gynecologic, and 
Neonatal Nursing 27(1): 11. 
 
470 For more information, see Colapinto, J. (1997). "The True Story of John/Joan." Rolling Stone 
Magazine 775: 54 - 97. Also, Colapinto, J. (2004). Gender Gap: What Were the Real Reasons 
Behind David Reimer's Suicide?, Slate. 2007. 
 
471 In his review of endocrine influences on gender identity, Byne notes that there have been only 
four documented cases of ablatio penis with female gender reassignment before the age of two, 
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 In spite of these complications, the John/Joan case is cited in reviews and 
textbooks as strong evidence that gender identity is innate and determined, at least in part, 
by prenatal hormones.472
 
  This hypothesis underlies theories about the etiology of 
transsexuality. 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 
 While it is not immediately apparent why the organization/activation model 
should apply to transsexuality in the first place, this application makes sense in light of 
the history of the field, as well as prevailing cultural presuppositions about gender 
congruity. 
The categorical confusions surrounding medical and endocrinological 
investigations of transsexuality (and other atypical phenomena) hindered much of the 
early research.  The eventual resolution of these confusions, especially those concerning 
the etiology of gender identity, served to shed light on the relative contributions of 
internal versus external influences on sexual and gendered behavior.    
                                                                                                                                                 
and detailed information is available for only two of these cases. Like many before him, Byne 
discusses the John/Joan case in detail “because of the inordinate impact it has had on the field.” 
Byne, W. (2006). "Developmental Endocrine Influences on Gender Identity: Implications for 
Management of Disorders of Sex Development." The Mount Sinai Journal of Medicine 73(7): 
950-959. 
 
472 For example, in their chapter on sexual development disorders, Conte and Grumbach write 
that studies by Diamond and others “suggest that prenatal exposure to androgen and the presence 
of genes on the Y chromosome can influence gender identity in the individual with ambiguous 
genitalia.” Conte, F., and Grumbach, Melvin (2007). Disorders of Sexual Determination and 
Differentiation. Greenspan's Basic and Clinical Endocrinology. D. Gardner, and Shoback, 
Dolores. New York, McGraw Hill.   
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The endocrinological research into the phenomenon of transsexuality illustrates 
both the unifying power of the organization/activation model as well as the strength of 
mechanistic-inspired research programs.  The unifying power is exemplied by the 
apparently incongruous extention of the model from a crucial resolution about the 
etiology of homosexuality to an explanation of transsexuality.  The notion of psycho-
neural pseudohermaphroditism, so crucial to the solution of the “problem” of 
homosexuality, provided a hypothetical answer (and inspired a research program) to that 
of transsexuality. 
The history of research into the etiology of transsexuality provides strong support 
for my main thesis: that the explanatory power of the organization/activation model lies 
in its ability to explain a host of developmental endpoints.  Both classifications of 
transsexuality – as a version of homosexuality or as a distinct phenomenon – explain it as 
the result of atypical sexual brain development.  As such, both appeal to a Kitcherian 
sense of unification in their attempt to explain the etiology of transsexualism. 
 But the unifying power of the model brings explanatory problems in its wake, 
problems brought to the fore by the phenomenon of transsexuality.  Because both 
conceptions of transsexuality conceive it to be a form of psycho-neural 
pseudohermaphroditism, this general explanation fails to shed light on the specifics of 
two developmental endpoints. 
  Nonetheless, the specificity, or modularity, of femininity acts as a major factor in 
the explanatory power of the organization/activation model in terms of both the etiology 
of (male) homosexuality, (male-to-female) transsexuality and, consequently, (male and 
female) heteronormative behavior. If researchers can discover the mechanisms that lead 
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to these specific developmental endpoints, as opposed to the rather vague explanations 
for the mismatch of gendered elements, than the organization/activation model will be 
able to fulfill its initial explanatory promise. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The early promise of hormones – that they could explain development in a much 
more satisfactory manner than external or genetic factors – set the research agenda for the 
field.  From an initial, heuristic definition, hormones came to be classified in a more 
sophisticated fashion, as members of a particular chemical class. 
But this conceptual and scientific innovation raised explanatory problems, some 
considered more important than others.  Those problems considered crucial were resolved 
in a crucial fashion.  Unlike crucial experiments, crucial resolutions occur in advance of 
unambiguous empirical evidence, determine the disciplinary matrix for the field, and 
appeal explicitly to explanatory unification.  As such, crucial resolutions, and the general 
explanatory models they inspire, constitute a logic of discovery.  The crucial resolution of 
the freemartin problem provided an answer to the lesser problems of timing and media.  
On a more general level, the crucial resolution of the problem of homosexuality provided 
a model that could explain both typical and atypical development. 
But the historical development of the field, especially the monumental adoption of 
the organization/activation model, cannot be explained entirely by the ideal of 
explanation by unification.  As scientists pursued the research agenda set by the 
organization/activation model, its tremendous unificatory promise, initially perceived as 
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its greatest strength, threatened to become its greatest weakness.  This weakness is 
especially apparent with etiological investigations into the phenomenon of transsexuality.  
The goal of scientists within this field has been, and continues to be, to cash out 
the initial predictions of the model in terms of biochemical mechanisms.  While the 
model fulfills the criteria for genuinely explanatory mechanistic models, mechanism per 
se cannot explain the phenomenon of crucial resolutions.  That is, mechanistic 
explanation cannot account satisfactorily for the adoption of general explanatory models.  
Crucial resolutions appeal to unificatory ideals, but set the eventual explanatory 
goal for a field as that of uncovering underlying mechanisms.  As such, I suggest that 
what counts as an explanation in the field of behavioral endocrinology is not a case of the 
same phenomenon being explained in two different ways, one mechanistic and the other 
unificationist, but rather a single explanatory model that explains the phenomena in terms 
of a general, mechanistic schema. 
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